State v. Engle
| Decision Date | 08 May 1900 |
| Citation | 82 N.W. 763,111 Iowa 246 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA v. J. H. ENGLE, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Clay District Court.--HON. F. H. HELSELL, Judge.
THE defendant was convicted of the crime of embezzlement, and appeals.--Reversed.
THE facts upon which the conviction is based are substantially as follows: The defendant, Engle, was a real-estate agent residing in Spencer, Iowa. In December, 1897, the prosecuting witness herein, Henry F. L. Brooks, listed with Engle, for sale, or to trade for land near Spencer, his farm in Dickinson county, Iowa. The selling price was to be thirty dollars per acre. There was talk between the two at that time that it might not be possible to make a cash sale at once and Engle said that exchanges could often be made so as to realize the price on the second deal, if not on the first. Soon after this, Engle notified Brooks of an opportunity to trade his farm to one Smith for a stock of goods. Brooks looked the Smith stock over, and told Engle to see what he could do with it. Following this conversation, Engle informed Brooks of an opportunity to trade for a stock of goods and some horses in Sioux City. He told him that he could sell the horses for him for one thousand five hundred dollars, and that the goods could be traded for land near Spencer. Engle at the same time stated that Brooks' equity in the farm was not sufficient to cover the goods and horses, and suggested to Brooks that a house and lot in Hartley belonging to Mrs. Brooks be put into the deal. The two went to Hartley explained the proposed trade to Mrs. Brooks, and she decided to put her Hartley property into the trade with the farm. The next day Engle, with an attorney, visited Brooks and his wife at Hartley, and procured from them deeds of the farm and the Hartley property, with the names of the grantees omitted. He also at the same time procured the following power of attorney: Within two or three days after this transaction, Engle went to Sioux City with a handy man by the name of Chase, and bought four hundred and eighty acres of Cheyenne county, Neb., land, and paid therefor one dollar per acre, and had it deeded to Chase. Engle inserted Chase's name as grantee in the deeds he had received of Brooks and wife. Chase then executed a note for one thousand dollars payable to Brooks, secured by mortgage on the Dickinson county land, and deeded the land and town property to Mary J. Lynch, the mother-in-law of Engle, and delivered the deed to Engle. Chase also deeded the Nebraska land to Brooks. Mary J. Lynch never accepted the deeds to the Brooks property, nor did she have or claim any interest therein, and executed conveyances thereof to Engle upon his request. The deed of the Nebraska land from Chase to Brooks was properly recorded in Nebraska, but never manually delivered to Brooks, nor was it recorded by his direction. On the eleventh day of May, 1898, Engle sold and conveyed the Dickinson county farm to one George Schee, and received for the equity therein two thousand six hundred and five dollars. In September of the same year Brooks demanded of Engle all money he had received for his Dickinson county property, which demand was refused. The money so received is the money the defendant is charged with embezzling.
REVERSED.
Corey & Bemis, Buck & Kirkpatrick, R. M. Wright, and Duffie, Gaines & Kebby for appellant.
Milton Remley, Attorney General, and Chas. A. Van Vleck, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
In the preceding statement of the case we have only given the most prominent facts. In addition thereto there are many minor ones. Taken altogether, they stamp the defendant's conduct in this transaction as being as fraudulent and vicious as any recorded in the books, and as deserving of the punishment imposed by the trial court as in any case with which we are acquainted. Notwithstanding the gross fraud perpetrated on Mr. Brooks and his wife by this defendant, we are compelled to reverse this case because of the well-settled legal principles controlling it, which we now consider.
I. Were the deeds to Chase void absolutely, or were they voidable only? If absolutely void and of no effect, of course no title passed to Chase, and he could convey none to others. If voidable only, the title passed to Chase according to the terms of the deeds, and he might, in turn convey to another. At the time the deeds were given to Chase, if, indeed, they were ever actually delivered to him, Engle was authorized to either sell or trade the Brooks land. There is no escape from this conclusion. Brooks so testifies, in substance, and the entire record confirms the defendant's contention on this point. It is true, nothing had been said up to that time about Nebraska land, and the written power of attorney provided for a sale only, but all parties understood, and so talked, that Engle was to either sell or trade for goods, stock or land, so that Mr. Brooks might eventually realize from his farm, and Mrs. Brooks from her home in Hartley. It clearly appears that every step taken by Engle in these transactions which culminated in his acquiring deeds to the Brooks farm was fraudulent. He bought the Nebraska land himself, and though the title thereto went to Chase, and from Chase to Brooks, it amounted to a transfer of the title from Engle to Brooks and the transactions as to the Dickinson county land were, in effect, deeds from Brooks to Engle. So that, reduced to a final analysis, the entire transaction was in reality an attempted purchase by...
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