State v. Farkarlun
| Decision Date | 04 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | A09-2092 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Trisha Kumba Farkarlun, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
Affirmed in part and remanded; motion denied
Hennepin County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Judd Gushwa, Minneapolis City Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Trisha Kumba Farkarlun (pro se appellant)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Toussaint, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On remand from the supreme court for reconsideration of appellant's appeal of a 2010 gross-misdemeanor conviction of falsely reporting police misconduct in violation ofMinn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 2(a)(2) (2010), we conclude that (1) the district court did not err in denying appellant's suppression motion, (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in the scope or conduct of the Schwartz hearing, (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct, and (4) the record is sufficient to support appellant's conviction under the supreme court's recent opinion in State v. Crawley, 819 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. 2012), which narrowly construed Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 2 to apply to defamation only. We therefore affirm the conviction. But because the record is insufficiently developed to address appellant's challenge to restitution, we remand for a restitution hearing or order explaining why appellant is not entitled to such a hearing.
In the early morning hours of July 28, 2007, appellant Trisha Kumba Farkarlun reported to medical personnel at a hospital that she had been raped by two Minneapolis police officers. The alleged rape occurred shortly after the officers responded to an altercation between Farkarlun and her then girlfriend. Against Farkarlun's wishes, the hospital notified the Minneapolis police department of the allegations. Based on information provided to the police department by the nurse who conducted the sexual-assault examination, the accused officers were readily identified. The patrol supervisor for the accused officers immediately contacted the on-call internal-affairs investigator and relayed the accusation, providing the names of the accused officers and the location of the alleged assault.
The on-call internal-affairs investigator contacted a second internal-affairs officer, and they agreed to meet at the hospital to begin an investigation into the criminal complaint, as well as an administrative investigation into the accusation against the police officers. Prior to going to the hospital, the primary investigator obtained a list of calls that the accused officers had responded to that morning, including the location of each call.
At the hospital, the investigators met with the examining nurse who briefly described what she learned from Farkarlun. The nurse testified that she observed bruises on Farkarlun's neck, wrists, and inner thigh. The investigators then went into Farkarlun's room, introduced themselves to Farkarlun as internal-affairs officers, and gave her a data-practices advisory. The advisory explained how any information she gave them might be used, including the fact that some information may be accessible to parties outside their internal-affairs division. Farkarlun agreed to talk to the investigators. She provided a narrative statement regarding the sexual assault and answered the investigators' questions, which elicited more detail about the events leading up to, during, and after the assault.
Farkarlun stated that the assault took place a few minutes after she walked away from her girlfriend's house where the officers had briefly detained her in relation to a dispute to which the officers had been dispatched. Farkalun said that the officers approached her in the squad car, that the Caucasian officer got out and dragged her into an alley, and the African American officer followed in the squad car. The Caucasianofficer held her down and at one point handcuffed her while the African American officer sexually penetrated her.
The investigation of Farkarlun's allegations included examining global positioning data from the identified officers' squad car, interviewing people in the area of the alleged crime scene, examining the scene, examining Farkarlun's clothing and person, examining the accused officers' uniforms, and comparing the DNA samples collected from the accused officers against a DNA sample obtained from Farkarlun at the hospital. The DNA evidence taken from Farkarlun was shown not to have come from either of the accused officers. GPS records showed that their squad car was not at the location of the alleged sexual assault. Based on the results of the investigation, Farkarlun was charged with falsely reporting police misconduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 2(a)(2).
Prior to trial, Farkarlun challenged admission of the statement that she made to the investigators at the hospital on the ground that it was "involuntary." Farkarlun also challenged the constitutionality of the statute under which she was charged. The district court held that Farkarlun's statements were voluntary and the statute is constitutional.
At trial, the jury was instructed that the elements of the crime charged are:
Farkarlun did not challenge the third element and conceded that the allegations involved a peace officer and that the internal-affairs investigators' duties involved investigating police misconduct. Her defense emphasized the intentional or negligent inadequacy of the investigation of her allegations and argued that, due to the shoddy investigation, the state's evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that her report was false. Farkarlun also argued that the state had not proved the first element because she did not know that she was communicating the misconduct to officers who had a duty to investigate. The jury found her guilty as charged.
Farkarlun moved for a new trial based on juror misconduct. After a Schwartz hearing in which the district court interviewed each juror individually, the district court denied the new trial motion. Farkarlun was sentenced to 365 days in jail, with all but 20 days stayed, and a $1,000 fine, with all but $300 stayed. She was also ordered to pay $3,000 in restitution. Farkarlun challenged the restitution and requested a restitution hearing, but no hearing was held.
Farkarlun appealed her conviction, challenging the constitutionality of the statute, admission of her statement to internal-affairs officers, denial of her motion for a new trial on juror-misconduct grounds, and the restitution order. Based on our holding in State v. Crawley, 789 N.W.2d 899, 910 (Minn. App. 2010), that Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 2 is unconstitutional because it criminalizes false speech that is critical of the police but not false speech that favors the police, this court reversed Farkarlun's conviction. State v. Farkarlun, No. A09-2092 (Minn. App. Dec. 14, 2010). This court did not consider Farkarlun's other appeal issues.
The supreme court subsequently granted review in Crawley, 789 N.W.2d 899 (Minn. App. 2010), review granted (Minn. Dec. 14, 2010), and in this case, Farkarlun, No. A09-2092, review granted (Minn. Feb. 15, 2011). Ultimately, the supreme court narrowly construed Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 2, to criminalize only defamatory speech not protected by the First Amendment and held that the statute, so construed, is constitutional. State v. Crawley, 819 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. 2012). The supreme court then remanded this case to our court for proceedings consistent with its holding in Crawley.
This court ordered supplemental briefing. Appellant failed to file a supplemental brief. Respondent filed a supplemental brief and a motion to dismiss the appeal based on appellant's failure to comply with the order for supplemental briefing.
Because this court has been directed on remand to consider Farkarlun's appeal in light of the supreme court's recent opinion in Crawley, we deny respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal.
In Crawley, the supreme court narrowly construed Minn. Stat. § 609.505, subd. 2, as applying to only defamatory statements. 819 N.W.2d at 107-08. To prevail on a defamation claim, the plaintiff must prove that (1) a defamatory statement is "communicated to someone other than the plaintiff"; (2) "the statement is false"; (3) "the statement tends to 'harm the plaintiff's reputation' and to lower the plaintiff 'in the estimation of the community'"; and (4) "the recipient of the false statement reasonablyunderstands it to refer to a specific individual." Id. at 104 (internal citation and quotations omitted). To prove the crime of falsely reporting police misconduct, the state "must prove that the person informed a police officer, whose responsibilities include investigating or reporting police misconduct, that another officer has committed an act of police misconduct, knowing that the information is false." Id. at 107. Additionally, "the State must prove that the officer receiving the information reasonably understands the information to refer to a specific individual." Id.
Crawley involved a report to the Winona police department that a police officer had forged Crawley's signature on a medical release form at a Winona...
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