State v. Englehart

• Decision Date: 01 April 1969
• Citation: 256 A.2d 231,158 Conn. 117
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Queenie ENGLEHART.

Page 231

256 A.2d 231

158 Conn. 117

STATE of Connecticut v. Queenie ENGLEHART.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

April 1, 1969.

John A. Spector, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

James N. Oliver, Jr., Pros. Atty., for appellee (state).

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, COTTER and THIM, JJ.

ALCORN, Associate Justice.

The defendant was charged, in the Circuit Court, with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The state presented evidence and rested its case. The defendant offered no evidence. A jury of twelve found her guilty. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to set saide the verdict and motion to set aside the verdict and appealed to the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court on the sole ground that the state had failed to prove that she had operated the vehicle. The Appellate Division sustained the conviction, and, on the defendant's petition, we granted certification. 233 A.2d 691.

The only issue presented is whether the jury could, on the evidence offered by the state, reasonably conclude that the defendant, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, was guilty of operating the vehicle.

Section 14-227a of the General Statutes, so far as material, provides that: 'No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this state * * * while under the influence of intoxicating liquor * * *.' The burden which rested on the state in order to establish the crime charged was to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, (2) the defendant operated a motor vehicle on a public highway. State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 484, 29 A.2d 582. It is not disputed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Our concern is only with the second element of the crime charged. The burden of proof of that element of the crime could be met by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. 'The law recognizes no distinction between circumstantial evidence and direct evidence so far as probative force a concerned. If evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, should convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that an accused is guilty, that is all that is required for a conviction.' State v. Smith, 138 Conn. 196, 200, 82 A.2d 816, 819; State v. Kreske, 130 Conn. 558, 563, 36 A.2d 389.

It is clear that the state's case concerning the operation of this motor vehicle by the defendant rested on circumstantial evidence to the extent that no witness was produced who actually saw her drive the vehicle along the road. The jury could reasonably have found from the evidence before them, in summary, as follows: On January 3, 1967, a state trooper was patrolling Babcock Hill Road, a public highway in Lebanon. The road, described as a 'back' road, is eighteen feet wide and has a 'blacktop' surface. The weather was clear and the road surface was dry. At about 8 p.m., the trooper came upon an automobile stationary in about the center of the road. The taillights and the bright headlights of the car were on, and the defendant was seated in the driver's seat, slumped over the steering wheel. She was unconscious, 'dead drunk', and drooling at the mouth. The key was in the ignition switch, which was turned to the 'on' position, the gear shift lever was in the 'drive' position, and the emergency brake was on. The motor was not running. No person other than the defendant was in the car. After a delay of ten or fifteen minutes while waiting for assistance to arrive, the trooper, with another trooper who was called to help him, lifted the defendant from the car in which she was seated to a police cruiser, drove to a police barracks and carried her inside. After she was removed from the car to the cruiser, one of the troopers started the car, which was in good operating condition, and drove it about 2000 feet down the road to a location where it was parked. For a period of about an hour and a half from the time she was first discovered, the defendant was unable to walk or to talk coherently.

There was no suggestion of the presence of any person, houses, or buildings of any sort in the vicinity of the spot where the defendant was found seated, alone, in the driver's seat of the car. There was no evidence as to who owned the car or how long it had stood in the center of the road. There was no evidence that the defendant was a licensed driver.

From the evidence before them, it is obvious that the jury, by their verdict, inferred that the defendant, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, had either driven the vehicle to the point at which it stopped or had attempted to start if after it had stopped, thereby giving rise to a situation such as that in State v. Swift, 125 Conn. 399, 403, 6 A.2d 359. The question before us is whether this inference is so unreasonable that the verdict cannot be supported.

It was unquestionably within the province of the jury to draw a reasonable and logical inference from the facts proved. The inference may be drawn as long as it comes only from, and bears a logical relation to, the other facts which have been proved and not from facts which are merely surmised. State v. Foord, 142 Conn. 285, 294, 113 A.2d 591. Moreover, the inference which the jury in the present case obviously drew had to be wholly consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion. State v. DeCoster, 147 Conn....