State v. Ellis
| Decision Date | 31 May 1837 |
| Citation | 4 Mo. 474 |
| Parties | STATE v. ELLIS. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
The indictment charges that the defendant did suffer or permit a certain gambling device, adapted, devised and designed for the purpose of playing a game of chance, then and there to be used for the purpose of gaming, in a certain house then and there occupied by him; which said gambling device so suffered or permitted to be used as aforesaid, then and there consisted of a common box used as a table, and a pack of cards, with which device, idle and illdisposed persons were then and there permitted to play at cards, and bet money and property on divers games of chance, and then and there to gamble at said games of chance, &c. The court, on motion of the defendant quashed the indictment, and the cause comes up on appeal by the State to this court. The reasons assigned for quashing the indictment, and now urged for affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court are, 1st. Because said indictment is uncertain. 2nd. Because it is argumentative. 3rd. Because it alleges the offense in the alternative. 4th. Because said indictment does not allege that said gambling device was adapted, devised and designed for playing a game of chance for money or property. 5th. Because said indictment omits some of the words of the statute that are descriptive of the offense, and said indictment is otherwise informal, &c.
T. C. BURCH, for Defendant. If the indictment were framed on the 18th section of the 8th article of the act concerning crimes and punishments, late Rev. Code, 208, evidence of the facts set out in the indictment, it is believed, would sustain it; but the face of the indictment clearly shows that it was framed upon the 17th section of said article; which provides “that every person who shall suffer or permit any gaming table, bank or device prohibited by the preceding provisions, to be set up or used,” &c., &c. Now the devices prohibited by the preceding provisions are: “A. B. C., Faro, E. O., Roulette, Equality, or any kind of gambling table or gambling device, adapted, devised and designed for the purpose of playing any game of chance for money or property.” The indictment does not allege that the device mentioned was adapted, devised and designed for playing, &c., either for money or property, although those words constitute part of the description of the offense given by the statute, and that omission is fatal--1 Chitty's Crim. Law, 235-6, top paging. The indictment charges that the defendant suffered or permitted. Now, either to suffer or permit constitutes the offense; and it is believed to be indisputable law, that either the one or the other should be charged separately or both jointly, by substituting the copulative for the disjunctive conjunction. The indictment alleges that with said device, &c., idle persons were permitted (without alleging by whom) to play at cards and bet money and property, &c., and to gamble at said games of chance or gambling device. The indictment is uncertain, because it does not, except by inference, allege who permitted, &c., and because it does not appear whether the betting was at the game or at the device.
J. WILSON, on same side. It will easily be seen by examination of this indictment, that it charges no offense known to the statute. The statute says he that shall “set up or keep any gaming table, &c., shall be liable.” Now, it is not said that he done the one or the other, either that he set it up or kept it. Nor is it said that he permitted any person to play on the table, and the playing may have been permitted by him. Again it is said that persons were permitted to play at cards and bet money or property, on divers games of chance. Now, the playing ought to have been shown to have been upon some of the tables mentioned in the statute. For these reasons, it is believed the judgment of the Circuit Court in quashing the indictment will be affirmed.
This indictment is framed on the 17th section of the...
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State v. Snyder
...... allegation is charged. These terms being used as synonyms, no. injustice can be done defendant and no error was committed by. the court in refusing to quash the indictment on that ground. State v. Moore, 61 Mo. 278; State v. Ellis, . 4 Mo. 474; Brown v. Com., 8 Mass. 59. It may be true. that the trial court took the view, in the presentation of. the matter to him, that the terms were not synonymous and. meant entirely different things, and that the circuit. attorney also assumed the same position. This, however, ......
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State v. Brown
...The Missouri statute has been construed in the following cases: Lowry v. The State, 1 Mo. 722; The State v. Purdom, 3 Mo. 114; State v. Ellis, 4 Mo. 474; Eubanks v. The State, 5 Mo. 450; State v. Mitchell, 6 Mo. 147; State v. Bates, 10 Mo. 166; State v. Ames, 10 Mo. 743; State v. Fletcher, ......
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State v. Gilmore
...statute as being of a kindred nature and similar in kind to those mentioned. State v. Ames, 1 Mo. 524; State v. Purdon, 3 Mo. 114; State v. Ellis, 4 Mo. 474; Schropshire v. Glascock, 4 Mo. 536; State Eubanks, 5 Mo. 450; State v. Mitchell, 6 Mo. 147; State v. Bates, 10 Mo. 109; State v. O'Bl......
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State v. Virdure
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