State v. Eskridge, 87-1483
| Decision Date | 20 July 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-1483,87-1483 |
| Citation | 38 Ohio St.3d 56,526 N.E.2d 304 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. ESKRIDGE, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The force and violence necessary to commit the crime of rape depends upon the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other. With the filial obligation of obedience to a parent, the same degree of force and violence may not be required upon a person of tender years, as would be required were the parties more nearly equal in age, size and strength. (State v. Labus [1921], 102 Ohio St. 26, 38-39, 130 N.E. 161, 164.)
2. A reviewing court will not reverse a conviction where there is substantial evidence upon which the court could reasonably conclude that all the elements of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (State v. Eley [1978], 56 Ohio St.2d 169, 10 O.O.3d 340, 383 N.E.2d 132, syllabus.)
On February 6, 1986, appellee, Anthony G. Eskridge, was indicted and charged with the rape of his four-year-old daughter. The indictment also charged him with using force or the threat of force in the commission of the rape. The rape occurred on January 24, 1986, while Eskridge was babysitting his daughter during the time her mother was at work. Eskridge and the child's mother never married and were not living together at the time of the alleged rape. The court convicted Eskridge of rape, found that he had used force or threat of force, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The court of appeals reversed in part and remanded the cause for resentencing, finding that "[t]he transcript reveals no threats, commands, or physical contact which would permit an inference of the force or coercion envisioned by the statute [R.C. 2907.02(B) ]."
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.
John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and DeLouis Broughton, Cleveland, for appellant.
Hyman Friedman, County Public Defender, and Robert M. Ingersoll, Cleveland, for appellee.
In this case, we consider the issue of whether there was substantial evidence presented at trial to prove that force or the threat of force was used in the commission of the rape. We hold that there was and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
R.C. 2907.02, since amended (139 Ohio Laws, Part I, 523, 538), provided in part:
"Force" is defined in R.C. 2901.01(A) as "any violence, compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing."
At trial, the victim gave the following testimony:
The victim's mother testified to the following:
The victim's mother further testified that for several nights after the incident, the child cried in her sleep, and later was unwilling to go to her father's house.
Two pediatricians who examined the victim testified that the victim had a redness in her vaginal area. One of the doctors testified that the hymenal ring bordered on abnormal in diameter. However, neither physician could state with a reasonable degree of certainty that penetration had occurred on the date in question. The absence of such evidence, one physician observed, is common in sexual abuse cases.
While the record could have been more explicit on the amount of force involved, in light of all the circumstances, i.e., the child's testimony, the child's tender age, and the relationship of parental authority that defendant had with his four-year-old daughter, we find substantial evidence from which the trial court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Eskridge committed the act with force. State v. Labus (1921), 102 Ohio St. 26, 38-39, 130 N.E. 161, 164. In the present case, the victim testified that Eskridge removed her panties and there was testimony that he laid her on the bed--both acts of compulsion and constraint that are independent of the act of rape. The victim's testimony also expressed her revulsion at her father's conduct. Further, we note the age difference and disparity in size between Eskridge, a twenty-eight-year-old man, and the victim, a four-year-old child. A four-year-old child cannot consent to sexual conduct. The victim here did not and could not have participated in the sexual conduct of her own free will.
Even the court of appeals admitted that force was involved. The court of appeals, however, went on to conclude that "R.C. 2907.02(B) clearly requires an additional quantum of force or coercion." We do not read the statute as the court of appeals applied it. R.C. 2907.02(B) requires only that minimal force...
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...[J.L.] physically resisted the defendant. Trial Transcript, Vol. VI, attached to Return of Writ, PageID# 1381-82. In State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56 (Ohio 1988), the Ohio Supreme Court clarified the meaning of force and held that, when a case involves a child under the age of thirteen, ......
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State v. Johnson, Case No. 2011-CA-237
...defer to the trier of fact who had the opportunity to hear the potential jurors and observe their demeanor. See State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304(1988); State v. Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 528 N.E.2d 523(1988); State v. Thomas, 70 Ohio St.2d 79, 434 N.E.2d 1356(1982). We ar......
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