State v. Estep
| Decision Date | 18 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 40646,2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 731 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Idaho |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TIMOTHY EUGENE ESTEP, Defendant-Appellant. |
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for rape and dispensing alcohol to a minor and fixed life sentence for rape, affirmed.
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Spencer J. Hahn, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Spencer J. Hahn argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M. Lorello argued.
__________
Timothy Eugene Estep appeals from his judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of rape and dispensing alcohol to a minor. Estep specifically claims that the district court denied him his constitutional right to represent himself and abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence of fixed life imprisonment for rape. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
In 2006, Estep was charged with lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen for inappropriately touching a developmentally disabled twelve-year-old girl. Estep ultimately pled guilty to felony injury to a child and was sentenced in 2008 to a unified term of six years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years. This sentence was suspended, however, and Estep was placed on probation for five years.
During his probation, Estep met and befriended the eighteen-year-old victim in the current case. On August 3, 2010, Estep invited the victim to go swimming with him and a few others, during which time Estep provided the victim with alcohol. The victim eventually became intoxicated and sick. Estep drove the victim to his home, bathed her, and had sexual intercourse with her while she lay unconscious in his bed. The victim awoke during the rape, but pretended to be asleep. After Estep finished, the victim got up, put on some clothing, and ran from the residence. Estep followed her and tried to persuade her to get in his vehicle. After she refused, he threw some of her clothing at her and drove away. The victim contacted police and was taken to a hospital for a rape examination. Police interviewed Estep at his home and later at the police station. Estep made several inconsistent and incriminating statements, but denied having sex with the victim. He eventually admitted that he had sex with the victim, although he contended that it occurred while she was vomiting into a toilet because she could not protest.
Estep was charged with rape, I.C. § 18-6101, and with dispensing alcohol to a minor, I.C. § 23-603. During a pretrial process that took over two years, Estep requested to represent himself several times. Judge Benjamin R. Simpson denied each request after finding that Estep was not competent to represent himself. Shortly before Estep's trial was to begin, Estep allegedly made a death threat against Judge Simpson. As a result, Judge Simpson voluntarily disqualified himself from the case and Judge John T. Mitchell presided over Estep's case. Estep was tried in abstentia at his request and a jury found Estep guilty of both counts. The district court sentenced Estep to a fixed life term for rape.1 Estep appeals.
Estep argues that the district court violated Estep's rights under Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it denied his several requests to represent himself at trial.2 When an alleged violation of aconstitutional right is asserted, we accept the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence; however, we freely review the court's application of constitutional requirements to the facts as found. State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 746, 170 P.3d 886, 889 (2007). A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to waive the assistance of counsel and to self-represent. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975); State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 885, 136 P.3d 350, 356 (Ct. App. 2006). The right to self-representation, however, is not absolute. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth App. Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 161-62 (2000); State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 277, 61 P.3d 632, 634 (Ct. App. 2002). Because a self-represented defendant relinquishes many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel, a waiver of the right to counsel may only be accepted as valid if it was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 865, 781 P.2d 197, 202 (1989); Averett, 142 Idaho at 885, 136 P.3d at 356. For a waiver to be knowing and intelligent, the defendant must be aware of the nature of the charges filed against him or her, the penalties that may result from those charges, and the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64, 90 P.3d 278, 289 (2003); Lankford, 116 Idaho at 865, 781 P.2d at 202 (1989). The burden is upon the state to show that the waiver satisfied this standard when a defendant's request to self-represent is granted. State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 625, 873 P.2d 877, 879 (1994).
However, when dealing with a mentally ill or deficient defendant, a state may insist upon representation by counsel if a defendant is competent enough to stand trial and assist with his or her own defense but is not competent enough to carry out the basic tasks necessary to present a defense without the assistance of counsel. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175-76 (2008); State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 779, 229 P.3d 379, 384 (Ct. App. 2009). This is permissible even if the defendant seems to understand the disadvantages of self-representation as required by Faretta. See Edwards, 554 U.S at 175-176. Edwards did not adopt a specific standard, but instead recognized that the trial judge "will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant." Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177.
Estep argues that his right to self-representation was violated by Judge Simpson's refusal to allow Estep to proceed pro se. Specifically, he asserts error in the district court's pretrial determinations that Estep was not competent to self-represent. At oral argument, Estep specified that he was only challenging Judge Simpson's June 9, 2011, decision denying his initial request to proceed pro se. We need not address whether the district court erred in concluding that Estep was not competent to self-represent, as the record indicates that Estep failed to make an unequivocal request to self-represent at the June 9 hearing. A defendant's demand to proceed pro se must be clear, unequivocal, and timely. State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 597, 181 P.3d 512, 523 (Ct. App. 2007). During a discussion at the June 9 hearing in which Estep expressed displeasure with his appointed counsel and his desire to hire private counsel, the following exchange took place:
(Emphasis added.)
Judge Simpson then conducted a colloquy with Estep to determine whether Estep understood the consequences of proceeding pro se and was capable of doing so, concluding at the end of that colloquy that Estep was not capable of representing himself. As indicated by the italicized portions above, all of Estep's requests to self-represent were, at best, equivocal. Indeed, the district court even had to clarify with Estep that he was attempting to request to proceed pro se. In addition, the context preceding and following the request suggested that Estep was primarily interested in obtaining different counsel and considered proceeding pro se only if substitute counsel could not be obtained. Furthermore, Estep's competence to stand trial, much less self-represent, was in question throughout the more than two years of pretrial proceedings. Such equivocal statements made against this backdrop are insufficient to waive the right to counsel and invoke the right to self-represent. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (...
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