State v. Eudaly
| Citation | 188 S.W. 110 |
| Decision Date | 05 July 1916 |
| Docket Number | No. 19382.,19382. |
| Parties | STATE v. EUDALY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Appeal from Criminal Court, Jackson County; Ralph S. Latshaw, Judge.
J. B. Eudaly was convicted of obtaining personal property by false pretenses, and he appeals. Judgment reversed, and defendant discharged.
On the 10th of April, 1914, the prosecuting attorney of Jackson county filed a duly verified information in the criminal court of that county, charging the defendant with obtaining certain personal property from one Matilda Keeney by means of false pretenses. Defendant was duly tried and convicted, and his punishment assessed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of two years.
On the part of the state, the evidence tends to show that at the time of the alleged transaction between the prosecutrix and defendant the former was the owner and in possession of certain household goods of the alleged and proven value of $140; that she was desirous, in fact anxious, to dispose of these, to the end that she might abandon her then residence and move elsewhere, and, in order to effectuate this purpose, she, either directly or impliedly, authorized one Woodward, a real estate agent, to find for her a purchaser, the result of which was the meeting and negotiations between the prosecutrix and defendant; that to her, and in the presence of an attorney who was engaged to prepare their written agreement, the defendant represented that he was the owner of certain property located at Kiowa, Kan., which he offered to exchange for her household goods and certain real estate located in Texas which she then owned. The defendant also told her that if the trade was made he must secure possession of her household goods immediately, as he intended to exchange same at once for a horse, of which he was in need; that prosecutrix was at first reluctant to deliver immediate possession, because defendant told her that he could not make her a deed then, owing to the fact that his abstract and other papers were in a bank at Kiowa; that he had with him and exhibited a general warranty deed by which one Henry Stephenson and wife had conveyed the property, for a consideration of $250, to G. E. Henson and J. E. Holmes, of whom more later. Prosecutrix, however, being desirous to sell, agreed to this, upon the condition that the following written contract be entered into, which was accordingly done:
It was further shown that at the time of the trial no deed to her had been executed, and that the defendant had admitted that he did not have a deed to the property, but merely an alleged contract for a deed. The state also proved that months subsequent to this transaction the defendant had given a check to some person for $2.50 on a bank in which he had no funds; and that he also had indorsed and received the money on another check which had been given him by a third person, when such person had no funds in the bank on which the check was drawn.
On the part of the defendant the uncontradicted evidence shows that, prior to his transaction with the prosecutrix, he had bought and paid for the property which he agreed to exchange, and of which he stated to the prosecutrix that he was the owner, but that, owing to the absence of the wife of one of the grantors, the deed had not been executed; that after so purchasing and paying for said property, and finding that the deed could not then be executed, the parties from whom he purchased executed the following instrument in writing:
— and that defendant was in possession of this instrument prior to and at the time of this transaction, but had not then secured his deed.
Witness Woodward, who had brought the prosecutrix and defendant together for the purpose of the trade, testified that defendant explained to him the condition of his title and exhibited the deed to Holmes and Henson, as well as the contract for a deed between Holmes and Henson on the one part, and the defendant on the other; that the defendant likewise made this explanation and exhibited the same documents in the presence of the prosecutrix, and that the attorney who drew up the agreement used these for the purpose of securing a description of the property. Defendant likewise testified to these facts, as he did also to the facts that he had bought and paid for this property, and that he honestly believed and was, in fact, the owner thereof, but had not secured his evidence of ownership, to wit, his deed, prior to the transaction, for the reasons above stated, and that he had not been able to secure same since because of certain legal actions and interference on the part of the prosecutrix and her counsel.
Defendant also offered evidence tending to show that, after his failure to secure his deed, the prosecutrix demanded of him the payment of $250 for the furniture, instead of $150 as specified in the contract, and that he was unwilling to pay this sum; also that the prosecutrix had on two or three occasions visited his home and inquired of his family as to whether the absent wife of one of the persons who had agreed to make him a deed had returned, and whether he had yet received his deed.
Noyes & Heath, of Kansas City, for appellant. John T. Barker, Atty. Gen. (Lewis H. Cook, of Jefferson City, of counsel), for the State.
REVELLE, J. (after stating the facts as above).
I. This record discloses conduct on the part of state's counsel and rulings and statements by the trial court...
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