State v. Evans
| Decision Date | 17 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2017-0248,2 CA-CR 2017-0248 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. QUENTIN LEE EVANS, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
The Honorable Sean E. Brearcliffe, Judge
AFFIRMED
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel
By Alexander M. Taber, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
Joel Feinman, Pima County Public Defender
By Michael J. Miller, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
Presiding Judge Staring authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Vásquez and Judge Eppich concurred.
¶1 Quentin Evans appeals from his convictions for first-degree burglary, three counts of armed robbery, five counts of kidnapping, three counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress pretrial and in-court identifications, and by denying his "motion for mistrial" when some jurors had the opportunity to see him in shackles. For the following reasons, we affirm Evans's convictions and sentences.
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding Evans's convictions. See State v. Allen, 235 Ariz. 72, ¶ 2 (App. 2014). One evening, a group of friends, J.F., M.E., and T.V., left J.F.'s house and went to pick up O.E. from his workplace, leaving A.O. behind at the house. The four friends returned to J.F.'s house. After they parked in the driveway, three men approached and pulled all of them except J.F. out of the car. The men had a gun and stole various possessions and money from the victims. At some point, J.F. got out of the car and confronted the men, prompting one of them to strike him in the back of the head with the gun. Two of the men went inside the house and awoke A.O. at gunpoint, while looking for more money. They then left the house, and with the third man then left the scene.
¶3 Detectives interviewed M.E. and J.F. individually at the scene. They told detectives that the three attackers were using nicknames, one of which being "Joker." M.E. said he knew a person nicknamed Joker, and immediately recognized him when he saw him during the attack. J.F. said he also knew someone who went by Joker, and recognized his mannerisms during the attack. When detectives showed M.E. and J.F. a photograph of Evans, both positively identified him as the Joker they knew.
¶4 Before trial, Evans filed a motion to suppress evidence of identification, arguing that showing his picture to M.E. and J.F. was impermissibly suggestive, unreliable, and resulted in unfair prejudice, and,therefore, testimony about the pretrial identifications and any in-court identification should be precluded. The detective who showed M.E. and J.F. the photograph of Evans testified at the motion hearing, summarizing his interviews with the victims. The trial court found that "the identification process used with [M.E.] to identify Mr. Evans or Joker was not unduly suggestive and is reliable," and later found J.F.'s identification similarly admissible after taking it under advisement. At trial, M.E. and J.F. again identified Evans as Joker.
¶5 The jury found Evans guilty as described above.1 The trial court sentenced him to a combination of consecutive and concurrent, presumptive and minimum prison terms totaling 15.5 years. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, § 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).
¶6 Evans argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the pretrial and in-court identifications made by M.E. and J.F. We review the court's "rulings on pretrial identifications for abuse of discretion." State v. Moore, 222 Ariz. 1, ¶ 17 (2009); see also State v. Leyvas, 221 Ariz. 181, ¶ 9 (App. 2009). We also review the reliability and fairness of a challenged identification for an abuse of discretion. Leyvas, 221 Ariz. 181, ¶ 9. Whether a common law procedural rule with constitutional underpinnings applies to a particular factual scenario is a question we review de novo. Id. Our review is "based solely on the evidence presented at the suppression hearing," and we defer to the court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. See Moore, 222 Ariz. 1, ¶ 17.
¶7 At the suppression hearing, the detective who showed M.E. and J.F. the photograph of Evans testified that both victims had told him they knew someone called Joker. Unsolicited, M.E. told the detective that Joker's real name was "Quen." M.E. elaborated that he recognized the nickname Joker being used by the attackers, and knew who it was because Joker used to live next to his house and play soccer every day. AlthoughM.E. "barely glanced at him" during the attack, "he looked exactly like him." M.E. went on to give detectives a physical description of Joker.
¶8 J.F. told detectives that he had known Joker for a long time, seeing him about twenty to thirty times before the attack. He did not see Joker's face, but saw the person being referred to as Joker and that he "acknowledged and accepted" that was his nickname. J.F. also gave detectives a physical description of Joker. After retrieving a photograph of Evans, the detective showed M.E. the photograph to confirm it was the same person who had attacked him and who he was referring to as Joker, and showed J.F. the photograph just to see if the individual he "had on the first interview [with M.E.] was the same person [J.F.] was referring to as Joker." Both M.E. and J.F. positively identified Evans.
¶9 "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires us to ensure that any pretrial identification procedures are conducted in a manner that is fundamentally fair and secures the suspect's right to a fair trial." Leyvas, 221 Ariz. 181, ¶ 10 (quoting State v. Lehr, 201 Ariz. 509, ¶ 46 (2002)). To determine whether an identification is admissible, a court first examines "whether the method or procedure used was unduly suggestive,"2 and then, "even if unduly suggestive, whether it led to a substantial likelihood of misidentification, i.e., whether it was reliable." Lehr, 201 Ariz. 509, ¶ 46. Thus, an unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedure does not bar the admission of an identification if it is reliable in spite of any suggestiveness. See Leyvas, 221 Ariz. 181, ¶ 10. "Whether an identification procedure is so suggestive that it violates a defendant's due process rights depends on the totality of the circumstances." State v. Rojo-Valenzuela, 237 Ariz. 448, ¶ 6 (2015).
¶10 Evans argues that the identification procedure used was unduly suggestive because detectives presented the photograph of Evans singly to the victims. But a procedure is not unduly suggestive where "the witness ha[s] a completely independent basis for the identification." Statev. Taylor, 109 Ariz. 518, 519 (1973). That independent basis makes it "obvious that the victim [identified] the assailant for the benefit of the police so that they could arrest the right person rather than the police suggesting the identity of the defendant." Id. Here, both M.E. and J.F. had an independent basis for the identification of Evans—indeed a stronger one than was present in Taylor. See id. (). M.E. and J.F. immediately recognized Evans during the attack and when shown his photograph, just like the victim in Taylor. Id.
¶11 The reasoning behind suppressing unduly suggestive identifications is in part "to protect the accused at a line-up from unfair suggestion or influence for 'once a witness has picked out the accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on his word later on.'" State v. Nunez, 108 Ariz. 71, 74 (1972) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967)); see also State v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 496 (1985) (). This concern is not present where the police procedure "merely serve[s] to confirm the initial identification." Nunez, 108 Ariz. at 74.
¶12 The detectives in this case did not suggest an identity; instead, M.E. and J.F. suggested the identity of their attacker and the detectives confirmed it with a photograph.3 As the trial court noted, "[b]ecause [Evans] is someone known to [J.F.], the police conduct did not suggest [Evans's] identity to him in these circumstances." Thus, the identification procedure used by detectives was not unduly suggestive; M.E. and J.F. were "identifying [Evans] for the benefit of the police so that they could arrest the right person rather than the police suggesting the identity of [Evans]." Taylor, 109 Ariz. at 519.
¶13 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the identifications.4
¶14 Evans argues the trial court erred by not granting him a new trial because some jurors had the opportunity to see him in shackles. Outside the presence of the jury, the deputy transporting Evans alerted the court that as he was exiting the holding cell with Evans behind him, three jurors walked by. The deputy assured the court that there was "no way [the jurors] could have seen [Evans's] handcuffs" because they were behind his back, but he was not sure whether they could have seen the leg restraints. The court asked both sides, "[I]s there anything you believe needs to be done or any instructions given?" Defense counsel agreed with the state that nothing should be done.
¶15 More than two weeks after his convictions, Evans filed a pro se "motion for mistrial," arguing that...
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