State v. Ellis

• Decision Date: 28 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-882,97-882
• Citation: 578 N.W.2d 655
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Taneka Cherissee ELLIS, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 655

578 N.W.2d 655

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Taneka Cherissee ELLIS, Appellant.

No. 97-882.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 28, 1998.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Kevin Cmelik and Dennis Hendrickson, Assistant State Appellate Defenders, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and D. Raymond Walton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, LAVORATO, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.

LAVORATO, Justice.

A jury convicted Taneka Ellis of first-degree burglary. She appeals, contending the district court used the wrong standard in denying her motion for new trial. We agree. We reverse and remand with directions.

I. Facts.

Ellis and several of her friends forced their way into Teria Marks's apartment, ostensibly to get to the root of rumors. Ellis's friends included Tammika Bradford, Dee Harrington, Angela Smith, Jatonna Clark, Trece Johnson, and Teresa Nix. Marks allegedly was spreading rumors that Ellis's boyfriend and Bradford were having an affair.

The confrontation between the women and Marks quickly escalated and turned violent. Marks armed herself with a kitchen knife. Harrington, the most aggressive one of the group, attacked Marks with a miniature baseball bat. Marks slashed in defense, grazing Harrington. Bradford and Harrington rushed Marks and the fray moved to the bathroom where Marks continued to protect herself with indiscriminate slashes. She also wounded a neighbor, Rob Bogg, who had entered the apartment to stop the fray. During the fray, Ellis played no active part, but said and did things to indicate her approval of the assault on Marks.

II. Proceedings.

The State charged Ellis with first-degree burglary as an aider and abettor. See Iowa Code §§ 713.1, .3 (1995). At the close of the State's case and again at the close of all of the evidence, Ellis moved for a judgment of acquittal. She argued that her mere presence was insufficient to support the charge. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found Ellis guilty of the charge.

Ellis moved for a new trial. Among other things, she contended the verdict was contrary to the law or evidence. Iowa R.Crim. P. 23(2)(b)(6). Ellis argued "a trial court should be able to grant a new trial under rule 23(2)(b)(6) even where there is some evidence in the record to sustain a guilty verdict." Moreover, Ellis argued that "sufficiency of the evidence, while appropriate for a motion for judgment of acquittal, was inappropriate for a motion for new trial."

The district court noted "considerable cogency in that argument." Nevertheless, the court thought the "law is pretty well-settled on the standard for granting a new trial." The court stated, "I note for the record my written order will overrule the motion for new trial based on sufficiency of the evidence."

In its written order, the court examined the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and found there was sufficient evidence to establish Ellis's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This evidence, while persuasive, yielded a result which the court found disproportionately harsh: a first-degree burglary conviction for conduct that was "relatively secondary and passive compared with the conduct of Dee Harrington."

The court sentenced Ellis to an indeterminate term of twenty-five years in prison. See Iowa Code §§ 713.3, 902.9(1).

On appeal, Ellis contends the district court should not have used a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard in deciding her motion for new trial. Rather, she contends, the court should have used a weight-of-the-evidence standard. A weight-of-the-evidence standard, Ellis argues, would have allowed the district court to grant her a new trial even though the evidence might have been sufficient to sustain a conviction.

III. Whether Sufficiency of the Evidence is the Correct Standard for Determining Motions for New Trial.

A. Background. Two cases stand out in the development of what is now the law in Iowa on the standard trial courts use in determining motions for new trial: State v. Tokatlian, 203 N.W.2d 116 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa 1980).

1. Tokatlian. In Tokatlian, this court considered a challenge to the district court's adverse ruling on the defendant's motion for new trial based on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. This ground is now codified in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(2)(b)(6) (court may grant new trial "[w]hen the verdict is contrary to law or evidence").

At the time Tokatlian was decided, Iowa Code section 787.3(6) listed "contrary to the evidence" as one ground for granting a new trial. This court held that the phrase "contrary to the evidence" was synonymous with "against the weight of the evidence," which, in turn, "is used interchangeably with the phrase 'insufficiency of the evidence.' " Tokatlian, 203 N.W.2d at 119.

The court also held that when the verdict of conviction is against the weight of the evidence, the trial court must grant a motion for new trial under section 787.3(6). Id. In making the determination that the verdict of conviction is against the weight of the evidence, the trial court must follow several principles. The trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and accept as established all reasonable inferences tending to support the jury verdict. Id. In addition, the Tokatlian court stated the trial court need "consider only the supporting evidence whether contradicted or not." Id.

After following those principles, according to Tokatlian, if the trial court finds that there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, the court may overrule the motion for new trial. Id. Substantial evidence is that which would convince a rational factfinder that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Schertz, 328 N.W.2d 320, 321 (Iowa 1982).

2. Robinson. Later, this court overruled that portion of the Tokatlian decision that held that the trial court need consider only the supporting evidence whether contradicted or not. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d at 340. The court did so relying on Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Before Jackson, the federal standard for considering a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge was whether there was no evidence to support the jury verdict. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 625, 4 L.Ed.2d 654, 655 (1960) ("The ultimate question presented to us is whether the charges against petitioner were so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to render his conviction unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").

In Jackson, the Supreme Court abandoned the Thompson no-evidence rule, providing this rationale:

[A] properly instructed jury may occasionally convict even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the same may be said of a trial judge sitting as jury. In a federal trial, such an occurrence has traditionally been deemed to require reversal of the conviction. Under [In re ] Winship, [397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)], which established proof beyond a reasonable doubt as an essential of Fourteenth Amendment due process, it follows that when such a conviction occurs in a state trial, it cannot constitutionally stand.

....

After Winship the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to "ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 317-19, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d at 572-73.

Relying on this language, Robinson held that

[a] court could not determine whether any rational factfinder could have returned a guilty verdict if the court considered only the evidence which supports guilt, because a rational factfinder cannot render a verdict without taking into consideration all the evidence in the record.

288 N.W.2d at 340. Thus, a trial court must consider both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence in deciding motions for new trial. Id. For this reason, this court abandoned the Tokatlian rule that the trial court need only consider the supporting evidence when a defendant challenges a jury verdict on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds. Id. Otherwise, to this date, Tokatlian remains the law of this state. See State v. Dallen, 452 N.W.2d 398, 399 (Iowa 1990) ("[R]eview of the sufficiency of the evidence is applicable ... to the motion for a new trial.").

Ellis now asks us to overrule the Tokatlian holding that "contrary to the evidence" means a "sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge." Ellis thinks there is a vast difference between a "sufficiency-of-the-evidence" standard and a "weight-of-the-evidence" standard. She asserts that "contrary to the evidence" in our rule 23(2)(b)(6) should only mean "weight-of-the-evidence." To support her position, Ellis relies heavily on Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982).

B. Tibbs. Two years after Robinson, the Supreme Court decided Tibbs. In Tibbs, the question was whether double jeopardy bars retrial after a state appellate court sets aside a conviction on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Court held that a reversal based on the weight, rather than the sufficiency, of the...