State v. Efler

• Decision Date: 31 October 1881
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. STEPHEN EFLER.

85 N.C. 585

STATE

v.STEPHEN EFLER.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October Term, 1881.

INDICTMENT for murder tried at Fall Term, 1881, of MCDOWELL Superior Court, before Seymour, J.

The prisoner was charged with the killing of Peggie Efler, his wife, on the 6th of January, 1881. The jury having found him guilty, he appealed from the judgment pronounced upon the verdict.

Attorney General, for the State .

Mr. J. M. Gudger, for the prisoner .

RUFFIN, J.

Impressed as we were with the earnestness of counsel who argued this cause before us, and realizing the immense importance to the prisoner of the issues involved, we have bestowed upon them our most earnest consideration. Having done so, and detecting nothing, in the matters assigned as errors, which in our opinion entitle the prisoner to another trial, it is our duty so to declare.

The first error assigned is based upon the action of the court with reference to the juror, Hunter. As appears from the record the facts connected with that matter are as follows: When the juror was called, he was challenged for cause by the prisoner's counsel, and in response to a question whether he had formed and expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, said, that he had. The counsel insisted that this constituted good cause of challenge, either principal or to the favor. His Honor held to the contrary, inasmuch as it did not appear that the opinion of the juror was unfavorable to the prisoner, but suggested to counsel to ask the juror directly whether he had formed and expressed the opinion that the prisoner was guilty. This the counsel declined to do, and excepting to the disallowance of his challenge for cause, peremptorily challenged the juror.

When a full jury was procured, there had been only eleven peremptory challenges made on the part of the prisoner.

An opinion fully made up and expressed, touching that which is the subject matter of an action, whether civil or criminal, constitutes a good cause of principal challenge for that party only against whom the bias supposed to be created by such a declaration operates, and it is therefore incumbent on him who challenges, to show himself to be the party likely to be prejudiced. State v. Benton, 2 Dev. & Bat., 196. The prisoner had the opportunity by putting to the juror the question suggested by the court, to ascertain certainly whether the preconceived opinion of the juror was against himself, and failing to do so, his mere apprehension that such might be the case, gave him no good cause of challenge. Apart from this, the prisoner sustained no injury by the action of the court, admitting it to have been an error to disallow his challenge. He had the full benefit of a trial by a jury free from all exception, and this is all that the law intends to secure for him. The juror objected to, was not forced upon him, and the peremptory challenge used to get rid of him, was not needed for any other purpose. State v. Arthur, 2 Dev., 217.

Second exception: The prisoner was examined as a witness in his own behalf, The state, for the purpose of discrediting him as a witness, and for no other purpose, offered evidence of his general bad character, and it was admitted by the court though objected to.

The statute of 1881, ch. 110, § 2, provides that in the trial of all indictments against persons charged with the commission of crimes in the several courts of the state, the person charged shall at his own request, but not otherwise, be a competent witness, and the question is as to the effect upon the rights of a defendant who sees proper to avail himself of the privilege. In declaring him to be “a competent witness,” we understand the statute to mean that he shall occupy the same position with any other witness, be under the same obligation to tell the truth, entitled to the same privileges, receive the same protection, and equally liable to be impeached or discredited. Unless willing to become a witness, he is invested with a presumption of innocence, such as the law makes in favor of every person accused of crime, and evidence cannot be offered to impeach his character, unless he voluntarily puts it in issue. But by availing himself of the statute, he assumes the position of a witness and subjects himself to all the disadvantages of that position, and his credibility is to be weighed and tested as that of any other witness.

This much seemed to be conceded by the counsel for the prisoner, but he insisted that the impeaching testimony should have been confined to an inquiry into the prisoner's general character for truth, and not permitted to extend to his general moral character, and for this position he cited us to the case of the State v. Fletcher, 49 Ind., 124. That case does draw the distinction suggested by counsel, but it proceeds, not at all upon any idea that a difference is to be made between a defendant who testifies for himself, and any other witness who might be examined in the cause; on the...