State v. Estrada
| Decision Date | 15 November 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. CR-00-0306-PR., No. CR-00-0140-PR |
| Citation | 34 P.3d 356,201 Ariz. 247 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Angelita ESTRADA, Appellant. State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Terry Lee Hatton, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Janet Napolitano, Attorney General, by Diane M. Ramsey, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee.
Dean M. Trebesch, Public Defender, by Lawrence S. Matthew, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellant.
Janet Napolitano, Attorney General, by Consuelo M. Ohanesian, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee.
Dean M. Trebesch, Public Defender, by Spencer D. Heffel, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellant.
¶ 1 We granted review and consolidated these cases in order to resolve a conflict between Divisions One and Two of the court of appeals concerning the sentencing provisions of Proposition 200, an initiative measure adopted by the voters of Arizona in 1996. The question is whether the probation eligibility provisions of the statute should be applied not only to convictions for possession or use of drugs, but also to convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia. We have determined that Proposition 200 does apply to paraphernalia convictions where the presence of paraphernalia is associated only with personal use by individuals simultaneously charged, or who could have been simultaneously charged, with personal possession or use under Proposition 200.
¶ 2 Proposition 200 is officially designated the "Drug Medicalization, Prevention, and Control Act of 1996." This ballot initiative, codified as Arizona Revised Statute ("A.R.S.") section 13-901.01, substantially altered applicable sentencing statutes for drug offenders by mandating probation and treatment for the first and second offenses committed by nonviolent defendants.1 "Briefly stated, the purpose was to change Arizona's drug control policy by treating drug abuse as a medical problem best handled by treatment and education, not by incarceration." Foster v. Irwin, 196 Ariz. 230, 231, 995 P.2d 272, 273 ¶ 3 (2000).
¶ 3 Immediately following its enactment, the legislature amended the statute to narrow the range of eligibility for probation, to limit those subject to mandatory probation, and to permit incarceration as a condition of probation. In 1998, however, in a second ballot measure, these amendments were repealed without ever taking effect. The voters rejected the legislative changes and again endorsed Proposition 200 as originally enacted. See Calik v. Kongable, 195 Ariz. 496, 990 P.2d 1055 (1999)
().
¶ 4 Police stopped the car in which Angelita Estrada was a passenger and searched the vehicle after arresting the driver. In a purse containing Estrada's driver's license and social security card, officers found methamphetamine in two plastic "baggies" and a single glass tube commonly used for smoking the drug.
¶ 5 The jury convicted Estrada of possession of a dangerous drug, a class 4 felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 6 felony. For the drug possession, she initially received a three-year term of probation pursuant to Proposition 200, but the court later concluded that a prior conviction made her ineligible for probation and sentenced her to 2.25 years in prison. The trial court also found the mandatory probation provision inapplicable to the paraphernalia conviction and sentenced Estrada to 0.75 years on that charge.
¶ 6 Estrada appealed her sentence to the court of appeals, Division One, arguing that Proposition 200 forbade imprisonment both on the drug count and the paraphernalia count. The court vacated the prison sentence on the drug count for independent reasons as stated in its opinion. Our review is limited to the paraphernalia question.
¶ 7 The appeals court noted correctly that the statute, on its face, does not apply to paraphernalia convictions. However, the court declined to apply a technical construction of the statute that would lead to the questionable result that while Proposition 200 offenders could not be imprisoned for possessing drugs, they could nevertheless be imprisoned for the less serious crime of possessing even simple paraphernalia items commonly employed in the personal use of those drugs.
¶ 8 The court concluded that the voters did not intend this result, as it would fully defeat the stated purpose of Proposition 200—that prison space should be reserved for violent offenders by diverting drug users from prison to treatment. The court thus vacated Estrada's prison sentence, holding that the mandatory probation provisions of Proposition 200 do apply to the possession of paraphernalia where the paraphernalia is associated solely with personal possession or use of drugs. See State v. Estrada, 197 Ariz. 383, 388, 4 P.3d 438, 443
¶ 9 Police approached Hatton, who was riding his bicycle at 2:30 a.m. When the officer checked Hatton's identification, he discovered that Hatton was the object of an outstanding warrant. He was arrested and subjected to a search which produced methamphetamine, marijuana, a set of scales, baggies, a ledger, and glass pipes presumably for smoking methamphetamine.
¶ 10 Hatton was charged with one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale, one count of possession of marijuana, and one count of paraphernalia possession. On both the drug possession and possession for sale counts, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of simple possession of methamphetamine and possession of marijuana. Both are probation eligible. He was also convicted of possessing drug paraphernalia, a class 6 felony. The court imposed concurrent three-year probation sentences for the drug convictions, but, finding Proposition 200 inapplicable to the paraphernalia conviction, gave Hatton a prison sentence of 1.75 years on that count.
¶ 11 On appeal, also in Division One, the court of appeals applied Estrada and found Hatton's paraphernalia prison sentence improper. In its memorandum decision, the court vacated that sentence and remanded for sentencing under Proposition 200.
¶ 12 In an earlier case, State v. Holm, Division Two held that possession of paraphernalia is not a lesser included offense of personal drug possession or use and, in contrast with Estrada and Hatton, affirmed Holm's convictions and sentence of imprisonment. 195 Ariz. 42, 985 P.2d 527 (App.1998). The court appears to have concluded that all drug paraphernalia charges necessarily fall outside Proposition 200. While we may agree that a paraphernalia charge is not a lesser included offense, it does not follow that every paraphernalia charge, regardless of circumstance and the nature of paraphernalia, falls beyond the reach of the statute.
¶ 13 Holm was not convicted of actual possession or use of drugs but only possession of drug paraphernalia. The nature of the paraphernalia is not discernable from the court's opinion. Review by this court was not sought by Holm.
¶ 14 Because of the apparent conflict between Holm and the instant cases, we granted the State's petitions for review to determine the applicability of Proposition 200's mandatory probation provision to drug paraphernalia convictions. We address solely the circumstance in which the defendant is, or could have been, simultaneously charged with the dual crimes of (a) personal possession or use of a controlled substance, and (b) possession of associated paraphernalia. We have jurisdiction under article VI, section 5(3) and (4) of the Arizona Constitution.
¶ 15 Whether Proposition 200 applies to drug paraphernalia convictions is a question of statutory construction subject to de novo review. Canon Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., Inc., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994). Our primary objective in construing a ballot initiative is to place a reasonable interpretation on "the intent of the electorate that adopted it." Foster v. Irwin, 196 Ariz. 230, 231, 995 P.2d 272, 273 ¶ 3 (2000) (quoting Jett v. City of Tucson, 180 Ariz. 115, 119, 882 P.2d 426, 430 (1994)) (internal quotations omitted).
¶ 16 We begin the inquiry with the language of the statute:
A.R.S. § 13-901.01 (2000). A separate statute defines "controlled substance" by reference to extensive lists of drugs, drug compounds, and chemical precursors. A.R.S. § 36-2501 (2000) (). Because these statutes do not specifically include paraphernalia, the State is correct that Proposition 200 does not expressly mandate probation for paraphernalia convictions. From time to time, however, we encounter circumstances in which the plain text of a statute, because of ambiguity or outright silence, fails to give effect to the legislature's obvious intent. As importantly, we interpret and apply statutory language in a way that will avoid an untenable or irrational result.
¶ 17 The State argues that our inquiry into voter intent must end with the statutory text because it is unambiguous and produces neither an absurd nor an irrational result. A result is "absurd `if it is so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to...
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