State v. Engstrom
| Decision Date | 28 December 1982 |
| Citation | 453 A.2d 1170 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Stanley ENGSTROM. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
David M. Cox, Dist. Atty., R. Christopher Almy, Gary F. Thorne (orally), Asst. Dist. Attys., Bangor, for plaintiff.
Conte, Crowe, Lunn & McCue, Carl D. McCue (orally), Bangor, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C.J., and GODFREY, NICHOLS, ROBERTS, CARTER and WATHEN, JJ.
The defendant, Stanley Engstrom, was convicted of criminal threatening with a firearm, Class C, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 209 (Pamph.1982), 1 following a jury trial in Superior Court, Penobscot County. He seeks reversal of his conviction on the following grounds: (1) discovery violations by the State, (2) error in admitting an opinion expressed by a lay witness, (3) error in requiring the jury to continue deliberating and in causing testimony to be read to the jury, (4) inconsistency of verdict, (5) cumulative error resulting in the denial of a fair trial, and (6) insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. We deny the appeal.
The defendant was indicted and tried for two counts of criminal threatening with a firearm. The two counts contain identical allegations with the exception of the identity of the person placed in fear of imminent bodily injury. Count I refers to Randall Scripture while Count II refers to Raymond Toothaker.
The testimony at trial reflects that the defendant arrived at Mr. Scripture's home at 10:30 p.m. on August 21, 1981, after a long day of heavy drinking. A party was under way and among the guests were the defendant's wife and children. Shortly after arriving the defendant displayed a pistol which he was carrying on his person. The incident with Mr. Scripture resulted from the defendant's asking to see his wife. Mr. Scripture stated that she was not there and the defendant pushed the pistol in Mr. Scripture's abdomen and called him a liar. Mr. Scripture turned his back and stated that he did not care if the defendant shot. Within minutes after this incident, Raymond Toothaker, a guest at the party, was stopped by the defendant at gun point while Mr. Toothaker was trying to get into his car to leave the party. He was held at gun point by the defendant for 15 to 20 minutes, during part of which time he was on his knees. The defendant told Mr. Toothaker that he was going to "blow his brains out."
Defense counsel sought to defend on the basis that defendant's intoxication created a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the required culpable state of mind. The defense presented Dr. Kamm, a psychiatrist involved in the treatment of alcoholics, who testified extensively on alcoholic blackouts and the effect of intoxication on awareness. It was his opinion that the defendant was suffering from a blackout on the evening in question. The jury ultimately returned a verdict of not guilty on Count I, and a verdict of guilty on the Count II indictment involving Mr. Toothaker. From this latter verdict the subject appeal is taken.
The alleged violation of the discovery rules arose at that point in the trial at which the State called the victim, Mr. Toothaker, as a witness. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial or dismissal on the grounds that the State failed to provide him with a written summary of the witness' statement. Defense counsel received automatic discovery and discovery upon request pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 16(a) and (b). He did not request any written or recorded statements of witnesses or summaries of such statements. At no time did he file a motion pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 16(c) seeking a court-ordered disclosure of such statements. No violation is demonstrated upon this record. Access to written statements of witnesses may be obtained by motion and order of court. One who does not avail himself of that procedure cannot complain. In this case the presiding justice found that the witness had been absent from the State and had never given a statement. Nevertheless the justice recessed to provide defense counsel an opportunity to confer with the witness prior to the point at which the witness took the stand. No error was committed in the denial of defendant's motion for mistrial or dismissal.
The defendant contends that the court erred in permitting Mr. Scripture to express an opinion. On re-direct examination by the State the following exchange took place:
The defendant now argues on appeal that since the witness is not a medical expert, he should not have been permitted to state his opinion as to the cause of the defendant's sorrow. It is possible that the witness was merely paraphrasing a statement of the defendant, but even if we assume that he was rendering his conclusion as to the etiology of defendant's sorrow it does not rise to the level of obvious error affecting substantial rights. The issue pressed by counsel was not preserved by stating the specific ground of objection at trial. M.R.Evid. 103(a)(1). If the court admitted the statement as opinion testimony by a lay witness pursuant to M.R.Evid. 701, such a shorthand rendering of the facts is unassailable when judged on the basis of obvious error.
The defendant has several objections to the conduct of the jury deliberations and to the reading of a portion of the trial testimony to the jury. The deliberations of the jury began at 12:15 p.m. At approximately 3:00 p.m., the jury made inquiry by note and requested: (1) clarification of the definition of intoxication, (2) the allegations of the indictment, and (3) instructions as to "how much weight do jurors put on intoxication." The presiding justice responded appropriately. At 5:15 p.m. the jury sent a note requesting that a portion of Dr. Kamm's testimony pertaining to his opinion of whether the defendant had experienced a blackout be read. The request was granted without objection. At 6:15 p.m., the presiding justice and counsel agreed on sending a note to the jury inquiring as to the state of their deliberations. The jury's reply stated: The presiding justice, without objection, then sent a note asking if the jury would like that portion of Dr. Kamm's testimony read in which he defined blackout. The jury responded affirmatively and counsel and the court first listened to the testimony in its entirety while in chambers. The court then selected a short definitional section of the testimony and in the presence of the jury the following took place:
THE COURT: The Court Reporter has located the portion of the transcript where there was actually a definition of blackout. That will be read back to you.
There are a number of portions of the doctor's testimony were [sic] he develops and gives examples, that is not going to be read back to you unless you specifically request it. What she will be reading is his definition of blackout.
Thereupon the Court Reporter read the following:
That's very lengthy and if you want it, you can have it but I would just as soon not have it read back without a specific request from you. But, as I say, if you want it, you can have it and let us know.
Defense counsel objected and requested that a greater portion of the testimony be read and requested an opportunity to make an...
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State v. Robinson
...that the court's decision whether to allow a read-back requested by a jury is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); State v. Engstrom, 453 A.2d 1170, 1172–73 (Me.1982). Rather, in its communications with the jurors, the court merely made a reasonable effort to clarify the nature of their re......
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State v. Snow
...inconsistent verdicts on separate counts of a single indictment require reversal. We are aware that there is language in State v. Engstrom, 453 A.2d 1170 (Me.1982), that might be construed as suggesting the necessity of a reversal in particular Inconsistent verdicts require reversal only if......
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State v. Finnemore
...284 U.S. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932) and Commonwealth v. Scott, 355 Mass. 471, 245 N.E.2d 415 (1969)). Later, in State v. Engstrom, 453 A.2d 1170 (Me.1982), we stated in dictum that "Inconsistent verdicts require reversal only if they are incapable of logical reconciliation." Id.......
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State v. Maizeroi
...reconciliation, mandating reversal. It is not without question that the verdicts were inconsistent, but if they were, in State v. Engstrom, 453 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Me.1982), we held that "inconsistent verdicts require reversal only if they are incapable of logical reconciliation." We have subs......