State v. Ellis
| Decision Date | 26 March 1945 |
| Docket Number | 37740. |
| Citation | 207 La. 812,22 So.2d 181 |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. ELLIS. |
Rehearing Denied April 30, 1945.
Patrick C. Ellis was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Conviction and sentence set aside, and case remanded.
Appeal from Eighth Judicial District Court, Parish of Grant; Cas moss, judge.
J. W. Ethridge, W. T. McCain, and J. H. Williams all of Colfax, for defendant-appellant.
Fred S. LeBlanc, Atty. Gan., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen Harry Fuller, Dist. Atty., of Winnfield, and W. T. Holloway of Jonesboro, for the State.
The defendant, Patrick C. Ellis, was indicted, tried and convicted of murder and sentenced to be electrocuted. He has appealed from the conviction and sentence.
The appeal is predicated on two bills of exception. Bill of Exception No. 1 is taken to the court's overruling of the defendant's objection to the admission of a written confession. Bill of Exception No. 2 is taken to the overruling of the motion for a new trial based on the same grounds. The two questions presented in the defendant's bills of exception are, (1) whether or not the confession was voluntary, and (2) whether the proper foundation was laid for its admission.
The defendant was a private in the 341st Infantry of the 86th Division which was located at Camp Livingston, Louisiana, at the time the offense was committed.
Shortly after the crime was committed, the defendant was taken to the office of the Post Prison Officer and interrogated. The written confession sought to be introduced resulted from this interrogation. The confession is in the form of questions and answers. It is stated in the written confession that it was taken at the office of the Post Prison Officer before a second lieutenant.
The confession purports to have been witnessed by three persons. Only one of these witnesses was produced by the State on the trial of the case, namely, Captain Harry W. Bennett. It appears from the record and the admissions of the State, in its brief, that he was not present at the time the defendant was interrogated. We gather from the record that the confession, after it was typed, was delivered to the office of Captain Bennett. He had the defendant brought in from the stockade and presented the instrument to the defendant. The defendant refused to sign it after he had read it, but upon Captain Bennett's informing him that it was his privilege to sign the instrument or not, the defendant signed the confession.
Some three weeks thereafter, the defendant was incarcerated in the parish jail. On the same day he was interrogated by the district attorney in the presence of some of the parish officials and confessed to the crime. He was asked at that time if the prior confession had been voluntarily made by him. His answer was to the effect that it was voluntary on his part.
On trial of the case, the State first proved the defendant's oral confession made to the district attorney and parish officials. No objection was offered to this confession. The State then sought to introduce the written confession taken at Camp Livingston. The defendant's counsel objected to the introduction of the written confession on the ground that the State had failed to affirmatively show that it had been freely and voluntarily made.
We find embodied in the confession the following statement made to the defendant:
This inducement was offered to the defendant after he had been questioned respecting his whereabouts on the date of the crime but before he was interrogated concerning his guilt. The confession shows on its face that the defendant was interrogated concerning his guilt after this inducement had been offered. Subsequently, he admitted to the killing of the deceased person. Near the conclusion of the confession, we find this statement: 'Now is the time to help yourself instead of waiting.' The defendant again admitted killing the deceased. We find the following statement at the conclusion of the confession, viz:
Under the provisions of Article 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a confession must be used in its entirety. The State cannot be permitted to contradict what is shown on the face of the confession which it seeks to introduce. In other words, if the confession shows on its face that it is inadmissible it must be excluded. When the State accepted the confession and offered it in evidence, it was bound by its contents. It could not be permitted to disprove and portion of its contents. To hold otherwise would permit the State to avail itself of that part of the confession favorable to it and disprove the prejudicial portion in direct conflict with the provisions of Article 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring the use of a confession in its entirety.
Moreover if the State were permitted to prove the confession was voluntarily made, it has failed to do so. The fact that the defendant signed the confession when it was presented to him by Captain Bennett does not disprove the inducement set out in that instrument. The fact that the defendant subsequently admitted having made the confession voluntarily is nothing more than the defendant's conclusion.
'A confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made.' Ziang Sung Wan v. United States of America, 266 U.S. 1, 45 S.Ct. 1, 3, 69 L.Ed. 131; State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910. The State has failed to show affirmatively that the confession was free and voluntary.
Furthermore, if there is any reasonable doubt as to whether the confession was free and voluntary, it must be excluded. 20 American Jurisprudence, verbo, Evidence, par. 537, p. 456; State v. Garvey, 25 La.Ann. 191; State v. Henry, supra.
The force of effect of influence upon the mind of the accused cannot be measured, and where any degree of influence has been exerted, the confession must be excluded. State v. Young, 52 La.Ann. 478, 27 So. 50; State v. Doiron, 150 La....
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State v. Ferguson
...inducements or promises.'6 E.g., State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910; State v. Graffam, 202 La. 869, 13 So.2d 249; State v. Ellis, 207 La. 812, 22 So.2d 181; State v. Ross, 212 La. 405, 31 So.2d 842; State v. Wilson, 214 La. 317, 37 So.2d 804; State v. Alexander, 215 La. 245, 40 So.2d ......
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State v. Mullin
...811, 112 So. 370; he will not be prosecuted, People v. Vinci, 295 Ill. 419, 129 N.E. 193; 'it will go easier on you', State v. Ellis, 207 La. 812, 22 So.2d 181, 182. But in Lewis v. U. S., 9 Cir., 74 F.2d 173, being told Indians usually get off easier, it was held not such an inducement so ......
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State v. Ross
... ... statement of what occurred in connection with the homicide ... However, be ... that as it may, the second confession was erroneously ... admitted, and its admission was reversible error ... In the case ... of State v. Ellis, 207 La. 812, 22 So.2d 181, 182, this court ... pointed out that: ... "A ... confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in ... fact, voluntarily [212 La. 423] made.' Ziang Sung Wan v ... United States of America, 266 U.S. 1, 45 S.Ct. 1, 3, 69 L.Ed ... 131; State v ... ...
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... ... See People v. Brockett, 195 Mich. 169, 161 N.W. 991 and State v ... Ellis, 207 La. 812, 22 So.2d 181, 183. Cf. Bayless v. United States, 8 Cir., 150 F.2d 236. In Stewart v. State, 231 Ala. 594, 165 So. 840, the admission was held not to be reversible error, because the evidence of the unlawful killing was undisputed, and the confession tended to show extenuating ... ...