State v. Eisen
| Decision Date | 16 March 1909 |
| Citation | 100 P. 257,53 Or. 297 |
| Parties | STATE v. EISEN. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
On petition for rehearing. Petition denied.
For former opinion, see 99 P. 282.
J.F. Watts and Waldemar Seton, for appellant.
A.M Crawford, Atty. Gen., Geo. J. Cameron, Dist. Atty., and Thad W. Vreeland, Deputy, for the State.
The juvenile act provides that it shall apply only to children under 18 years of age, and that any person who shall, by threats, persuasion, or otherwise, endeavor to induce any child to do or perform any act, or to follow any course of conduct, which will cause, or manifestly tend to cause, any child to become delinquent shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Statutes previously enacted permit the marriage, with the consent of her parents, of any female over 15, and under 18 years of age, after which all parental control ceases. In other words, the child then loses its legal status as such and does not come within the term "child," as contemplated by the juvenile act; the law conclusively presuming the guardianship of the state under such circumstances to be unnecessary. The Supreme Court of Colorado, in Gibson v. People, 99 P. 333, in construing juvenile statutes of similar import to ours, goes even farther than held in this case, and, in effect, holds it not to have been the intention of the juvenile act, by the use therein of the words "any person," to provide for the prosecution, on a charge of having contributed to a child's delinquency, of any person except one occupying with reference to such child, the position of parent guardian, brother, sister, or other similar relation. We are inclined, however, to the view announced in the opinion in the case in hand (99 P. 282) and in State v. Dunn, 99 P. 278, to the effect that the juvenile act is sufficiently broad in terms, and has for its purpose the protection of the youth of the country, and of thereby making better citizens of them, to carry out which the same protection was intended to be invoked in their favor against the wrongs of those not in loco parentis with reference to them, as should be applied to parents, guardians, etc. But, while we differ from that eminent court in its interpretation of the law as to the class of individuals intended to be punished for contributing toward the waywardness of minors, we think the law is limited in its scope, and that we would not be justified in further extending its application as to include married women under 18 years of age. Construing the juvenile acts of this state with sections 5216, 5228, B. & C. Comp., it cannot be seriously questioned but that the effect of the law is to provide that any one contributing to the delinquency of an unmarried person under 18 years of age shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, etc.; that is, the legislative acts on the subject were only intended to include such as may require parental care and attention, and not those placed at the head of the household. The effect of the statutes on this point is as obvious as if specifically mentioned therein, making such persons an exception to the class under 18 years of age mentioned in the law on the subject.
It would seem that the rule governing pleadings is so well settled, by the numerous adjudications on the subject in this state, that no doubt could well arise as to the proper manner of pleading in such cases, in reference to which it has frequently...
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State v. J.C.N.-V. (In re J.C.N.-V.)
... ... Pierce, 113 Or. 386, 231 P. 652 (1925) (the purpose of juvenile court is not to convict or punish but to protect); State v. Dunn, [53 Or. 304, 30910, 99 P. 278(1909) ] (juvenile court treats delinquent children not as criminals but as wards to be protected); State v. Eisen, 53 Or. 297, 300, 99 P. 282 (1909) (general purpose of juvenile code is not to punish, but to reform). Id. at 568, 857 P.2d 842. Then, despite the apparent trend in the United States * * * toward the crime control model of juvenile justice, especially for children who are involved 342 P.3d 1070 ... ...
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State v. Gauthier
... ... female person is of the age of 13 years. The definition of ... the word "child," as adopted by this court, is as ... follows: ... "Specifically, a very young [113 Or. 304] person; one ... not old enough to dispense with maternal aid and care." ... State v. Eisen, 53 Or. 297, 301, 99 P. 282, 283 ... In an ... indictment for statutory rape it is not vitally necessary to ... use the word "child." It is sufficient if the ... indictment charges sexual intercourse "with a female ... person under the age of sixteen years, ... ...
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State v. Peebler
...except to state that prosecutions under O.C.L.A. § 23-1034 have been before this court many times. State v. Eisen, 53 Or. 297, 99 P. 282, 100 P. 257; State v. Dunn, 53 Or. 304, 99 P. 278, 100 P. 258; State v. Gates, 98 Or. 110, 193 P. 197; State v. Stone, 111 Or. 227, 226 P. 430; State v. M......
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Ex parte Packer
...age of majority upon their being married, according to law." The petitioner relied upon the case of State v. Eisen, 53 Or. 297, 99 P. 282, 100 P. 257, wherein it was held at the time of the acts contributing to the delinquency of the female, " she was old enough, under the statute, to contr......