State v. Epps
| Decision Date | 15 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. S96A1076,S96A1076 |
| Citation | 476 S.E.2d 579,267 Ga. 175 |
| Parties | STATE v. EPPS |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
J. Michael McDaniel, Asst. Dist. Atty., John Tom Morgan, Dist. Atty., Decatur, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Atlanta, for the State.
Drew Findling, Elizabeth Lee Rankin, Atlanta, for Epps.
Appellee Victoria Epps was the sole employee present at a convenience store when Gerald Dunn entered, armed with a handgun, and fatally shot a customer before removing $82 from the store's cash register. Other customers were not harmed by Dunn. Believing the crime to have been staged by Epps and Dunn, police arrested Epps and charged her with felony murder, the underlying offense being armed robbery, and with hindering the apprehension of a criminal. Dunn pleaded guilty to murder and armed robbery, and testified against Epps. The jury returned guilty verdicts against Epps on both charges. The trial court denied Epps' motion for new trial but subsequently vacated that order and granted Epps a new trial on an issue not germane to this appeal.
In response to a new indictment which charged her with hindering the apprehension of a criminal and felony murder by aiding and abetting Dunn in armed robbery, Epps filed a motion to quash the count of the indictment charging her with felony murder. After holding a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to quash. In its order, the trial court examined the law of armed robbery, the underlying felony of the felony murder charge, and made three findings: under Georgia law, Epps was the only possible victim of the robbery; it was "legally impossible" for Epps to have committed an armed robbery against her own person; and, assuming Epps had been a participant in the crime, there was no actual or constructive force necessary to the commission of armed robbery. The trial court concluded that Georgia law did not "encompass a person being both a party to or perpetrator of the crime [of armed robbery] and the victim," and that the indictment charging Epps with felony murder/armed robbery was not in accordance with the law. Pursuant to the authority granted it by OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(1), the State filed a direct appeal from the order quashing the indictment. 1
The indictment at issue charged Epps with felony murder, alleging that she,
while in the commission of the offense of Armed Robbery, did cause the death of [the victim] ... by shooting him with a handgun, said Armed Robbery having been committed in the following manner: the accused, with intention to commit theft, did aid and abet Gerald Walker Dunn in taking U.S. currency from her person and immediate presence by the use of a handgun, the same being an offensive weapon....
The crime of armed robbery is codified at OCGA § 16-8-41(a) as the taking, with intent to commit a theft, "of property of another from the person or immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon...." We turn our attention to one of the two essential elements of the crime on which the trial court based its ruling: the force necessary to effectuate a robbery.
A taking accomplished by force or intimidation is the "distinguishing characteristic" of robbery--the "gist" of the offense. 77 C.J.S. Robbery § 13, p. 603. The force necessary for robbery is actual violence or intimidation "exerted upon the person robbed, by operating upon his fears--the fear of injury to his person, or property, or character." Long v. State...
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Prater v. State
...a felony, he causes the death of another human being irrespective of malice." OCGA § 16-5-1(c). 3. OCGA § 16-8-41(a); State v. Epps, 267 Ga. 175, 176, 476 S.E.2d 579 (1996). 4. Epps, 5. OCGA § 16-8-41(a); Conner v. the State, 251 Ga. 113, 114-15, 303 S.E.2d 266 (1983). 6. Hicks v. State, 23......
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Jackson v. the State., A10A2164.
...armed robbery may be found even “if the defendant's use of force occurs ‘in flight’ after the taking.” FN21. State v. Epps, 267 Ga. 175, 176–177, 476 S.E.2d 579 (1996) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). FN22. Oliver v. State, 232 Ga.App. 816, 817(1), 503 S.E.2d 28 (1998)......
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Hawkins v. Barnhart, CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-115-DLB
.... likely to create an apprehension of danger, and induce a person to part with his property for the safety of his person.State v. Epps, 476 S.E.2d 579, 580 (Ga. 1996) (citations omitted). Because armed robbery in Georgia requires at least the "threatened use of physical force" against the v......
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Hewitt v. State
...or intimidation if that threat of harm induces the victim/possessor of property to relinquish possession. [Cit.] State v. Epps, 267 Ga. 175, 176, 476 S.E.2d 579 (1996). The evidence was that Hewitt planned to take the truck as "collateral," and that he had a handgun visible in the waistband......