State v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 07 February 2017
• Docket Number: ED 104090
• Citation: 510 S.W.3d 374
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. William EDWARDS, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

510 S.W.3d 374

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.William EDWARDS, Appellant.

ED 104090

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION FOUR .

Filed: February 7, 2017

Kathryn B. Parrish, 6642 Clayton Road, Suite 209, St. Louis, MO 63117, for appellant.

Josh Hawley, Evan J. Buchheim, PO Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102, for respondent.

Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., Judge

Introduction

William Edwards (Defendant) appeals the judgment entered upon his convictions of two counts of assault in the second degree, two counts of armed criminal action, one count of resisting arrest, and one count of driving while revoked. He argues that his two convictions for assault resulting from the same act violate his right to freedom from double jeopardy. He also contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. We affirm.

Background

Defendant waived a jury trial on the above charges. The evidence at his bench trial, in the light most favorable to the judgment, was the following.¹ On July 5, 2105, Sergeant Paul Anderson (Sergeant Anderson) was working at a DWI checkpoint, where it was his task to locate any vehicles turning around or trying to avoid the checkpoint before reaching it. He saw a dark-colored Mercury turn around before reaching the checkpoint and then accelerate away from the checkpoint at a high rate of speed. Sergeant Anderson immediately pulled into the street behind the Mercury, activated his lights and sirens, and attempted to stop the vehicle. The driver of the Mercury, later identified to be Defendant, did not stop.

Sergeant Anderson followed the Mercury and observed it go through a red light without stopping, traveling at speeds up to 70 miles per hour on a street with a speed limit of 30 miles per hour. After turning onto a different street, the Mercury reached speeds of 90 miles per hour and was crossing over the center lane of the road. Defendant drove the car through another red light while on the left side of the road. At one point, Defendant had to stop the Mercury due to traffic backed up at a red light. Sergeant Anderson pulled up behind the Mercury, exited the police vehicle, walked over to the Mercury, and attempted to take Defendant into custody. The driver's side door handle of the Mercury was locked, and Defendant continued trying to move the vehicle around traffic. The stoplight turned green and traffic started to flow again, so Sergeant Anderson returned to his police vehicle and continued following Defendant.

As Sergeant Anderson was following Defendant eastbound at a speed of approximately 74 miles per hour, he saw Defendant go through a red light at an intersection without attempting to stop. Another vehicle came through the intersection from the south at the same time and collided with the Mercury. Defendant's vehicle spun to the north, up onto a sidewalk and into a yard, struck a tree, and became tangled with a fence. The other vehicle spun eastbound, rolled a bit south, and came to rest against the curb.

Sergeant Anderson saw Defendant inside his vehicle trying to get out through the front passenger door. When Defendant saw Sergeant Anderson he tried to go back into the vehicle. Sergeant Anderson was able to put one handcuff on Defendant, and backup officers arrived and helped get Defendant out of the vehicle. Sergeant Anderson and some other officers went to the other vehicle and saw two women, neither of whom were moving. The driver, Pierra Hathaway (Hathaway), was hanging out of the driver's side door where the window was broken. Sergeant Anderson did not have any contact with the passenger, Shawnte Champ (Champ).

Hathaway's mother, Maria Fonville (Fonville), testified at Defendant's trial that she received a call from the hospital that night regarding her daughter. Fonville went to the hospital and found Hathaway in a coma with a bolt driven into her brain. Hathaway was in a coma for three weeks, and her condition at the time of trial was that she had sustained a spinal cord injury and brain damage, leaving her with the cognitive ability of a 10–year-old. At the time of trial, Hathaway had to use a walker to get around, and she was no longer able to take care of her two children or provide any income for her family as she had previously. At trial, Champ testified that she was not able to remember the moment of impact, but she testified that she suffered a lacerated spleen, a broken wrist, a broken jaw, and head injuries because of the accident.

The trial court found Defendant guilty in Counts I and III of second-degree assault, one related to Hathaway and one related to Champ, for which the court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of 15 years' imprisonment. The trial court also found Defendant guilty in Counts II and IV of the accompanying charges of armed criminal action. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 15 years' imprisonment for each, Count IV to be served concurrently with all of the other counts, and Count III to be served consecutively. Finally, the trial court found Defendant guilty in Count V of resisting arrest and in Count VI of driving while revoked, for which the trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of seven years and one year, respectively, for a total sentence of 30 years. This appeal follows.

Discussion

Defendant raises four points on appeal. First, he argues the trial court erred in finding him guilty of two counts of second-degree assault because the charges arose out of one act, and thus his conviction of more than one charge of assault and the accompanying charge of armed criminal action violates his right to freedom from double jeopardy. In Point II, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in convicting him of all counts of second-degree assault and armed criminal action because the evidence at trial did not support the charging document's language describing the collision. In Points III and IV, Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of each count of assault, and thereby each accompanying count of armed criminal action, regarding the issue of whether the collision caused the injuries to each victim. We discuss each in turn.

Point I

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in convicting him of two counts of second-degree assault arising from one criminal act, thus violating double jeopardy. We disagree.

Defendant raises this claim for the first time on appeal. The protection against double jeopardy is a constitutional right addressing the power of the State to bring a charge against an accused. State v. Neher , 213 S.W.3d 44, 48 (Mo. banc 2007). In order to preserve a constitutional claim for review, it must be raised at the earliest opportunity. State v. Horton , 325 S.W.3d 474, 477 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). However, if a claim of double jeopardy can be determined from the face of the record, it is entitled to plain error review upon appeal.

Neher, 213 S.W.3d at 48. Here, the record does not facially reveal any such error.

One of the protections afforded by the double jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is a protection from "multiple punishments for the same offense." State v. Hardin , 429 S.W.3d 417, 421 (Mo. banc 2014). In this respect, "the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended." Id. (quoting Missouri v. Hunter , 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) ); see also State v. Walker , 352 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (Missouri follows separate offense rule). Thus, the first step is to look to the statute under which Defendant was charged and convicted. State v. Porter , 464 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015).

Here, Defendant was convicted of second-degree assault under Section 565.060, RSMo. (Supp. 2006), which states the following:

1. A person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if he:

...

(3) Recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person[.]

The statute defines assault as causing injury to another person, in the singular. Thus, the plain language indicates that an assault on several persons would support separate charges of assault against each victim.

The Missouri Supreme Court considered a similar issue in State v. Smith , 456 S.W.3d 849 (Mo. banc 2015). There, the defendant had fired a gun three or four times at a person who was running away from him, missing that person but hitting and killing another person nearby. Id. at 851. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for the victim he had killed and first-degree assault for the person the defendant had shot at but had not injured. Id. In concluding that the defendant's freedom from double jeopardy was not violated by the two convictions, the Missouri Supreme Court reasoned, "[w]hen the same conduct results in harm to two or more victims, double jeopardy is not violated if a defendant is convicted for the harm to each victim." Id. at 853.

The Smith Court relied on a previous Missouri Supreme Court case finding no double jeopardy violation in a defendant's convictions of three separate counts of manslaughter where the defendant had killed three persons in an automobile accident. Id. (citing State v. Whitley , 382 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Mo. 1964) ). The Whitley Court had stated that "[t]he gravamen of the offense is killing a human being, and the statute by its terms contemplates that there shall be as many offenses as there are human beings killed, whether by one or several acts." 382 S.W.2d at 667, quoted in Smith , 456 S.W.3d at 853 ; see also State v. Bowles , 754 S.W.2d 902, 908 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988) ("The double jeopardy doctrine is directed to the identity of the offense, and not to the act").

This analysis applies equally in the present case, and in fact this Court has found it applies in the context of multiple assaults arising from one act by the defendant. In State v. Bowles , this Court explained that "[t]he overwhelming weight of authority holds that a...