State v. Edwards, 22808.

• Decision Date: 12 March 1931
• Docket Number: 22808.
• Citation: 295 P. 1017,161 Wash. 268
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CHAPMAN v. EDWARDS et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

295 P. 1017

161 Wash. 268

STATE ex rel. CHAPMAN v. EDWARDS et al.

No. 22808.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 12, 1931

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Adam Beeler, Judge.

Mandamus proceeding by the State, on the relation of Harry Chapman against Frand Edwards and others. From a judgment dismissing the action, relator appeals.

Affirmed.

Guy E. Dunning and George E. Flood, both of Seattle, for appellant.

A. C Van Soelen and Glen E. Wilson, both of Seattle, for respondents.

MAIN J.

By this action, the relator sought a writ of mandamus directing the board of trustees of the firemen's relief and pension fund of the city of Seattle to retire him upon a pension. To the amended affidavit and application for the writ, the board demurred and answered. The demurrer was sustained, and, the relator refusing to plead further, judgment was entered dismissing the action, from which he appeals.

The facts are these: The appellant became a member of the fire department of the city of Seattle January 1, 1921. July 17 1922, he was injured while in the performance of his duties as a member of the department. As a result of the injury, he was in the hospital for some weeks, and did not return to active duty for approximately five and one-half months, or January 1, 1923. December 20, 1925, the appellant, while performing duties in the fire department, injured his back in the region of the injury received July 17, 1922, aggravating the old injury, and causing him to retire from active duty for a period of eighty-one days.

The board allowed him full pay for sixteen days of this period, and placed him on the permanent disability list for the remaining sixty-five days, allowing him half pay for the latter period. March 10, 1926, the appellant again returned to active duty, and subsequently did not apply for retirement. In April, 1927, he was, for cause, dismissed from the department. May 11, 1928, he made application to the board for a pension based upon his disability received in the line of duty, but no action was taken upon this application. May 7, 1929, he again made application for a pension, and the board declined to grant the application. August 2, 1929, at a regular meeting, without hearing evidence in support of the appellant's claim, the board decided that appellant was, as a matter of fact, totally and permanently disabled in the line of duty, and entitled to a pension; but, solely because of a question of law, it could not then grant a pension, and requested the Seattle civil service department to reinstate him in the fire department in order to eliminate the question of law which then prevented the board from granting the pension. The civil service commission declined to make the reinstatement, believing that it had no right to do so. December 1, 1929, the appellant and his attorney presented themselves in response to an invitation by the board of trustees of the firemen's relief and pension fund, prepared to present the appellant's claim for a pension, but the board declined to hear them or permit them to present evidence. March 3, 1930, the appellant filed his affidavit and application for writ of mandate in this action, and subsequently, as above indicated, the demurrer thereto was sustained, and the alternative writ, which had previously been issued, was quashed. By this action, the relator sought an order directing the board of trustees of the firemen's relief and pension fund to grant him a pension, as required by law, and retire him as and from the date of his separation from the service.

The first question is whether the superior court had the power or authority to review the action of the board.

Section 9571, Rem. Comp. Stat., which is one of the sections of the Firemen's Relief and Pension Fund Law, in part provides as follows: 'Said board shall hear and decide all applications for such relief or pensions under this act, and its decisions on such applications shall be final and conclusive and not subject to revision or reversal except by the board.'

By this statute, the action of the board is, in plain language, made final and conclusive, and it is expressly provided that the ruling thereof shall not be subject to revision or repeal except by the board. In State ex rel. Criswell v. Board of Trustees, 93 Wash. 468, 161 P. 361, 362, it was held that, under the provisions of the Firemen's Relief and Pension Fund Law, providing that the board of trustees of the firemen's relief fund should hear and decide all applications for relief or pensions under the act, and that its decisions on such applications should be final and conclusive on the courts, mandamus would not lie to inquire into the correctness of the ruling of the board, or review its action in denying an application for permanent relief under the act. In that case, the widow of a deceased firemen filed with the board a claim for the sum of $1,000, payable by the terms of the act to a widow of a fireman who had served as such for two years, and who died from natural causes. Her claim was disallowed by the board, and she applied for a writ of mandamus in the superior court to enforce the allowance to the claim. The court denied the application on the ground that the action of the board thereon was final and conclusive. From...