State v. Eich
| Decision Date | 16 December 1938 |
| Docket Number | 31802. |
| Parties | STATE v. EICH. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Certified questions from District Court, Hennepin County; Lars O. Rue Judge.
Matthew Eich was charged with poisoning a dog in violation of statute. On defendant's request the court certified five questions to the Supreme Court.
Questions answered in the negative in accordance with opinion.
Syllabus by the Court .
1. A statute is unconstitutional for indefiniteness if it requires or forbids in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Applying this rule to 2 Mason Minn.St.1927, § 10448 held that the mentioned section does not violate U.S. Const. art. 14, § 1, U.S. C.A.Const. Amend. 14, § 1.
2. The due process clause does not render unconstitutional a statute which compels a party to act at his peril. The criterion in such cases is to examine whether common social duty would under the circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct.
3. Nor is the mentioned act violative of U.S. Const. Art. 14, § 1, U.S. C.A.Const. Amend. 14, § 1, guaranteeing to defendant the equal protection of the law.
4 and 5. The mentioned act and the information charging defendant with its violation are not so indefinite as to offend Minn.Const. Art. 1, §§ 6 and 7.
6. The statute does not offend Minn.Const. Art. 1, § 5, since there has been no departure in the act from our fundamental law and the spirit and purpose thereof, the punishment thereby imposed not being manifestly in excess of constitutional limitations.
William S. Ervin, Atty. Gen., Roy C. Frank, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ed J. Goff, Co. Atty., and Arthur Markve, Asst. Co. Atty., both of Minneapolis, for the State.
Frederick P. Warber and Robert H. Petzke, both of Minneapolis, for defendant.
Defendant was charged with violating 2 Mason Minn.St.1927, § 10448 which provides that ‘ any person who unjustifiably administers any poisonous, or noxious drug or substance to any animal, * * * or unjustifiably exposes any such drug or substance with intent that the same shall be taken by any animal,’ is guilty of a felony.
The information charged that ‘ said Matthew Eich on the 30th day of March, A. D. 1938, at the city of Minneapolis, * * * then and there being, did wilfully, unlawfully, wrongfully, unjustifiably, knowingly and feloniously expose a certain poison, drug and substance generally known as strychnine, * * * with intent that the same should be taken by an animal, to-wit: a dog, [describing it] the property of and belonging to George A. Furlong, and which said strychnine was then and there taken and eaten by the said dog; contrary to the statute,’ etc.
Defendant's demurrer was based upon the contentions that (1) the facts alleged did not state a public offense; (2) the statute violates the due process clause of U.S. Const. Art. 14, § 1, U.S. C.A.Const. Amend. 14, § 1, and Minn.Const. art. 1, § 7; and (3) the information is also contrary to Minn.Const. art. 1, § 6, in that it does not inform the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation. The demurrer was overruled. Thereupon the court, upon defendant's request and pursuant to 2 Mason Minn.St.1927, § 10756, certified five questions as so important and doubtful as to require decision by this court.
1. The first question is whether the act, § 10448, violates U.S. Const. Art. 14, § 1, U.S. C.A.Const. Amend. 14, § 1, in that it is so indefinite as to deprive defendant of liberty without due process of law.
The principles of law applicable in determining whether a statute, as applied to a particular defendant, is unconstitutional for indefiniteness have been discussed recently by this court in State v. Northwest Poultry & Egg Co., 203 Minn. 438, 281 N.W. 753. It is sufficient here to state that a statute is unconstitutional for indefiniteness if it requires or forbids in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. And while a penal statute must be strictly construed, yet it is not necessary that it designate every particular circumstance that calls for imposition of the penalty. Where the act of the legislature has as its purpose to prohibit an undesirable form of conduct rather than a specific act, the definition by its very nature must be broad. Consequently if it can be determined with reasonable definiteness what is disapproved, the statute is not unconstitutional on this ground.
Defendant's main assault is that the word ‘ unjustifiably’ fails to present a sufficiently definite standard. Because of the complexity of our social organization and the attendant difficulty of successfully enumerating each specific forbidden act, the legislature by necessity has had to enact many criminal statutes which are broad in their scope and character. Otherwise the fertile mind of the criminal could find omissions and loopholes as means of escape. The statute belongs to the category of such comprehensive and inclusive acts as do not readily yield to exactness of definition. We think it presents a sufficiently definitive standard. It is possible to determine with reasonable certainty what the law regards as forbidden. Many factors indicate this. The word ‘ unjustifiable’ and its antonym ‘ justifiable’ are far from being unknown in our law. For instance, 2 Mason Minn.St.1927, § 10067, makes a premeditated killing of a human being murder in the first degree unless it is ‘ excusable or justifiable’ ; and by § 10113 the term ‘ justifiable’ is used in connection with libel. While often the statutes define what is meant by the word, yet that would not seem to be always necessary, as the word from common usage has a well known meaning. Unquestionably the legislature has the power to prohibit absolutely the use or exposure of poison to or in connection with any animal, wild or domestic. Yet the legislature might well think that it was not feasible to enact such a rigid law in light of the conditions existing in our society where, by common acceptance, poisoning might be justified in the light of the interests to be protected. Defendant should not be heard to complain that the legislature has recognized that in some cases it is not a crime to use or expose poison when the dividing line, though not clear cut, is ascertainable with reasonable definiteness. Poisoning of animals is, in most instances, a secret and anonymous act. It is of that nature because the party using or exposing poison realizes that there is moral stigma attached to his conduct, not approved by the norms accepted and adhered to by society as a whole. A man of ordinary understanding certainly must realize that it is improper from the point of view of our moral standards to poison or expose poison to an animal belonging to another. Yet it is possible that due to a change or rise of a peculiar circumstance the impropriety dissolves in the new attitude created by the circumstance. The statute must be broad enough so that flexibility will permit intelligence to prevail in its application. It seems to us that a man of ordinary prudence, acquainted with ordinarily accepted moral standards, would have a reasonably clear and certain concept as to when poison could or could not be used or exposed.
In People v. Curtiss, 116 Cal.App.Supp. 771, 775, 300 P. 801, 802, the statute provided that, ‘ Any person who willfully * * * inflicts thereon [on any child] unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering * * * is guilty of a misdemeanor.’ Pen.Code Cal. § 273a. The statute was held to be sufficiently definitive, the court saying (116 Cal.App.Supp. 779, 300 P. 804): serves as a criterion in determining the violations of duty which amount to negligence.'
If this court were to hold the standard enunciated in this statute too uncertain we would be compelled to hold subsequently many other of our criminal statutes likewise unconstitutional on the same ground although in daily application they operate without difficulty or prejudice. For instance, § 10078 provides that a homicide which results from ‘ culpable negligence’ is manslaughter. Obviously these words present as broad a standard as ‘ unjustifiable.’ Again, § 10070 makes the killing of a human being third degree murder when perpetrated by an act ‘ eminently dangerous' to others, and ‘ evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life,’ although without design to effect death. Furthermore, this court has sustained the constitutionality of a statute making it a penal offense to drive a motor vehicle on a public highway at a speed greater than ‘ reasonable and proper,’ having regard to the traffic and use of the way or so as to ‘ endanger the life or limb or injure the property of any person.’ G.S.1913, § 2635. State v. Goldstone, 144 Minn. 405, 408, 175 N.W. 892.
Another factor...
To continue reading
Request your trial