State v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 18 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 34279.,34279.
• Citation: 148 Conn.App. 760,87 A.3d 1144
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Joseph EDWARDS.

148 Conn.App. 760

87 A.3d 1144

STATE of Connecticut

v.Joseph EDWARDS.

No. 34279.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 15, 2013.

Decided March 18, 2014.

Deren Manasevit, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Lisa A. Riggione, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Kevin D. Lawlor, state's attorney, and John E. Barney, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

LAVINE, BEACH and BEAR, Js.

LAVINE, J.

The dispositive question in this appeal is what constitutes a change of address for the purposes of our sex offender registration statutes. The defendant, Joseph Edwards, appeals from the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation pursuant to General Statutes § 53a–32(a), following an arrest on a charge of failing to register as a sex offender in violation of General Statutes § 54–251(a) and (e).¹ On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred when it interpreted § 54–251 and that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he violated his probation. ² We agree with the defendant and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.³

The following evidence, as adduced at the probation violation hearing, is relevant to our resolution of this appeal. As a result of previous criminal convictions, the defendant is required to register as a sex offender for life. In June, 1999, the defendantwas convicted of first degree robbery and sentenced to twenty years incarceration, execution suspended after ten years, followed by five years probation. The defendant's probationary period for the robbery conviction began on December 17, 2008, and continued to December 17, 2013. As a standard condition of probation, the defendant agreed not to violate any criminal laws. On August 13, 2010, the defendant was arrested for failing to notify the Commissioner of Public Safety (commissioner) of an address change pursuant to § 54–251.⁴ Thereafter, the defendant was charged with a violation of probation.

At the probation violation hearing conducted on October 26, 2011, the court heard testimony from two witnesses and the defendant. Brian Reilly, a West Haven police officer, testified that the address on file with the Connecticut Sex Offender Registry for the defendant was 73 Fresh Meadow Road. He stated that on August 12, 2010, he received a complaint from the owner of a warehouse located at 15 Center Street that the defendant, who had been renting a storage space since May, 2010, had been living in the warehouse. Reilly testified that on August 12, 2010, he went to 73 Fresh Meadow Road to verify that the defendant was still residing there. Reilly testified that he found no evidence that the defendant was living in the residence at 73 Fresh Meadow Road.

Carla Scinto, the defendant's probation officer, testified that the defendant told her that he had been evicted from the home on 73 Fresh Meadow Road on July 13, 2010, and that he had been living in his box truck on the rear of the property. The defendant, on the other hand, testified that in June, 2010, he had been evicted from 73 Fresh Meadow Road, but that he had continued to live inside the home on 73 Fresh Meadow Street on the second floor. He also stated that the electric bill remained in his name through September, 2010. Finally, he testified that when the police arrested him, they found him at 73 Fresh Meadow Road.

The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had violated § 54–251(a) and (e) because he was homeless and did not inform the commissioner of this fact. Accordingly, the court found that the defendant had violated the term of his probation that he not violate any criminal laws. The court stated: “[W]hether he was living in a warehouse or whether he was living in a truck on the property does not satisfy the requirement of keeping the registry informed as to what your residential address is.... Living in a truck does not equal a residence; it equals homeless. Living in a warehouse equals homeless. And because he was homeless he had the obligation to keep the [commissioner] notified of the fact that he was now homeless .... So, the court does find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated his conditions of probation, specifically the first condition that he not violate any laws of the state of Connecticut or the United States.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court revoked the defendant's probation and sentenced him to the remaining portion of his suspended sentence. This appeal followed.⁵

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court misinterpreted § 54–251 and that there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that the defendant had violated his probation by failing to inform the commissioner of an address change pursuant to § 54–251(a) and (e). The defendant claims that the court erred when it interpreted the term “change of address” as used in that statute. We agree with the defendant.

We begin by setting forth the legal principles and the standard of review pertinent to our discussion. “To support a finding of probation violation, the evidence must induce a reasonable belief that it is more probable than not that the defendant has violated a condition of his or her probation.... In making its factual determination, the trial court is entitled to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the evidence.... This court may reverse the trial court's initial factual determination that a condition of probation has been violated only if we determine that such a finding was clearly erroneous.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Welch, 40 Conn.App. 395, 401, 671 A.2d 379, cert. denied, 236 Conn. 918, 673 A.2d 1145 (1996).

“A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is based on the court's factual findings. The proper standard of review is whether the court's findings were clearly erroneous based on the evidence.... A court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous and its conclusions drawn from that finding lack sufficient evidence when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hooks, 80 Conn.App. 75, 80–81, 832 A.2d 690, cert. denied, 267 Conn. 908, 840 A.2d 1171 (2003).

“The requirements of the statute present a question of statutory construction over which we exercise plenary review.... When construing a statute, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... [General Statutes] § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretative guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter.... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.... We presume that the legislature did not intend to enact meaningless provisions.... [S]tatutes must be construed, if possible, such that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant....

“[W]hen the statute being construed is a criminal statute, it must be construed strictly against the state and in favor of the accused.... [C]riminal statutes [thus] are not to be read more broadly than their language plainly requires and ambiguities are ordinarily to be resolved in favor of the defendant.... Rather, penal statutes are to be construed strictly and not extended by implication to create liability which no language of the act purports to create.... Further, if, after interpreting a penal provision, there remains any ambiguity regarding the legislature's intent, the rule of lenity applies. It is a fundamental tenet of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a [P]enal [C]ode against the imposition of a harsher punishment.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). State v. Drupals, 306 Conn. 149, 159–160, 49 A.3d 962 (2012).

To determine whether the court properly found that the defendant changed his residence address, and thereby violated § 54–251(a) and (e) by not informing the commissioner of this change, we must ascertain what constitutes a residence address for the purposes of our sex offender registration statutes. The defendant argues that the court improperly construed the term “change of address” and that the court erred when it concluded that becoming homeless necessarily means there has been a change of address. The state, on the other hand, argues that the court properly construed § 54–251(a) and (e) to require sex offenders to notify the registry when they become homeless. ⁶

In State v. Drupals, supra, 306 Conn. at 163, 49 A.3d 962 our Supreme Court held that the term “residence address” means “the act or fact of living in a given place for some time....” The Supreme Court also noted that, “[t]he definition of residence we adopt today furthers the purpose of [§ 54–251], which is to allow the [commissioner] to keep track of the registrant's location....” Id., at 165, 49 A.3d 962. Moreover, our Supreme Court noted that the legislature intended “residence address” to be “synonymous with ‘place of residence,’ or more precisely, to denote the physical description of where the registrant resides.” Id., at 161 n. 7, 49 A.3d 962.

Having reviewed the...