State v. Fairmont Creamery Co. of Neb.

• Decision Date: 18 December 1911
• Citation: 153 Iowa 702,133 N.W. 895
• Parties: STATE v. FAIRMONT CREAMERY CO. OF NEBRASKA.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

153 Iowa 702

133 N.W. 895

STATE

v.FAIRMONT CREAMERY CO. OF NEBRASKA.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 18, 1911.

Appeal from District Court, Buena Vista County; A. D. Bailie, Judge.

The defendant was indicted in Buena Vista County, under the provisions of section 5028b, Code Supplement, as amended by chapter 222 of Acts 33d Gen. Assem. Upon motion of the defendant at the close of the State's evidence, the trial court dismissed the indictment and discharged the defendant. The State has appealed. Reversed.George Cosson, Atty. Gen., and W. C. Edson, Co. Atty., for the State.

Hainer & Smith and Faville & Whitney, for appellee.

EVANS, J.

[1] The discharge of the defendant in the trial court is final and cannot be disturbed by us on this appeal. The state has taken an appeal for the purpose of obtaining a review of the holding of the trial court as to the constitutionality of the statute upon which the indictment is based. The statute in question purports to be an amendment to section 5028b of the Code Supplement, and is as follows: “Any person, firm, company, association or corporation foreign or domestic, doing business in the state of Iowa and engaged in the business of buying milk, cream or butter fat for the purpose of manufacture, or of buying poultry, eggs or grain for the purpose of sale or storage, that shall for the purpose of creating a monopoly or destroying the business of a competitor discriminate between different sections, localities, communities, cities or towns of this state by purchasing such commodity or commodities at a higher price or rate in one section, locality, community, city or town than is paid for the same commodity by said person, firm, company, association or corporation in another section, locality, community, city or town, after making due allowance for the difference, if any, in the grade or quality, and in the actual cost of transportation from the point of purchase to the point of manufacture, sale or storage, shall be deemed guilty of unfair discrimination which is hereby prohibited and declared to be unlawful, but prices made to meet competition in such locality shall not be in violation of this act; and any person, firm, company, association or corporation or any officer, agent, receiver or member of any such firm, company, association or corporation found guilty of unfair discrimination as defined herein, shall be punished as provided in section five thousand twenty-eight c (5028c) of the Supplement to the Code, 1907.”

This statute was assailed in the court below as unconstitutional on two grounds, namely: (1) That it was in violation of sections 1, 6, and 9 of article 1, and of section 30 of article 3, of the Constitution of Iowa, and of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. (2) That it was in violation of section 29, article 3 of the Constitution of Iowa, in that the subject of the act was not expressed in the title, as required by such section of the Constitution. The trial court sustained both grounds of the attack upon the constitutionality of the statute, and we are required to review such holding. The questions thus presented will be considered in the order stated.

Section 6 of article 1 of the Constitution of Iowa is as follows: “Laws Uniform. Sec. 6. All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation; the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not belong to all citizens.” We need not quote the other provisions of the Constitution above referred to, because all must be tested by the same considerations so far as they relate to the first ground of attack, and we shall have no need to discuss them separately.

[2] It is urged by appellee that the act is discriminatory and arbitrary in its classification. Not only is the act limited in its application to the business of buying milk, cream, butter fat, poultry, eggs, and grain, but it is further limited to particular methods of pursuing the same. It operates upon the business of buying milk, cream, and butter fat only when such articles are bought for the purpose of manufacture, and it operates upon the business of buying poultry, eggs, and grain only when the same are bought “for the purpose of sale or storage.” The argument directed against the statute is not without its cogency. If it were presented to a legislative committee, it might properly cause hesitation as to the particular form of the proposed legislation; but the courts have neither advisory nor veto powers over legislation as such. And even though the court may entertain great doubt as to the constitutionality of a particular legislative act, it may not interpose such mere doubt against the legislative prerogative. It is only when the violation of the Constitution is “clear and palpable” that the court is justified in rendering nugatory a legislative act.

To speak accurately, the constitutionality of an act is not dependent upon an affirmative holding to that effect by the court. It is the province of the court only to determine whether a legislative act in question is or is not “clearly, plainly, and palpably” unconstitutional. The legislative and executive departments of government are under the same responsibility to observe and protect the Constitution as is the judicial department. This responsibility is always present in the enactment by the Legislature, and approval by the executive, of all legislation. The constitutionality of all proposed legislation must be determined in the first instance by such co-ordinate branches of the government. Within the zone of doubt and fair debate such determination is necessarily conclusive. For the court to enter that zone would of itself be an offense against the Constitution. But when a legislative act is clearly and unmistakably unconstitutional, then the court must so declare. By common consent such a declaration is not deemed as usurpation by the court, but as a protest against usurpation already done. In such a case the court furnishes the only means of authoritative protest possible to the body politic. The responsibility which thus falls upon the judicial branch is an extraordinary one. It is the duty of the court to meet it fully and fairly and without evasion. On the other hand, it performs the duty with scrupulous regard for the prerogatives of the co-ordinate branches of the government and without lust of power. Hence the rule which obtained in an early day, and which has been adhered to strictly ever since, that the court will declare a law unconstitutional only when it is “clearly, plainly, and palpably.” See Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa, 304. In Santo v. State, 2 Iowa, 165, 63 Am. Dec. 487, it was said that the case presented must be “clear, decisive, and unavoidable.” To the same effect are Stewart v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Iowa, 14, 1 Am. Rep. 238;Sisson v. Board of Supervisors, 128 Iowa, 464, 104 N. W. 454, 70 L. R. A. 440;McGuire v. C., B. & Q. R. R., 131 Iowa, 340, 108 N. W. 902, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 706;Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa, 36, 126 N. W. 914.

In the last-cited case we said: “It is well settled that the courts will not declare unconstitutional an enactment of the Legislature unless it is clearly and palpably so. The power of the courts to nullify the act of a co-ordinate branch of the government is one of grave importance. Its exercise has always been recognized by all the departments of government as essential to the well-being of the body politic. But the power is one which the courts exercise with great caution and with the highest regard for the prerogatives of the legislative department. With the wisdom or the advisability of the legislation the courts have nothing to do. That question must be argued before the legislative tribunal.”

The previous utterances of this court in that regard are in harmony with those of the Supreme Court of the United States. Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 431, 22 Sup. Ct. 425, 46 L. Ed. 623;Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 223, 24 Sup. Ct. 124, 48 L. Ed. 148;Holden v. Hardy, 160 U. S. 397, 18 Sup. Ct. 383, 42 L. Ed. 780.

Obedient to this rule, we pass to a consideration of the main question.

[3] Does the act in question offend against the Constitution in that its operation is not uniform, or in that it grants immunities to some classes of citizens which are withheld from others?

[4] That the act constitutes special legislation, and that its practical application will be limited to comparatively few persons, must be conceded. But this is not sufficient to condemn. A very large part of all legislation is subject to this characterization. McAunich v. Railroad Co., 20 Iowa, 338; Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. 1161, 32 L. Ed. 107.

[5] It is urged by appellee that the classification adopted in the act is purely arbitrary and unreasonable, and that it rests upon no natural basis. No very definite rule has ever been laid down whereby the reasonableness of a statutory classification may be determined. In the very nature of the case no definite rule is possible for such purpose. Generally speaking, classification must be based upon substantial distinction which makes one class so different from another as to suggest the necessity of different legislation with respect to it. It must be natural and reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. The legislation must extend to and embrace accurately all persons who are or may be in like circumstances. For a collation of the utterances of the courts on this question, see Hubbell v. Higgins, supra.

The act under present consideration applies only to persons engaged in the business of buying milk, cream, poultry, eggs, and grain. Is this classification arbitrary and capricious, or does it arise fairly out of existing conditions? Has the statute fairly aimed at a particular evil, whether real or apparent, and is the classification as comprehensive as the...