State v. Farris

• Decision Date: 12 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2004-0604.,2004-0604.
• Citation: 109 Ohio St.3d 519,2006 Ohio 3255,849 N.E.2d 985
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. FARRIS, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

849 N.E.2d 985

109 Ohio St.3d 519

2006-Ohio-3255

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. FARRIS, Appellant.

No. 2004-0604.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted April 27, 2005.

Decided July 12, 2006.

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Martin Frantz, Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Robert E. Kerper Jr., for appellant.

PFEIFER, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

{¶ 1} On the afternoon of December 18, 2002, Ohio Highway Patrol Trooper Richard Menges stopped appellant, Stephen F. Farris, for speeding on U.S. Route 30, in Wooster. Once Farris pulled over and stopped his vehicle, Menges approached on the right side of the car. When Farris lowered the passenger window, Menges smelled a light odor of burnt marijuana coming from inside the car. Menges had not observed Farris smoking, nor did he see him throw anything out a window.

{¶ 2} Menges asked Farris to step out of the car. He did not conduct a field sobriety test on Farris, but did conduct a pat-down search and found no evidence of contraband or drugs. Menges took Farris's car keys and requested that Farris sit in the front seat of the police cruiser.

{¶ 3} While they were seated in the front of the cruiser, Menges told Farris that he had smelled marijuana in the car. Without administering a Miranda warning or seeking consent to search the car, Menges asked Farris about the smell of marijuana. Farris told Menges that his housemates had been smoking marijuana when he left the house. Menges told Farris that he was going to search the car and then specifically asked whether there were any drugs or drug devices in the car. Farris admitted that there was a "bowl," i.e., a marijuana pipe, in a bag in his trunk.

{¶ 4} Menges testified that after Farris made those statements, Menges immediately administered Miranda warnings, but did not tell Farris that his previous admissions could not be used against him. He then asked Farris the same questions and obtained the same responses regarding the location of the drug paraphernalia.

{¶ 5} Menges and a second trooper searched the interior of Farris's vehicle and found nothing. They then opened the trunk, searched it, and seized a closed, opaque container that held a glass pipe and cigarette papers. Farris was charged with a misdemeanor for possession of drug paraphernalia.

{¶ 6} Farris filed a motion to suppress certain statements that he had made to the highway patrol troopers and to suppress the evidence seized from the trunk of his car. On April 29, 2003, the trial court ruled that statements made prior to the Miranda warnings were to be suppressed but that statements made after the warnings were admissible. The trial court also ruled that the seized paraphernalia was admissible, as the trooper had probable cause to search the trunk of Farris's vehicle based solely on the odor of burnt marijuana coming from inside the car.

{¶ 7} After the trial court's evidentiary rulings, Farris entered a no-contest plea and the trial court entered a judgment of conviction. Farris appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's holding. The appellate court held that Farris's statements—both before and after the Miranda warning—were voluntary and that once warned, he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The court further held that the search of the vehicle's trunk was proper because Farris's "admissible inculpatory statements relating to the drug paraphernalia gave the officer probable cause to search the trunk of [Farris's] vehicle without a warrant pursuant to the automobile exception."

{¶ 8} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a discretionary appeal.

Law and Analysis

{¶ 9} This case presents several issues for our review: (1) whether the detention of Farris constituted an unreasonable seizure and thus violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, (2) whether Farris was in custody when he made his pre-Miranda statements in the police vehicle, (3) whether the statements Farris made after receiving a Miranda warning confirming his pre-Miranda statements can be used against him, (4) whether the fruits of Farris's post-Miranda statements are admissible, and (5) whether the above issues are irrelevant in this matter because an officer has probable cause to search an entire vehicle, including its trunk, when he smells the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle. We hold that Farris was not unreasonably detained; that he was, however, in custody; that his post-Miranda statements are inadmissible; that the physical evidence seized as a result of his statements is inadmissible pursuant to the Self-Incrimination Clause of Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution; and that with respect to the car, the officer had sufficient probable cause to search only the interior of the vehicle, not its trunk.

{¶ 10} Appellant argues first that he was being illegally held by Officer Menges when he made his incriminating statements. In State v. Robinette (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 685 N.E.2d 762, this court held in paragraph one of the syllabus:

{¶ 11} "When a police officer's objective justification to continue detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation for the purpose of searching the person's vehicle is not related to the purpose of the original stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention to conduct a search constitutes an illegal seizure."

{¶ 12} Here, Farris's extended detention was not based upon the purpose of the original stop, excessive speed, but was based upon Menges's detection of the scent of burnt marijuana. In State v. Moore (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 734 N.E.2d 804, a case involving the search of a driver and his car pursuant to a traffic stop, this court held, "The smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle" without a warrant. Based on Moore, then, Farris's detention in order to effectuate a search was justified and did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or its Ohio counterpart, Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.

{¶ 13} Having conceded below and in its memorandum opposing jurisdiction in this court that Farris was in custody for purposes of Miranda, appellee now argues that Farris was never in custody, rendering Miranda warnings unnecessary. A defendant need not be under arrest, however, to be "in custody" for Miranda purposes. Although a motorist who is temporarily detained as the subject of an ordinary traffic stop is not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda, Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, if that person "thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him `in custody' for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda." Id.

{¶ 14} Here, the officer's treatment of Farris after the original traffic stop placed Farris in custody for practical purposes. Officer Menges patted down Farris, took his car keys, instructed him to enter the cruiser, and told Farris that he was going to search Farris's car because of the scent of marijuana. Farris was not free to leave the scene—he had no car keys and reasonably believed that he would be detained at least as long as it would take for the officer to search his automobile. The "only relevant inquiry" in determining whether a person is in custody is "how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317. We hold that a reasonable man in Farris's position would have understood himself to be in custody of a police officer as he sat in the cruiser.

{¶ 15} While in custody in the cruiser, Farris made virtually identical statements to Menges before and after Menges's recitation of the Miranda warning regarding the presence of drug paraphernalia in the trunk of his car. In Missouri v. Seibert (2004), 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the technique of successive interrogations, first unwarned and then warned, violates a defendant's Miranda rights.

{¶ 16} In Seibert, an officer purposely and by design questioned a defendant without Miranda warnings for 30 to 40 minutes. After the defendant made an admission, the officer gave the defendant a 20-minute break. After the break, the same officer gave the defendant Miranda warnings, obtained a signed waiver, and resumed questioning, confronting the defendant with her prewarning statements. The defendant repeated her admission. The court referred to this interrogation technique as "question first" and wrote that "[t]he object of question-first is to render Miranda warnings ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to give them, after the suspect has already confessed." Id. at 611, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643. The court held that the postwarning statements were inadmissible. Id. at 617, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643.

{¶ 17} The overarching concern when considering the sufficiency of a Miranda warning is whether it is given in a manner that effectuates its purpose of reasonably informing a defendant of his rights. The words themselves are not magical and are not curative of interrogation mistakes that occur before it is given:

{¶ 18} "Just as `no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy [Miranda's] strictures,' California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 [101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696] (1981) (per curiam), it would be absurd to think that the mere recitation of the litany suffices to satisfy Miranda in every conceivable circumstance. `The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably "conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda."' ...