State v. Espinoza
| Docket Number | S-1-SC-38642 |
| Decision Date | 30 October 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JOSE ESPINOZA, Defendant-Petitioner. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Kimberly Chavez Cook Appellate Defender Charles D. Agoos, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Meryl E. Francolini, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellee
DECISION
{¶1} Defendant Jose Espinoza was pulled over in his car by a sheriff's deputy pursuant to a be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) for a stabbing suspect who fled in a grey Honda Civic. Defendant's car was stopped thirty-seven to forty minutes after the BOLO advisement, just one mile from the location of the alleged stabbing. Defendant was eliminated as the suspect, but he was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. The district court concluded that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant and accordingly granted Defendant's motion to suppress "all evidence . . . obtained as a result of the unlawful search and seizure of Defendant."
{¶2} The Court of Appeals reversed the district court. Explaining its holding that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, the Court of Appeals concluded that the deputy "reasonably considered that the suspect . . . might hide for a period of time . . . to escape detection." State v. Espinoza, A-1-CA-38243, mem. op. ¶ 17 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2020) (nonprecedential). The Court of Appeals reached its conclusion despite the district court's contrary factual finding that the suspect in this case did not hide. The district court's finding that the suspect did not hide is supported by evidence in the record-namely, that the suspect fled. By rejecting the district court's finding that the suspect did not hide, the Court of Appeals misapplied our standard of review. Giving appropriate deference to the district court's factual findings, we conclude under the totality of the circumstances that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment to seize Defendant. We reverse.
{¶3} After receiving reports of a stabbing in Anthony, New Mexico, a BOLO was issued to law enforcement for a suspect described as having neck tattoos and wearing a white shirt. The location of the stabbing was broadcast, as was the name and address of the suspect. The BOLO advised that the suspect fled eastward from the scene of the crime toward the desert in a grey Honda Civic with a damaged front fender and a Texas license plate.
{¶4} Pursuant to the BOLO, Deputy Luis Ruiz of the Dona Ana County Sheriff's Office pulled over a silver Honda Civic near the location of the stabbing. That stop did not result in the capture of the suspect.
{¶5} Defendant, driving a silver[1] Honda Accord and heading south, passed within sight of the Deputy Ruiz and other officers conducting the stop of the Honda Civic. A sergeant tried to get Defendant's attention, but Defendant did not stop. The sergeant then issued an instruction to stop Defendant's vehicle. Deputy Ruiz got in his patrol car and pursued Defendant with his lights and sirens on. The stop occurred thirty-seven to forty minutes after the BOLO was issued. Although Defendant was not the suspect in the stabbing, he smelled of alcohol and was arrested for DWI.
{¶6} Defendant was convicted of DWI in the magistrate court after the judge denied Defendant's motion to suppress all evidence from the stop. Defendant appealed to the district court for a trial de novo. He again filed a motion to suppress all evidence from the stop, arguing that the warrantless seizure violated both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution because Detective Ruiz lacked reasonable suspicion.
{¶7} The district court received evidence establishing the following facts. At the time Deputy Ruiz seized Defendant, he knew Defendant's vehicle was a silver Honda, but did not remember whether he knew it was an Accord rather than a Civic. Deputy Ruiz testified that Defendant's car had a Texas license plate. At the time Deputy Ruiz initiated the stop, he did not notice any damage to the front fender as described in the BOLO. Deputy Ruiz testified that that there was not much traffic that night. Asked whether his department was "stopping anything that looked similar to a grey Honda in the pursuit of this suspect," Deputy Ruiz responded,
{¶8} Relying on his training and experience, Deputy Ruiz also testified that in order to evade capture, suspects in the area sometimes flee to Texas, modify their vehicles by doing things such as changing license plates, and "try to lay low until lights and sirens are completely out and they feel safe that they can actually come out and go on their way to wherever they were planning to go."
{¶9} The district court granted Defendant's suppression motion and explained its ruling from the bench.[2] The court agreed with the State that Deputy Ruiz had particularized, well-articulated suspicion. But the district court concluded that the stop was objectively unreasonable. The district court explained that it knew the area and took judicial notice that the distance between the location of the stabbing and the location where Defendant was stopped is one mile. The district court also noted that although the suspect fled east from the stabbing, the road headed in that direction from the location of the stabbing "comes back." The district court stated that making its decision took hours and explained some of its reasoning as follows:
I don't quite believe you had reasonable suspicion because of the time frame.... I look at these facts and their totality. The facts are good, it's that time factor that bothers me. In a situation where it would have been ten minutes, fifteen minutes, twenty minutes-and I'm not putting time constraints but-that would make it a little more reasonable. Thirtyseven, forty minutes is a little bit unreasonable in my opinion because of the distance .... Do I believe this individual may have hidden? No, I don't. I do believe that the time factor was the biggest factor.
{¶10} The State appealed from the order suppressing evidence, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Espinoza, A-1-CA-38243, mem. op. ¶ 1. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that Deputy Ruiz had particularized suspicion and then turned to whether the suspicion was objectively reasonable. Id. ¶¶ 13-17. The Court of Appeals stated that no evidence in the record supported the district court's belief that the suspect, in the words of the Court of Appeals, "did not hide after fleeing." Id. ¶ 14. Crediting the training-and-experience-based testimony of Deputy Ruiz that "suspects often hide until they feel it is safe to continue on their way," id. ¶ 15, the Court of Appeals concluded that "Deputy Ruiz reasonably considered that the suspect might hide for a period of time after the stabbing to escape detection," id. ¶ 17. Relying on State v. De-Jesus Santibanez, 1995-NMCA-017, 119 N.M. 578, 893 P.2d 474, the Court of Appeals concluded that "Defendant's vehicle substantially matched the description provided in the BOLO" and that "it was reasonable for Deputy Ruiz to believe that the suspect . . . might have traveled in a different direction than provided in the BOLO." Espinoza, A-1-CA-38243, mem. op. ¶ 17.
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals held that Deputy Ruiz had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant under both the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10. Espinoza, A-1-CA-38243, mem. op. ¶ 18.
{¶11} We granted Defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari to address whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied our standard of review and whether the Court of Appeals was correct to conclude that Deputy Ruiz had reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 10.[3]
{¶12} A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 15, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57. We review each under a different standard, so our inquiry involves two parts.
{¶13} We review the district court's factual findings deferentially. "[W]e look for substantial evidence to support [each of] the district court's factual finding[s], with deference to the district court's review of the testimony and other evidence presented." State v. Martinez, 2018-NMSC-007, ¶ 8, 410 P.3d 186. {¶14}Our restraint when reviewing factual findings includes "defer[ence] to the district court's evaluation of witness credibility." Id. ¶ 14. It is the responsibility of the district court to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to determine the appropriate weight to give to the evidence. Id. "The district court may exercise discretion to credit portions of a witnesses' testimony even though it finds other portions dubious." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When a "district court does not make explicit credibility findings, we will indulge in all reasonable presumptions in support of the district court's ruling." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{¶15}We defer also to the inferences drawn by the district court because "[f]actfinding frequently involves selecting which inferences to draw." State v. Jason L. 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M.119, 2 P.3d 856 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Martinez, 2020-NMSC-005, ¶ 15, 457 P.3d 254 ("[I]...
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