State v. Edwards

• Citation: 130 N.W.2d 623,269 Minn. 343
• Decision Date: 25 September 1964
• Docket Number: No. 39024,39024
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Martin EDWARDS, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 623

130 N.W.2d 623

269 Minn. 343

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Martin EDWARDS, Appellant.

No. 39024.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 25, 1964.

Syllabus by the Court

In prosecution for the offense of possession of burglary tools in violation of Minn.St. 621.13, an essential element of which offense requires proof of specific intent to possess such tools for the commission of a crime, it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury that such intent could be presumed from the fact of possession. Where intent is an element of the offense charged, it can never be presumed. Following State v. Higgin, 257 Minn. 46, 99 N.W.2d 902, we hold that the instruction so substantially and materially prejudiced defendant's rights, notwithstanding failure to make timely objection, as to require a new trial.

Smith, McLean, Peterson & Sullivan, Charles T. Peterson, Mankato, for appellant.

Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Houston, Sol. Gen., St. Paul, Charles C. Johnson, County Atty., Mankato, for respondent.

MURPHY, Justice.

This is an appeal from the denial of a motion for a verdict of not guilty notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, after conviction of possession of burglars' tools in violation of Minn.St. 621.13. Numerous errors are assigned, the principal one of which is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that possession of burglarious tools gave rise to a presumption of intent to use them in the commission of a crime.

From the record it appears that in the early morning hours of July 12, 1961, four members of the Mankato police force responded to a burglar alarm connected to the premises of Spence-McCord Drug Company. After finding the doors locked, the police called for additional assistance and notified the plant manager. Some 15 or 20 minutes after the alarm, one of the officers saw the shadow of a man between two buildings behind the Spence-McCord premises. The man fled, but was quickly apprehended. He was later identified as the defendant, Martin A. Edwards. There was taken from his possession a loaded .38-caliber pistol and a two-way radio. Nearby there was found a pair of gloves and a flashlight. Just prior to apprehension, defendant was observed to have a gun in his hand and was heard to say into the two-way radio, 'Stay where you are, I am trapped.'

After defendant's apprehension the police were admitted to the drugstore by its manager. They found that a wall of the narcotics vault hed been damaged and one of the alarm wires in the wall broken. An inside lock on the back door was broken and there were pry marks on the outside of the front door. The police also found a two-way radio identical in make and appearance to that found in defendant's possession, and with a serial number only four digits removed from that of defendant's radio. Transmission from defendant's radio was heard on the radio found in the building The police also found a punch, sledge hammer, crowbar, and a flashlight identical in make and appearance to that found at the scene of defendant's apprehension.

Defendant was charged by information with possession of burglars' tools in violation of § 621.13, which provides:

'Every person who shall make or mend, or cause to be made or mended, or have in his possession, in the day or night-time, any engine, machine, tool, false key, picklock, bit, nippers, implement, or explosive adapted, designed, or commonly used for the commission of burglary, larceny, or other crime, under circumstances evincing an intent to use or employ, or allow the same to be used or employed, in the commission of a crime, or knowing that the same is intended to be so used, shall be guilty of a felony. The having in possession any such engine, machine, tool, false key, picklock, bit, nippers, implement, or explosive shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to so use or employ the same in the commission of a crime.' ¹

We pass those assignments of error which we think are without substance to reach the determinative issue which relates to the asserted error of the trial court in his instructions to the jury. After the state rested, the case was submitted to the jury. Defendant had not taken the stand. In instructing the jury the trial court read § 621.13, including the provision stating that possession of tools or implements generally covered by the statute 'shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to so use or employ the same in the commission of a crime.' The trial court then went on to say:

'Prima facie, as used in this law or statute, means at first sight or in the first instance, or, it is presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary. You will consider prima facie evidence together with all other evidence in the case in arriving at your verdict.'

The trial court went on to explain to the jury the distinction between an inference and a presumption and emphasized the mandatory effect of a presumption, stating:

'I have referred to inference and to presumption. An inference is a deduction or conclusion which the jury may draw from the facts which have been proved. A presumption is an inference which the law requires the jury to make from particular facts in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary. A presumption continues in effect until overcome or outweighed by evidence to the contrary, but, unless so outweighed, the jury is bound to find in accordance with the presumption.'

Defendant asserts error on the basis of denial of due process in that the effect of these instructions was to reverse the presumption of innocence and authorize a presumption of guilt from the omission of defendant to testify. There is little doubt that the legislature has the power in civil cases to establish a rule of law relating to presumptive evidence that is essentially a regulation of the burden of proof. ² But it cannot safely be said that the legislature has the power to establish a valid presumption in a criminal case. It is true under Federal authorities that such presumptions have been approved by Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519, and Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 45 S.Ct. 470, 69 L.Ed. 904, which hold that it is not in violation of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments for Congress to make proof of one fact or group of facts evidence of the existence of ultimate facts upon which guilt of a crime is predicated, so long as there exists a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed. The term 'rational connection' has many shadings and is not easy to apply. ³ The term is discussed in the Minnesota decision of State v. Kelly, 218 Minn. 247, 15 N.W.2d 554, 162 A.L.R. 477. It has given rise to a great deal of legal writing and its application has varied widely in the innumerable decisions since the Tot case.

In the recent decision of Barrett v. United States (5 Cir.) 322 F.2d 292, the court held that the statute creating a presumption of the defendants' possession of a still and carrying on the business of a distiller predicated upon the unexplained presence of defendants at the site of an unregistered still was unconstitutional. In that case the court referred to Mr. Justice Holmes' statement in McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86, 36 S.Ct. 498, 501, 60 L.Ed. 899, 904, to the effect that 'it is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime,' and pointed out (322 F.2d 296) that the government has both the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion and that '(a) statute which shifts either one or both of these burdens to an accused is difficult to reconcile with our hard-earned heritage of fair trials.' In discussing the 'rational connection' test the court emphasized that the presumption must not be strained, but must be reasonably related to the fact proved as it tends to establish a defendant's guilt. From an examination of the Barrett case, which contains a comprehensive review of the authorities relating to the issue, it would appear that under the Federal interpretation of the 'rational connection' test, such connection to be rational must be fairly certain. The court held that although there was sufficient evidence that the defendant Barrett was part owner of the still and was there 'to make the first run,' nevertheless his presence at the site would not support the presumption of possession. On the other hand, however, they agree that the court in Manning v. United States (5 Cir.) 274 F.2d 926, was correct in coming to a contrary result in a prosecution penalizing possession of marijuana where it was reasoned that there could be no other explanation than guilt consistent with the possession of that drug.

Although the 'rational connection' test was discussed in the Kelly case, our court has consistently rejected the notion that presumptions of guilt should be permitted. We have always taken the position that an instruction as to presumption of law which directs the jury to draw inferences from a given set of facts should not be given in a criminal case. Our decisions have generally expressed the view that such presumptions in criminal statutes come into conflict not only with constitutional guaranties of due process, trial by jury, and protection against being compelled to testify, but also with such fundamental rights as presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which, though not expressly enumerated in the constitution, are as much a part thereof as though expressly set out. State v. Simon, 163 Minn. 317, 203 N.W. 989; State v. Kelly, supra; State v. Higgin, 257 Minn. 46, 99 N.W.2d 902; State v. Townsend, 259 Minn. 522, 108 N.W.2d 608; State v. Keaton, 258 Minn. 359, 104 N.W.2d 650, 86 A.L.R.2d 649.

To return to the precise issue before us, it may be said that if the court had omitted from its instructions that part of § 621.13 which...