State v. Martinez
| Decision Date | 02 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. S-1-SC-36516,S-1-SC-36516 |
| Citation | 457 P.3d 254 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Mikel A. MARTINEZ, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, MJ Edge, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent
{1} Defendant Mikel Martinez moved to suppress all evidence obtained as the fruits of a Terry stop that he alleges was unlawful and led to the discovery that he possessed drugs and drug paraphernalia. The district court determined that the stop was lawful as it was predicated on reasonable, articulable suspicion. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the officer’s suspicion amounted to nothing more than an "unparticularized hunch." State v. Martinez , No. 35,402, mem. op. ¶¶ 1, 15, 2017 WL 2992973 (N.M. Ct. App. June 5, 2017) (non-precedential). This case requires us to evaluate what, precisely, the difference is between reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminality and a mere hunch. We conclude that the officer who stopped Martinez was not operating upon a hunch but had "a particularized and objective basis" to suspect that Martinez was engaged in criminal activity. Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We affirm the district court. The Court of Appeals is reversed.
{2} Martinez’s charges included drug trafficking and possession. Prior to trial, he moved to suppress all evidence the State had to support these charges. At the suppression hearing on the motion, New Mexico State Police Officer Donald Garrison provided the following testimony.
{3} At the time of the hearing, Officer Garrison had been with the New Mexico State Police for twenty years and had significant training and experience in narcotics investigations. On the date he encountered Martinez, Officer Garrison was conducting surveillance of an Allsup’s gas station and convenience store, a location at which he knew drugs were purchased and sold with frequency. He had personally purchased drugs at the Allsup’s in an undercover capacity "probably 15 to 20 times," and used confidential informants to make "[a]nother probably 20, 30" drug purchases there.
{4} While watching the Allsup’s, he saw two men—later identified as Martinez and Don Crespin—drive up to one of the gas pumps at the Allsup’s. Martinez was driving. Crespin exited the vehicle, started the gas pump, and then got back in. Martinez also exited and walked towards the convenience store. Before entering the store, he passed a large man. After passing Martinez, the large man walked to Martinez’s vehicle; got in the left, rear seat; interacted with Crespin for about two to three minutes; and then exited the vehicle. Martinez left the store and returned to the vehicle. Officer Garrison believed he had just witnessed a "possible narcotics transaction."
{5} Martinez then drove to the side of the Allsup’s and parked. After "a few minutes," an SUV appeared and parked next to Martinez and Crespin. A woman exited the SUV; entered Martinez’s vehicle again on the left, rear side; stayed in the vehicle for a few minutes; exited; and then reentered the SUV, which drove away. Officer Garrison suspected he had just witnessed a second "illegal narcotics transaction."
{6} Officer Garrison decided to investigate to determine "exactly what was going on." He suspected that Martinez and Crespin were engaged in drug sales, but was "open-minded" and wanted to see if they had "a legitimate reason" for their activity. When asked why he suspected Martinez and Crespin were engaged in drug sales, Officer Garrison explained that
{7} Officer Garrison pulled his car behind Martinez and Crespin’s vehicle, activated his emergency equipment, and made contact with the men. The remainder of the events are established by evidence in the record other than Officer Garrison’s testimony.
{8} Crespin would not, despite Officer Garrison’s request, keep his hands on the dashboard while they spoke, so Officer Garrison directed Crespin to exit the vehicle and then put him in handcuffs. After Crespin was handcuffed, Officer Garrison discovered a clear, plastic bag containing a white powdery substance he was sure was methamphetamine near the right, rear tire of the vehicle. Martinez was then also detained.
{9} Martinez and Crespin denied throwing the methamphetamine on the ground. Officer Garrison then asked for their consent to search the vehicle. His request was denied, so Officer Garrison summoned a K-9 unit and the dog alerted on the right, rear side of the vehicle. Officer Garrison informed the men that he would obtain a warrant to search the vehicle and that they were free to leave but that the vehicle would remain with him. Once the search warrant was obtained, methamphetamine, marijuana, a scale, cash, and other drug paraphernalia were discovered inside the vehicle.
{10} In his suppression motion, Martinez argued that Officer Garrison did not have reasonable suspicion "at the inception of the seizure" and, therefore, the seizure was unlawful and any fruits of that seizure must be suppressed. Martinez specifically asserted that Officer Garrison’s suspicion that he was engaged in drug transactions "did not amount to anything more than an inarticulate hunch that falls short of the reasonable, articulable, and particularized suspicion required to justify a seizure." The district court rejected Martinez’s arguments.
{11} The court found that Officer Garrison had knowledge that the Allsup’s was a place where drugs were sold and saw Martinez undertake precisely the type of conduct in which those selling drugs engage. Officer Garrison’s training, experience, and observations produced, in the court’s view, far more than a mere "hunch." He had, the court concluded, reasonable, articulable suspicion of possible criminality to perform a Terry stop. We think it worthwhile to reproduce the district court’s own words.
{12} Martinez proceeded to trial and was convicted and sentenced. He appealed and challenged the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that Officer Garrison’s knowledge and experience about drug sales at the Allsup’s gave rise to nothing more than an "unparticularized hunch" and, therefore, "it was not reasonable for Officer Garrison to conclude that [Martinez] was involved in drug transactions." Martinez , No. 35,402, mem. op. ¶¶ 1, 15. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on State v. Neal , 2007-NMSC-043, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57, which the Court described as "instructive" and "controlling." Martinez , No. 35,402, mem. op. ¶¶ 11-14, 18.
{13} The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. We granted the petition and have jurisdiction over the State’s appeal. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3 ; NMSA 1978, § 34-5-14(B) (1972).
{14} "The legality of a search questioned in a suppression hearing is generally tested as a mixed question of law and fact ...." Neal , 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 15, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This standard involves two separate lines of inquiry and is, therefore, spoken of as involving "a two-step process[.]" State v. Leyva , 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 30, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861.
{15} The first inquiry or step concerns the facts. The trial court is responsible for determining "the historical facts that animate the transaction to be evaluated." State v. Attaway , 1994-NMSC-011, ¶ 5, 117 N.M. 141, 870 P.2d 103. The court "performs this fact-finding role by reciting events and assessing the credibility of the testimony offered[,]" and is given "wide latitude in determining that an historical fact has been proven." Id. We review these "purely factual assessments" only "to determine if the fact-finder’s [findings are] supported in the record by substantial evidence." Id. "Factfinding frequently involves selecting which inferences to draw." State v. Jason L. , 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And because it is the district court’s responsibility to select the factual inferences that shall govern, "all reasonable inferences in support of the [trial] court’s decision will be indulged in, and all inferences or evidence to the contrary will be disregarded." State v. Lopez , 2005-NMSC-018, ¶ 9, 138 N.M. 9, 116 P.3d 80 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{16} The second inquiry involves the law. This Court sits as final arbiter of what the law is and how it applies to any...
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