State v. J.C.N.-V. (In re J.C.N.-V.)

• Decision Date: 22 January 2015
• Docket Number: A147958.,J090600,Petition Number 05J090600
• Citation: 268 Or.App. 505,342 P.3d 1046
• Parties: In the Matter of J.C.N.-V., a Youth. STATE of Oregon, Petitioner–Respondent, v. J.C.N.-V., Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

268 Or.App. 505

342 P.3d 1046

In the Matter of J.C.N.-V., a Youth. STATE of Oregon, Petitioner–Respondent

v.J.C.N.-V., Appellant.

J090600

Petition Number 05J090600

A147958.

Court of Appeals of Oregon, In Banc.

Argued and Submitted March 18, 2014.

Resubmitted En Banc Dec. 3, 2014.

Decided Jan. 22, 2015.

Angela Sherbo argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Jamie Contreras, Assistant Attorney–in–Charge, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and Laura S. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before HASELTON, Chief Judge, and ARMSTRONG, ORTEGA, SERCOMBE, DUNCAN, NAKAMOTO, EGAN, DeVORE, TOOKEY, GARRETT, and FLYNN, Judges.

Opinion

SERCOMBE, J.

Youth appeals a judgment of the juvenile court granting the state's petition to waive youth into circuit court so that he could be tried as an adult on the charge of aggravated murder. Youth, who was 13 years and eight months old at the time of the alleged offense, was made eligible for adult prosecution by ORS 419C.352, which allows for discretionary waiver for 12–to 14–year–olds accused of certain crimes if the juvenile court “makes the findings required under ORS 419C.349(3) and (4).” The juvenile court in this case, after a hearing, found that youth “at the time of the alleged offense was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved” under ORS 419C.349(3) and, after reviewing the additional criteria set out in ORS 419C.349(4), found “that retaining jurisdiction [would] not serve the best interests of the youth and of society and therefore [was] not justified.”

On appeal, youth's sole contention is that the juvenile court misinterpreted ORS 419C.349(3) and therefore erred in finding that youth satisfied that criterion. He argues that the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 419C.349(3) demonstrate that the legislature intended to require “a showing of more sophistication and maturity than is possessed by the twelve to fourteen year-old, with normally developed intellectual and emotional capacities.” As explained in detail below, we conclude that the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 419C.349(3) do not support that view. The legislature intended ORS 419C.349(3) to be a predicate threshold finding of mental capacity before the juvenile court weighs the additional, and more wide-ranging, criteria in ORS 419C.349(4). Specifically, the legislature intended ORS 419C.349(3) to test whether a youth had enough sophistication and maturity to appreciate the “nature and quality” of his actions—i.e., whether he could appreciate what he was doing in a physical sense and that those actions were wrong or would likely have criminal consequences. Because the evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that youth met that standard, we affirm.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Youth requests that we exercise our discretion to review certain factual findings de novo, arguing that this is an “exceptional” case. See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (Court of Appeals has discretion to “make one or more factual findings anew upon the record”); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (“The Court of Appeals will exercise its discretion * * * to make one or more factual findings anew on the record only in exceptional cases.”). We decline that request. Youth challenges a particular determination of the juvenile court—that youth, at the time of the offense, was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved. But youth's primary contention is a legal one—that the juvenile court made an “erroneous assumption[ ] about what the statutory term[s] mean[ ]” by “equating ‘average’ 13 year-old sophistication and maturity with the higher degree of sophistication and maturity intended by the legislature.” Put another way, the success of youth's argument on appeal turns on the proper interpretation of ORS 419C.349(3), not on whether we take a fresh look at the evidence in this case. Cf. Dept. of Human Services v. A.R.S., 256 Or.App. 653, 656, 303 P.3d 963, rev. den., 354 Or. 386, 314 P.3d 964 (2013) (declining to exercise de novo review because the court could resolve the “appeal based on a purely legal question—one that [was] not dependent on any disputed factual findings of the trial court”). Beyond that, our review of the juvenile court's findings that relate to the disputed legal issue shows that those findings comport with the evidence in the record, and those findings are consistent with the court's decision.

For those reasons, we conclude that this is not a case that warrants de novo review of the evidentiary record. Accordingly, we review the record to determine whether any evidence, and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the evidence, supports the juvenile court's findings. State v. S.T.S., 236 Or.App. 646, 655, 238 P.3d 53 (2010). We review the juvenile court's legal conclusions, including its interpretation of ORS 419C.349(3), for errors of law. Id.

II. BACKGROUND

In accordance with our standard of review, we set out the procedural and historical facts necessary to give context to our discussion of the parties' dispute about the meaning of ORS 419C.349(3). The state alleged that youth and the older brother of youth's girlfriend, Alejandro Aguilar–Mandujano, beat, stabbed, and robbed the victim on October 2, 2009. The victim died as a result of his injuries. The state charged youth by juvenile court petition with offenses that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of aggravated murder, first-degree robbery, and unlawful use of a weapon. The state petitioned to waive youth into circuit court for prosecution as an adult on the aggravated murder charge under ORS 419C.349 and ORS 419C.352.

ORS 419C.352 sets forth the conditions for waiver for youths who are 12, 13, or 14 years of age:

“The juvenile court, after a hearing * * * may waive a youth under 15 years of age at the time the act was committed to circuit court for prosecution as an adult if:

“(1) The youth is represented by counsel during the waiver proceedings;

“(2) The juvenile court makes the findings required under ORS 419C.349(3) and (4) ; and

“(3) The youth is alleged to have committed an act or acts that if committed by an adult would constitute [aggravated murder or other crimes].”

Subsections (3) and (4) of ORS 419C.349 set forth specific criteria by which the court assesses the youth:

“(3) The youth at the time of the alleged offense was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved; and

“(4) The juvenile court, after considering the following criteria, determines by a preponderance of the evidence that retaining jurisdiction will not serve the best interests of the youth and of society and therefore is not justified:

“(a) The amenability of the youth to treatment and rehabilitation given the techniques, facilities and personnel for rehabilitation available to the juvenile court and to the criminal court which would have jurisdiction after transfer;

“(b) The protection required by the community, given the seriousness of the offense alleged;

“(c) The aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner in which the offense was alleged to have been committed;

“(d) The previous history of the youth, including:

“(A) Prior treatment efforts and out-of-home placements; and

“(B) The physical, emotional and mental health of the youth;

“(e) The youth's prior record of acts which would be crimes if committed by an adult;

“(f) The gravity of the loss, damage or injury caused or attempted during the offense;

“(g) The prosecutive merit of the case against the youth; and

“(h) The desirability of disposing of all cases in one trial if there were adult co-offenders.”

Here, the juvenile court heard evidence that, at the time the victim was killed in early October 2009, youth was 13 years old and Aguilar–Mandujano was 20 years old. Aguilar–Mandujano gave a statement to police, describing how he had planned to rob and murder the victim and explaining that he and youth carried out the plan at a park near the Tualatin River. Youth waived his Miranda rights and, after being confronted with Aguilar–Mandujano's statement, admitted that he had participated in the robbery and murder. Youth stated that, on the day of the murder, Aguilar–Mandujano told him that he planned to kill the victim, and youth agreed to “have his back.” Youth told police that he drove with Aguilar–Mandujano to the park and, after they arrived, he hit the victim on the head several times with a tire iron while Aguilar–Mandujano stabbed him. After being handed the knife, youth then stabbed the victim. At Aguilar–Mandujano's direction, youth kicked the victim's body into the river.

Three expert witnesses provided testimony related to whether “youth at the time of the alleged offense was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved.” ORS 419C.349(3). On behalf of the state, Dr. Sebastian interviewed and tested youth on three dates in November 2010. In her report, which the state introduced and relied upon in its waiver petition, Sebastian explained that youth was “bright,” he “knew that he would be in legal trouble from his encounter with [the victim],” and he could “articulate that what he did was wrong and understands the consequences.” At the same time, Sebastian stated that youth “has not yet developed an internal locus of control, is influenced and led by older youth[s],” and “has a hard time delaying gratification, favoring a more immediate payoff.” Ultimately, Sebastian summarized her conclusions regarding youth's sophistication and maturity:

“By structured interview, testing and collateral data, it is this examiner's opinion that [youth] is as sophisticated and mature as one might expect of a thirteen/fourteen- year old. In other words, he is average in sophistication and maturity for his age.

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