State v. English

• Decision Date: 30 June 1915
• Docket Number: 9122.
• Parties: STATE v. ENGLISH.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

85 S.E. 721

101 S.C. 304

STATE v. ENGLISH.

No. 9122.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 30, 1915

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Marlboro County; H. F Rice, Judge.

Brooks English was convicted of abandonment of his wife and failure to support her without just cause, and he appeals. Affirmed.

J. K Owens and S. S. Tison, both of Bennettsville, for appellant.

Townsend & Rogers, of Bennettsville, for the State.

GAGE J.

The defendant was tried and convicted for a violation of section 697 of the Criminal Code of 1912, the law which makes it a misdemeanor for a husband to abandon his wife and to fail to support her without just cause. The appeal is from a judgment of imprisonment entered upon the verdict.

There are five exceptions; the second is split into five, and the third is split into four, alleged errors. But the appellant's counsel concedes in his argument that the case presents really only four issues, and he has stated them thus, he contends: (1) That the statute in the case is in violation of section 24, article 1 of the Constitution of 1895; (2) that the marriage was illegal because had under the provisions of section 389 of the Criminal Code of 1912; (3) that the wife was admittedly not dependent upon her husband for support and that circumstance bars the prosecution; (4) that the husband had "just cause or excuse" to abandon and fail to support his wife, because, before her marriage to him, and without his knowledge thereof until after marriage with him, she had been guilty of gross immorality with other men.

History The prosecutrix was married to the defendant in the latter part of 1911 when she was 17 years old. The marriage resulted under the proviso of section 389 of the Criminal Code; that which permits a seducer to escape the penalty of his wrong by marrying his victim. The defendant abandoned his wife in the early months of 1912, and has admittedly done nothing since then towards her support. She gave birth to three children, one in 1911, one in 1913, and one in 1914, all now dead, and all by the defendant, so she swears. The defendant did not deny the paternity of the first child, but did, by necessary inference, deny that of the others.

It was admitted at the trial on circuit, that the prosecutrix and the defendant had been married, and that the defendant had abandoned her and failed to supply her with the necessaries of life. The excuse for his conduct is that he had just cause to abandon his wife; that the marriage is of no force, because contracted under compulsion; that the statute creating the offense is against the fundamental law; that the wife is not dependent upon him for support, because her father is able to do that for her. These defenses are but a restatement of the four exceptions. They will be considered in the order first hereinabove stated.

I. It is true the Constitution of 1895, and for that matter most others, prohibit imprisonment for debt except in cases of fraud. From that fundamental it is argued: (1) That defendant made a contract of marriage with the woman; (2) that his failure to support her constituted a breach of the contract; and (3) that for such breach the Legislature cannot penalize the defendant by imprisonment. The argument is not sound; the conclusion is too general for the limited character of the premises.

It is true marriage has been termed by our courts a civil contract, but it has not been confined to that definition. Issues depend upon it, and results spring out of it which do not follow upon the performance or the breach of other contracts. A relationship is not much simplified by calling it a contract, for thereout may arise multitudinous and different rights.

Coming now to the minor premise of the argument: It is true one of the many obligations of the marriage contract is that resting on the husband to support the wife, however poorly that obligation may in fact be sometimes performed. The implied contract to support is incident to the marriage relation. But the parties to the marriage contract are not alone interested in the performance of the implied obligation to support. All those who constitute organized society have a direct interest in that event. The state has always busied itself about the domestic relations; about marriage and who may contract it and how women may be protected from the force and stratagem of men; about children, their education, and their employment; about morality and how it shall be preserved in the family. Those forces which operate to impair the integrity of the family will finally sap the foundations of the state. Society is interested that the family shall be maintained first of all by meat and bread. The state...