State v. Edmonson, 98-2603.
| Decision Date | 08 September 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-2603.,98-2603. |
| Citation | 86 Ohio St.3d 324,715 NE 2d 131 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. EDMONSON, APPELLEE. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelli K. Norman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Hirt & Hirt and David S. Hirt, for appellee.
David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and John Fenlon, Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Office of the Ohio Public Defender.
Based on the recent changes to the sentencing law in Ohio, minimum sentences are favored for first-time imprisonment and maximum sentences are disfavored generally. For instance, R.C. 2929.14(B) requires a trial court to impose a minimum sentence for first-time imprisonment unless it specifies on the record that the shortest prison term will demean the seriousness of the conduct or will not adequately protect the public from future crime by the offender. And R.C. 2929.14(C) and 2929.19(B)(2)(d) prevent a court from imposing a maximum sentence for a single offense unless the court records findings that give its reasons for selecting the maximum. Edmonson's sentencing raises both of these issues because Edmonson was convicted of a single offense, was faced with imprisonment for the first time, and was sentenced to the maximum term of imprisonment.
R.C. 2929.14(B) R.C. 2929.14(B) reads as follows: "[I]f the court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a felony elects or is required to impose a prison term on the offender and if the offender previously has not served a prison term, the court shall impose the shortest prison term authorized for the offense pursuant to division (A) of this section, unless the court finds on the record that the shortest prison term will demean the seriousness of the offender's conduct or will not adequately protect the public from future crime by the offender or others."
The appellate districts in this state currently hold differing opinions about what information a trial court must include in a sentencing hearing record when imposing a sentence that is longer than the minimum upon an offender expected to receive the minimum sentence according to the presumption in R.C. 2929.14(B). The appellate debate in this state centers on the scope of the statutory phrase "finds on the record."
We construe this statute to mean that unless a court imposes the shortest term authorized on a felony offender who has never served a prison term, the record of the sentencing hearing must reflect that the court found that either or both of the two statutorily sanctioned reasons for exceeding the minimum term warranted the longer sentence.
R.C. 2929.14(B) does not require that the trial court give its reasons for its finding that the seriousness of the offender's conduct will be demeaned or that the public will not be adequately protected from future crimes before it can lawfully impose more than the minimum authorized sentence. By contrasting this statute with other related sentencing statutes, we deduce that the verb "finds" as used in this statute means that the court must note that it engaged in the analysis and that it varied from the minimum for at least one of the two sanctioned reasons. With other sentencing statutes, the General Assembly explicitly demands that courts give reasons. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) requires a trial court to "make a finding that gives its reasons for selecting the sentence imposed." (Emphasis added.) In R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(b), the General Assembly requires a court to provide a finding and an explanation by stating that the court shall set forth "the basis of the findings it made." We discern from the difference in the language of these sections within the same chapter and on the same subject—sentencing—that had the General Assembly intended the R.C. 2929.14(B) finding to include reasons, it would have explicitly expressed that intent as it did in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2).
Our deduction is buttressed by other language in the sentencing statutes. The phraseology in R.C. 2953.08(A)(2), for example, supports the view that the statutory purpose is fulfilled when a court notes that it has considered the statutory criteria and specifies which of the given bases warrants its decision to vary from the preferred minimum sentence. It reads that a defendant may appeal as a matter of right if "the court did not specify at sentencing that it found one or more factors." (Emphasis added.) And likewise, the text of R.C. 2953.08(G)(1)(b) ratifies the view that in enacting the new sentencing laws, the General Assembly only sought to confirm that courts considered the statutory requirements by stating that a defendant may obtain certain relief if "the court did not specify in the finding it makes at sentencing that it found one or more of the factors specified." (Emphasis added.) The structure of the various sentencing statutes suggests that the General Assembly approached felony sentencing by mandating a record reflecting that judges considered certain factors and presumptions to confirm that the court's decision-making process included all of the statutorily required sentencing considerations.
Edmonson contends that construing the statute to require findings without also requiring the court to articulate its reasoning will hamper appellate review, and that the appellate courts will be unnecessarily forced to review the entire record. But because R.C. 2953.08(F) explicitly obligates the appellate courts to review the record, we discount this argument.
Having determined that a trial court sentencing an offender to his first imprisonment must specify on the record that one or both reasons allowed by R.C. 2929.14(B) justify a sentence longer than the minimum, we next assess whether the trial court did so in this case. The record shows that prior to imposing the maximum sentence, the court noted the following:
In the judgment entry, the trial court stated:
Although one...
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...therefore, a court is not authorized to exceed the shortest prison term unless it makes the additional findings. State v. Edmonson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326, 715 N.E.2d 131 (findings required, reasons not); State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463, 2003-Ohio-4165, 793 N.E.2d 473 (findings req......
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...adequately protected from future crimes before it can lawfully impose more than the minimum authorized sentence." State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 715 N.E.2d 131, 1999-Ohio-110, syllabus. Rather, "the trial court merely has to state, somewhere on the record, that one or both of the fin......
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