State v. Ettenberg
| Citation | 176 N.W. 171,145 Minn. 39 |
| Decision Date | 30 January 1920 |
| Docket Number | 21,454 |
| Parties | STATE v. MEYER ETTENBERG |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Defendant was indicted by the grand jury of Hennepin county charged with the crime of arson in the third degree, tried in the district court for that county before Jelley, J., and a jury which found him guilty as charged in the indictment. From an order denying his motion for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Criminal law -- attempt by accused to bribe witness evidence of guilt.
1. An attempt by a person under an indictment for crime to bribe an adverse witness who is likely to be called at the trial to testify against him, is evidence of guilt and may be so considered by the jury.
Criminal law -- corroboration of accomplice.
2. Such an attempt is sufficient corroboration of an accomplice upon whose testimony the prosecution relies for conviction.
Criminal law -- arson -- evidence of similar fire admissible.
3. In a prosecution for arson for the deliberate burning of a clothing store, evidence that defendant suffered a similar fire three months earlier, the plans and details of which, indicating deliberation, were the same as those of the fire in question, held admissible in corroboration of that tending to show the guilt of the charge on trial.
Verdict supported by evidence -- charge to jury.
4. The evidence supports the verdict, and there were no errors in the rulings of the court in the admission or exclusion of evidence, or in the instructions to the jury.
Albert H. Hall and Maurice Rose, for appellant.
Clifford L. Hilton, Attorney General, John E. Palmer, Assistant Attorney General, and William M. Nash, County Attorney, for respondent.
Defendant was convicted of the crime of arson in the third degree and appealed from an order denying a new trial.
From sometime in 1914 until February, 1918, defendant conducted a general retail clothing store at No. 22 Hennepin avenue in the city of Minneapolis, the premises being occupied by him under a lease from the owner. On February 21, 1918, his stock of goods and fixtures were almost wholly destroyed by fire, as a result of which he received something over $10,000 insurance money. The term of his lease expired on March 1 following the date of the fire. Either before the fire or on the day thereof he leased the premises involved in this prosecution, No. 308 Nicollet avenue, and thereafter continued his business in the new location. The date of the lease was February 20, the day before the fire, though it is claimed that it was not procured until after the fire. But this is of no special importance. The fact remains that he continued his clothing business at the new location as soon after the fire as convenience would permit. About three months later, on June 23, 1918, he was again burned out, and his entire new stock wholly destroyed. It was insured for $15,000. The indictment charges that this fire was deliberately planned by defendant and the jury found the charge true.
During all the time stated defendant had one Grodnick in his employ as a clerk or salesman, acting as such at the Hennepin avenue and also the Nicollet avenue establishment. He was the chief witness for the state on the trial and gave evidence to the effect that, at the special instance and with the connivance and assistance of defendant, he arranged the details and set fire to the premises at the time and for the purpose stated in the indictment, and was compensated therefor by defendant. His testimony on the subject is full and complete as to time, manner and details. The plan which was carried out consisted in the accumulation of a lot of combustible material in the basement of the building, directly below the stock of goods, such as drygoods boxes filled with waste paper and other inflammable matter, including lace curtains, placing in one of the boxes a tallow candle, so timed when lighted as to bring results at an appropriate hour at night. The candle was lighted by Grodnick at about ten o'clock at night; the fire occurred early the next morning and the program of destruction was a complete success.
Grodnick also testified that he caused the fire at the Hennepin avenue store in the same manner at the instance and co-operation of defendant, the details and arrangements thereof being followed as to the fire in question. Defendant paid Grodnick $400 for that fire, and $200 for this one with a promise of $300 more when the insurance money came in.
Defendant was in Chicago on this occasion, though he had joined in the preparations for the fire which Grodnick carried out. He denied all the evidence given by Grodnick insofar as it tended to incriminate or connect him with the transaction, and it was urged in his behalf that Grodnick in collusion with one Willis had stolen large quantities of goods from the Nicollet avenue store, and that they caused the fire to cover their tracks and conceal the theft.
The assignments of error present the general questions: (1) Whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict of guilty; (2) whether there was error in the rulings of the court in the admission or exclusion of evidence; and (3) whether the court erred in its charge to the jury in the respects pointed out in the assignments. We dispose of them in the order stated.
If the testimony given by Grodnick is worthy of belief, a question for the jury, therein is a full and complete answer to the question whether the evidence supports the verdict. His testimony directly connects defendant with the fire, and makes clear that the motive thereof was the money to be realized by defendant from the insurance of the destroyed goods. But as correctly contended by defendant, Grodnick was an accomplice and his testimony insufficient to sustain a conviction, unless corroborated by other credible evidence. Defendant contends that there was no such corroboration, and that presents the principal question in the case. We do not sustain the point.
It is unnecessary to restate the rule on the subject of corroboration in such cases. It is well understood and the extent to which it must go in support of the accomplice is clearly stated in our prior decisions. State v Lawlor, 28 Minn. 216, 9 N.W. 698; Clark v. Clark, 86 Minn. 249, 90 N.W. 390; State v. Christianson, 131 Minn. 276, 154 N.W. 1095; State v. Price, 135 Minn. 159, 160 N.W. 677. Our examination of the record discloses several items of evidence tending strongly in corroboration of Grodnick. But it is unnecessary to encumber the opinion by their statement, for one outstanding item, namely, the attempt of defendant to bribe Grodnick presents itself as well nigh conclusive, and condemns the whole defense as a deliberate effort to procure from him a false affidavit contradictory of what defendant had good reason to believe he had...
To continue reading
Request your trial