State v. Ellerson
| Decision Date | 27 February 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 4839-PR,4839-PR |
| Citation | 125 Ariz. 249,609 P.2d 64 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ralph Tauarr ELLERSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer, III and Lynn Hamilton, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.
Richard S. Oseran, Pima County Public Defender by P. Donovan Riddle and Barry J. Baker-Sipe, Deputy Public Defenders, Tucson, for appellant.
This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment of guilt to the charge of unlawful possession of a narcotic drug, heroin, A.R.S. § 36-1002, as amended, and A.R.S. § 36-1002.10. 1 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment and verdict, and we granted review because of what we believed to be a misstatement of the law by the Court of Appeals.
We must determine four matters on appeal:
1. Did the defendant, by admitting the prior conviction upon direct examination, waive the right to contest on appeal the court's ruling denying his pretrial motion in limine as to the prior conviction?
2. Did the trial court err in not finding that the probative value of the prior conviction outweighed its prejudicial effect?
3. Does sentencing in absentia under Rule 26.9, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., violate due process?
4. Was defendant's sentence excessive?
The facts necessary for a determination of this matter on appeal are as follows. Defendant was charged with possession of a narcotic drug with a prior felony conviction. Defendant was previously convicted of burglary in 1968, possession of unregistered firearms in 1972, and petty theft in 1972. Before trial, the defendant made a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the three prior convictions. The court granted the motion in limine as to the convictions for possession of unregistered firearms and petty theft, but did not grant the motion for the burglary conviction. At trial, the defendant took the stand and "drew the sting" by admitting on direct examination the prior burglary conviction. From a jury verdict and judgment of guilt and a sentence of not less than ten nor more than twelve years in the custody of the State Department of Corrections, defendant appeals.
The State contended, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that because the defendant testified on direct examination that he had previously been convicted of burglary, he had waived the right to question the court's ruling on the motion in limine. We do not agree.
Generally, a motion in limine, made prior to trial, is sufficient to preserve the question of admissibility on appeal. State v. Briggs, 112 Ariz. 379, 542 P.2d 804 (1975); State v. Reid, 114 Ariz. 16, 559 P.2d 136 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 921, 97 S.Ct. 2191, 53 L.Ed.2d 234 (1977). In the instant case, the defendant attempted to preclude the admission of evidence of a prior conviction by a timely motion in limine, which was denied. The defendant's attorney then attempted to minimize the prejudicial effect of the prior burglary conviction by asking the defendant, on direct examination, if he had been previously convicted of a felony. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the defendant was required to wait for the State to elicit this information on cross examination. The defendant, having lost his motion, was entitled to adjust his strategy to meet the question he could reasonably expect to be asked. By doing so, he did not waive the right to raise on appeal the alleged erroneous ruling of the trial court. In a case wherein the defendant, after an adverse ruling on his motion to exclude impeachment by prior convictions, elected not to testify, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated:
United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1184 (9th Cir. 1979).
We agree with the Ninth Circuit that a party should not necessarily lose his right to appeal a ruling because he alters his strategy in response to a trial court's finding against him. We hold that the defendant may raise on appeal the ruling of the trial judge denying defendant's motion to exclude evidence of the prior conviction for burglary.
Having determined that the defendant did not waive his right to appeal the ruling upon the motion in limine, we must now consider whether the court properly denied the motion insofar as the prior burglary conviction was concerned. Defendant makes two arguments regarding the denial of the motion: (a) that the offense was more than ten years old as provided by Rule 609(b) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, 17A A.R.S., and (b) that the trial court failed to make a finding that the probative value of the prior conviction outweighed its prejudicial impact.
Rule 609(b) reads as follows:
* * * "
Defendant pled guilty in November of 1968 for the prior crime of burglary. The trial in the instant case occurred in April of 1978 less than ten years after the burglary conviction. It is apparent that section (b) of the statute did not apply, because more than ten years had not elapsed since the prior conviction and the trial herein.
The defendant further contends, however, that the court failed to find specifically that the probative value of the conviction substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect, as required by section (a) of Rule 609. Our rule, which is the same as the federal rule, reads as follows:
The transcript in this case reveals that the merits of admitting all three prior convictions were fully discussed by the judge and counsel during the hearing on the motion in limine. The trial court did weigh the probative value of these convictions against their prejudicial effect in determining that the firearms and petty theft convictions would be excluded while the burglary conviction would be admitted. It is true that the record does not affirmatively show that the court in denying the motion in limine as to the burglary convictions made the findings required by Rule 609(a). This is not fatal, however, as it would appear from a complete reading of the transcript of the hearing on the motion in limine, that the court did consider the matters required by Rule 609(a). We agree with the D.C. Court of Appeals that
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