State v. McDonough
| Decision Date | 28 December 1942 |
| Citation | 129 Conn. 483,29 A.2d 582 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. McDONOUGH. |
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New Haven County; Parmelee, Judge.
John McDonough was charged in an information with crime of operating an automobile while under influence of intoxicating liquor, which charge was brought to the court and tried to the court. Judgment of guilty and appeal by defendant.
Error and case remanded with directions.
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and JENNINGS, ELLS, DICKENSON, INGLIS, JJ.
John J. Sullivan, Jr., of New Haven, for appellant (defendant).
Edwin S. Pickett, of New Haven (Luke H. Stapleton, of New Haven, on the brief), for appellee (the State).
The defendant was charged with driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of General Statutes, § 1585. The state produced evidence and rested its case, whereupon the defendant also rested, claiming that the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court found him guilty as charged, and he has appealed.
The state must prove each of the two essential elements of the crime charged; if it fails to prove either one beyond a reasonable doubt, it has failed in its burden of proof. State v. Newman, 127 Conn. 398, 400, 17 A.2d 774. There is evidence that the defendant was under the influence of liquor when found in a stationary automobile; there is no direct evidence that he was or had been driving the car. A policeman on duty in a squad car, at about 9 :30 in the evening, saw an automobile against the highway fence with a wheel over a wire of this barrier. The car was on its right side of the road, the motor was not running, it was dark and the headlights were lighted. The weather was clear and dry. The officer investigated and found the defendant seated in the middle of the front seat, leaning toward the right, with one hand on the floor and the other on the dashboard, as though he was reaching or feeling for something. The officer asked him what happened and how he got there; upon receiving an unintelligible answer and smelling the odor of liquor, he "assumed" the defendant had been driving the car and arrested him. Witnesses who saw the defendant at the police station testified that he was under the influence of liquor. There was no evidence as to how long the car had been standing, who owned it, that the defendant had been seen driving it prior to the occurrence or that he could drive a car or had a driver's license. The defendant made no admissions to the police or to anyone else. Upon these facts it is a reasonable conclusion that a negligent driver had operated the car. It may be a fair guess that the defendant was the driver. It is the law of this state, however, that a man shall not be convicted upon mere suspicion. The state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that is, by such proof as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it tends to support. It is proof wholly consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion; State v. Block, 87 Conn. 573, 577, 578, 89 A. 167, 49 L.R.A., N.S., 913; but this requirement does not mean that the proof must be beyond a possible doubt, and a possible supposition of innocence is a far different thing from a reasonable hypothesis. State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124, 139, 145 A. 761.
It is true that when any circumstance offered in evidence is susceptible of two conclusions, one of which is in favor of guilt and one of innocence, the trier is not bound to disregard such circumstance. It may take it into consideration in reaching its conclusion. It is entitled to draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances which it finds established by the evidence. State v. Murphy, 124 Conn. 554, 562, 1 A.2d 274. This does not mean that the trier may adopt a supposition of guilt which is merely a possible one. It must be a fair and reasonable one. Nor may it adopt a possible supposition of innocence; it must be a reasonable one. Our law is settled that the proof of guilt must exclude, not every possible, but every reasonable supposition of the innocence of the accused. State v. Block, supra, 87 Conn. 577, 89 A. 167, 49 L.R.A., N.S., 913. We conclude that the evidence in the instant case does not exclude every reasonable supposition of the innocence of the defendant. A rational and reasonable conclusion would be that another person had driven the car and had gone to secure assistance in extricating the wheel from the wire. It follows that the evidence offered by the state, in and of itself, is insufficient to support the conviction of the defendant.
The state contends, however, that even if its evidence, standing alone, did not justify the court in reasonably concluding that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence plus the inference which the court could draw from his failure to testify in his own behalf did justify such a conclusion. The question immediately arises as to how much evidence the state must produce before the trier is permitted to apply the inference. Obviously the state must first produce some evidence of guilt. It could not rest its case without producing evidence, and, when the defendant rested, claim his...
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Mccoy v. Comm'r Of Pub. Safety, SC 18545
...v. Englehart, 158 Conn. 117, 119, 256 A.2d 231 (1969); State v. DeCos-ter, 147 Conn. 502, 504, 162 A.2d 704 (1960); State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 484, 29 A.2d 582 (1942). Indeed, in 1980, the Appellate Session of the Superior Court squarely considered and rejected an argument by the st......
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...... "[A] mere 'possible hypothesis' of innocence will not suffice." ' (Citations omitted.) State v. Englehart, 158 Conn. 117, 121-22, 256 A.2d 231 (1969)." State v. Morrill, 193 Conn. 602, 611, 478 A.2d 994 (1984); see State v. Foord, supra, 142 Conn. at 295, 113 A.2d 591; State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 485, 29 A.2d 582 (1942). While proof of guilt must exclude every reasonable supposition of innocence, it need not exclude every possible supposition of innocence. State v. Englehart, supra, 158 Conn. at 121, 256 A.2d 231. We start our analysis recognizing that to ......
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