State v. Edmunds

• Decision Date: 17 November 1904
• Citation: 127 Iowa 333,101 N.W. 431
• Parties: STATE v. EDMUNDS.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

127 Iowa 333

101 N.W. 431

STATE

v.EDMUNDS.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 17, 1904.

Appeal from District Court, Wright County; J. H. Richard, Judge.

Defendant was indicted for practicing medicine as an itinerant physician without a license. He demurred to the indictment, and his demurrer was sustained, and the case dismissed. The state appeals. Reversed.Charles W. Mullan, Atty. Gen., Lawrence De Graff, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Sylvester Flynn, Co. Atty., for the State.

David Evans, for appellee.

DEEMER, C. J.

The indictment charges that the defendant, a nonresident of the state of Iowa, did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously practice medicine, and assume the duties of and publicly profess to be a physician, and did then and there unlawfully attempt and profess to treat, heal, and cure diseases, injuries, and ailments by certain appliances and methods, namely, by dieting his patients, causing them to take certain exercises, and to wear glasses or spectacles which he furnished; that the said J. Wilson Edmunds did then and there go from house to house, from place to place, and by circular letters and advertisements solicit persons to meet him at other places than his office at the place of his residence for treatment, and did, for a money consideration, while so practicing as an itinerant physician, treat and attempt to cure and heal diseases, injuries, and ailments; and that the said defendant did not then have, and has never, procured from the State Board of Medical Examiners, a license authorizing him to practice medicine or surgery as an itinerant physician within the state of Iowa, neither has he ever applied for or paid for such a license. The material parts of the statutes (Code 1897) on which it is based read as follows: Section 2579 defines “physician,” “practice of medicine,” etc., as follows: “Any person shall be held as practicing medicine, surgery or obstetrics or to be a physician within the meaning of this chapter who shall publicly profess to be a physician, surgeon or obstetrician, and assume the duties, or who shall make a practice of prescribing or prescribing and furnishing medicine for the sick, or who shall publicly profess to cure or heal.” This section also contains this further provision: “But it shall not be construed to apply to physicians as herein defined who have been in practice in this state for five consecutive years.” Section 2580 provides a penalty to be imposed upon “any person who shall practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics in the state without first having obtained and filed for record the certificate therein required.” Section 2581 defines an “itinerant physician” as follows: “Every physician practicing medicine, surgery or obstetrics, or professing or attempting to treat, cure or heal diseases, ailments or injuries, by any medicine, appliance or method, who goes from place to place, shall be considered an itinerant physician.” This section also provides for a license fee of $250 per annum, the same being payable into the state treasury for the use of the state of Iowa. Such license may issue only to such as hold a certificate from the State Board of Medical Examiners. The demurrer was upon the grounds (1) that the indictment is uncertain in its terms, and bad for duplicity; (2) that the facts stated do not constitute an offense under the laws of this state; (3) that section 2581 applies only to persons properly described as physicians, who already hold state certificates; and (4) that section 2581 does not properly come under the title, “Of the practice of Medicine.”

The principal question for discussion is, do the acts charged in the indictment constitute an offense under the laws of this state? And this, of necessity, involves a construction of the statutes quoted.

The state contends that the indictment practically follows the language of section 2581, and that these statutes, properly construed, cover the case made by the indictment. The charge is that defendant, being a nonresident, assumed the duties of, and publicly professed to be, a physician, and did attempt and profess to heal and cure diseases by dieting his patients, and causing them to take certain exercises and to wear glasses furnished by him; that he went about, and in various ways solicited persons to meet him for treatment, and did, while so practicing as an itinerant physician, treat and attempt to cure injuries, diseases, etc. While he was thus charged with being an itinerant physician who was attempting to practice without a license, the means used by him for affecting cures are set out; and we have to inquire, does the doing of these things in the manner charged constitute an offense under our statutes? In arriving at a correct conclusion on this branch of the case, it may be well to quote the following from section 2594 of the Code, which related to itinerant vendors of drugs: “All those who by any method publicly profess to treat and cure diseases, injuries or deformities are to be considered itinerant vendors of drugs.” This, of course, as will be observed from a reading of the entire section, applies to those who vend drugs, nostrums, ointments, or appliances of any kind for the treatment of diseases or injuries. It was not sought to convict defendant under this section, and we refer to it in order to arrive at a proper interpretation to be placed on the other statutes quoted. Defendant would not be guilty under these sections because he sold eyeglasses for defective eyes, although he might, perhaps, be held under section 2594, although on this point we do not at this time make any pronouncement. But the question here is, do the facts recited make defendant an itinerant physician, under sections 2579, 2580, and 2581? Section 2579 defines “physicians” and the “practice of medicine,” and the allegations of the indictment clearly bring the defendant within the first and third classes of persons named therein. But it is contended that as defendant did not profess or attempt to cure by any medicine, appliance, or method similar to medicine, but by dieting his patients, etc., his acts do not come within the prohibitions of section 2581 of the Code. The question here is a narrow one, and depends wholly upon the construction to be given the words “medicine, appliance, or method.” Do they mean a medicine or drug, or something administered as a medicine or drug would be? We think this is too narrow a construction. An appliance can hardly be said to be a medicine or drug, and a method may or may not involve the administration of any substance, either internally or externally. True, when general terms follow specific words of a like nature, the general terms are presumed to embrace things and methods of the kind...