State v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 02 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 106,435.,106,435.
• Citation: 288 P.3d 494
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Charles L. EDWARDS, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

288 P.3d 494

STATE of Kansas, Appellee,

v.Charles L. EDWARDS, Appellant.

No. 106,435.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Nov. 2, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

1. When a court considers the constitutionality of a statute, the court must presume the statute is constitutional. Consistent with this principle, all doubts must be resolved in favor of the statute's validity; a court must interpret the statute in a manner that makes it constitutional if there is any reasonable way to do so within the apparent intent of the legislature in passing the statute.

2. When a court is determining the constitutionality of a statute and a fundamental right or interest is not implicated, the statute at hand is reviewed under the rational basis test. Under this test, a statute withstands a constitutional challenge as long as the State identifies a legitimate state interest that the legislature could rationally conclude was served by the statute.

3. When the legislature revises an existing law, it is presumed the legislature intended to change the law from what existed prior to the amendment. It is likewise presumed the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation.

4. The sexual relationship between a teacher and a student at the same school is not a relationship that warrants protection as a fundamental right; therefore, a rational basis test must be used to decide the constitutionality of a statute making such conduct a crime.

5. The Kansas Legislature has sought to preserve the trust that parents and the public have with teachers who are educating our students by enacting a law prohibiting teachers from misusing their access to students as a means to have sex. By virtue of the learning environment, teachers are in a unique position to groom or coerce students into exploitative or abusive conduct. K.S.A. 21–3520(a)(8) promotes the preservation of a safe school environment for students by preventing their sexual exploitation. Because there are legitimate state interests served by this statute, it is constitutional.

Steven D. Mank, of Ariagno, Kerns, Mank & White, L.L.C., of Wichita, and Kristen B. Patty, of Wichita, for appellant.

Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before McANANY, P.J., HILL, J., and ALLEN R. SLATER, District Judge, assigned.

HILL, J.

In our system of ordered liberty, ordinances and statutes regulate the actions of people—while constitutions regulate the actions of states. In this case, we are confronted with the question whether the State has exceeded constitutional bounds by enacting a law making sexual relations between a teacher and student a crime. Charles L. Edwards, a Wichita area high school music instructor, engaged in sexual intercourse with one of his 18–year–old high school students. In this appeal of his unlawful sexual relations conviction, Edwards contends the statute defining his conduct as a crime is unconstitutional because it infringes upon his fundamental right, while in the privacy of his home, to engage in sexual conduct with a consenting adult. In sharp contrast, the State maintains Edwards has no constitutional right to have sexual relations with one of his students and there are legitimate reasons to make such conduct a crime. Because the statute applied in this case implicitly recognizes the disparity of power inherent in the teacher/student relationship, we conclude that the right of privacy does not encompass the right of a high school teacher to have sex with students enrolled in the same school system. We hold the statute in question is constitutional. Therefore, we affirm Edwards's conviction.

There are no factual disputes here.

This prosecution is straightforward and uncomplicated. Edwards waived his right to a jury trial and made an agreement with the State about the facts. At Edwards' bench trial, the parties stipulated that at the times pertinent to the charge:

• Edwards was a 30–year–old choir teacher employed by Wichita U.S.D. No. 259.

• A.C.A. was a student enrolled at the same high school where Edwards was employed.

• A.C.A. was 18 years old and had reached the age of majority and was an adult before March 2010.

• A.C.A. was the natural mother of a child as of March 2010 (although the State disputes the relevancy of this fact).

• Edwards and A.C.A. were not married to each other.

• A.C.A. willingly transported herself to Edwards' home in Sedgwick County and supplied a condom worn by Edwards.

• Edwards engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with A.C.A.

• This act occurred on or about March 3, 2010, in Sedgwick County.

• That in return for the submission of this matter to the court for bench trial on stipulated facts, the State agreed to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 of the complaint/information.

Weighing these stipulations, the district court found Edwards guilty of unlawful sexual relations in violation of K.S.A. 21–3520(a)(8). See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21–5512(a)(8).

On appeal, Edwards argues K.S.A. 21–3520(a)(8) is unconstitutional because it infringes upon a privacy right protected by both the United States Constitution and the Kansas Constitution—the right to engage in private, consensual sexual conduct. We look first at the right of privacy.

We track the Supreme Court's search for the right of privacy.

We begin our analysis by pointing out there is no specific language in either the Kansas Constitution or the United States Constitution guaranteeing the right to privacy. A series of cases dealing with contraception, pregnancy, and consensual sexual relations established this court-created right of privacy, when a court is considering intimate conduct.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states simply: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” But the question that arises is what liberty interests are protected by that Amendment? Our constitutional jurisprudence has placed privacy on the periphery, where it is implicitly recognized because of the existence of other more certainly stated rights in the Bill of Rights. It is a right created by inferences. For want of a better word, the astronomical term “penumbra” has been used to communicate that the right to privacy arises in the periphery, at the edge next to the more clearly stated rights. Justice Douglas wrote in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965): “[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that give them life and substance. [Citation omitted.] Various guarantees create zones of privacy.” Griswold, striking down Connecticut's ban against selling contraceptives as it applied to married persons, certainly implied there was, at least for married persons, an implicit right to marital privacy. 381 U.S. at 485–86, 85 S.Ct. 1678. The cases that followed Griswold expanded the “zones of privacy.”

In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448–54, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), the Supreme Court pushed past Griswold by rejecting Massachusetts' law banning the sale of contraceptives to unmarried persons, ruling the law impaired their personal rights, there was no rational basis for the law, and the law was a violation of equal protection. Next, the Supreme Court announced its ruling in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977), where the Court overturned three New York rules: one against selling contraceptives to people younger than 16, one requiring contraceptives to be sold only by licensed pharmacists, and a third banning advertisements for these items or displaying them.

Even though the “outer limits of the substantive sphere” of protected liberties have not been defined, the United States Supreme Court has indeed recognized certain liberties as protected—including a right of personal privacy or a guarantee of certain zones of privacy. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern PA. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). These zones of privacy includes certain rights deemed “fundamental”—such as those related to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects only those rights considered to be fundamental. These “fundamental” rights include those clearly enumerated in the Bill of Rights, along with some other rights the Supreme Court has recognized as requiring constitutional protection. See Wooten v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 696, 699 (11th Cir.1995).

But the case most pertinent to this appeal is Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003). In Lawrence, the United States Supreme Court held the Texas law against homosexual sodomy was unconstitutional. In the majority's view, the Texas statute furthered no legitimate state interest which would justify its intrusion into an individual's intimate personal and private life. The case was resolved by the Court deciding the petitioners were free, as adults, to engage in private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. 539 U.S. at 560, 123 S.Ct. 2472.

From this line of cases, we conclude that a court-recognized constitutional right to privacy is now out of the shadows and has become clearer with each Supreme Court case dealing with the subject. But we caution that liberty must never be confused with license.

We turn to the statute at issue.

The criminal charge here arises under K.S.A. 21–3520(a)(8), which defines unlawful sexual relations as engaging in consensual sexual intercourse, lewd fondling or touching, or sodomy with a person who is not married to the offender if

“the offender is a teacher or a person in a position of authority and the person with...