State v. Falcon

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: Before PETERS; PETERS
• Citation: 494 A.2d 1190,196 Conn. 557
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. John FALCON.
• Decision Date: 02 July 1985

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494 A.2d 1190 196 Conn. 557 STATE of Connecticut
v.
John FALCON. Supreme Court of Connecticut. Argued April 9, 1985.
Decided July 2, 1985.

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[196 Conn. 558] Erskine D. McIntosh, Asst. Public Defender, with whom, on the brief, was Joette Katz, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Donald A. Browne, State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, was Dominick J. Galluzzo, Asst. State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before [196 Conn. 557] PETERS, C.J., and HEALEY, SHEA, DANNEHY and SANTANIELLO, JJ.

[196 Conn. 558] PETERS, Chief Justice.

The principal issue in this criminal appeal is whether there is a constitutional right to counsel once extradition proceedings have been instituted. The defendant, John Falcon, was indicted for murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54(a). The trial court accepted a jury verdict finding the defendant guilty as charged, and he has appealed. We find no error.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On June 24, 1979, Edward Moran was stabbed to death in an abandoned building in Bridgeport. He had been tied to a bed that was then set on fire.

The defendant was first apprehended by the police on the day of the crime when he was trying to sell the victim's car for $150. The defendant had previously been sought by the police with respect to an unrelated crime for which the police had an outstanding warrant. Upon interrogation the defendant gave the police two statements, neither of which was directly incriminatory. [196 Conn. 559] The police turned the defendant over to the United States army when they discovered that he was absent without leave.

Further inquiries led the police again to suspect that it was the defendant who had slain Moran. An arrest warrant charging the defendant with murder was obtained, and proceedings to extradite him from New Jersey were initiated. The defendant waived extradition and was returned to police headquarters in Bridgeport on September 1, 1979. There the defendant gave the police a written statement admitting that he had stabbed Moran.

At the trial, the court permitted the state, over the defendant's objection, to introduce into evidence all the statements that he had made to the police. The defendant had unsuccessfully challenged their admissibility at a pretrial hearing in which he argued that the statements were not voluntary for a number of reasons, including the absence of counsel.

The trial court also permitted the state to introduce photographic evidence that showed not only the scene of the crime but also the body of the victim. The defendant duly objected that this evidence should have been excluded as inflammatory and unnecessary, but his objection was overruled.

The defendant's appeal from his conviction for murder raises two issues. The defendant argues that: (1) his statements were inadmissible because they were secured in violation of his constitutional right to counsel under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment and under article first, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution; and (2) the photographs

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of the victim were inadmissible because they were so inflammatory as to prejudice the defendant's due process right to a fair trial.

[196 Conn. 560] I

The defendant's challenge to the admissibility of his statements rests on the proposition that the statements were made after the commencement of adversary judicial criminal proceedings. The defendant does not claim any violation of his fifth amendment right to counsel during custodial interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1629-30, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Relying instead on the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, ¹ and article first, § 8 of the Connecticut constitution, ² he argues that it was improper to elicit self-incriminating evidence in the absence of counsel because formal criminal proceedings had been commenced against him either upon the issuance of an arrest warrant or upon the initiation of extradition proceedings. We disagree.

We have consistently held that a defendant's right to counsel under the sixth amendment or its state constitutional counterpart ³ arises only " 'at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings--whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment.' Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972)." State v. Vitale, 190 Conn. 219, 232, 460 A.2d 961 (1983); State v. Ledbetter, 185 Conn. 607, 609, 441 A.2d 595 (1981); State v. Packard, 184 Conn. 258, [196 Conn. 561] 267, 439 A.2d 983 (1981); see also State v. Boulay, 189 Conn. 106, 112-13, 454 A.2d 724 (1983). The United States Supreme Court has recently reiterated this formulation and the rationale behind it. "[O]ur conclusion that the right to counsel attaches at the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings 'is far from a mere formalism.' Kirby v. Illinois, supra, 406 U.S., at 689, 92 S.Ct., at 1882. It is only at that time 'that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.' Ibid." United States v. Gouveia, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2299, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984); see State v. Vitale, supra, 190 Conn. at 233, 460 A.2d 961.

Following the initiation of the adversarial process, the defendant is entitled to the presence of counsel at certain crucial proceedings, including interrogation. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, reh. denied, 431 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 2200, 53 L.Ed.2d 240 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964); see State v. Vitale, 190 Conn. at supra, 231, 460 A.2d 961; State v. Jones, 187 Conn. 504, 506, 446 A.2d 1080 (1982). Resolution of the defendant's claim that he was entitled to counsel at his interrogation thus depends upon whether either the issuance of an arrest warrant or the initiation of extradition, both of which occurred prior to his interrogation, can be said to have commenced formal adversarial judicial proceedings.

The defendant's first claim, which focuses on the issuance of an arrest warrant, is foreclosed by State v. Vitale, 190 Conn. at supra, 231-33, 460 A.2d 961. There we held that an arrest, whether or not accompanied by a warrant, does not mark the start of adversarial judicial proceedings.

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[196 Conn. 562] The defendant maintains that Vitale should not control for two reasons. First, he asserts that Vitale is distinguishable because the defendant in that case was arrested for a crime unrelated to the one for which he was eventually convicted. Our holding in Vitale, however, did not rely on the...