State v. Faulkner

• Decision Date: 23 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 7586,7586
• Citation: 624 P.2d 940,1 Haw.App. 651
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maurice W. FAULKNER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Court of Appeals

Page 940

624 P.2d 940

1 Haw.App. 651

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maurice W. FAULKNER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 7586.

Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i.

Feb. 23, 1981.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The rule is that a trial judge, in passing upon a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, must determine whether upon the evidence, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. The test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, and this court will not disturb the ruling of the lower court if there is such substantial evidence.

3. It is well-settled that the admissibility of evidence, generally, and the scope of cross-examination at trial are matters exercised within the discretion of the trial court.

4. In determining the proper scope of cross-examination, the trial court must necessarily be vested with sufficient discretion both to keep cross-examination to its primary purpose and to maintain orderly expeditious and relevant presentation of the evidence to the trier of fact. The trial court's exercise of its discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination will not be ruled as reversible error when it limits irrelevant and repetitious questions by counsel which do not result in any manifest prejudice to the appellant.

5. The burden of establishing abuse of discretion is on appellant and a strong showing is required to establish it. To constitute an abuse, it must appear that the trial court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules of principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of the appellant.

6. A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence will only be granted if (1) the evidence has been discovered after the trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered before or at trial through the exercise of due diligence; (3) the evidence is material to the issues and not cumulative or offered solely for purposes of impeachment; and (4) the evidence is of such a nature as would probably change the result of the later trial. Implicit in this criteria is that the newly discovered evidence upon which the motion for new trial is based must be evidence consisting of facts that were in existence and hidden at the time of trial.

Barbara Lee Melvin, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Colleen K. Hirai, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before HAYASHI, C. J., and PADGETT and BURNS, JJ.

HAYASHI, Chief Judge.

Appellant was convicted in a jury trial of resisting an order to stop motor vehicle (HRS § 710-1027) ¹ and sentenced to one year's probation with the requirement that he undergo mental health counseling. He appeals that conviction and raises as error three main issues: 1. whether the trial court improperly denied his motion for acquittal; 2. whether the trial court abused its discretion in a) limiting the appellant's cross-examination, and b) excluding the testimony of a former attorney regarding a prior case; and 3. whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for a new trial. For the reasons stated hereinafter, we affirm.

The facts reveal the following: On April 28, 1979, Officer Redling of the Harbors Division Police received a complaint that parts were being removed from a car parked in an area under the supervision of the Harbors Division. He proceeded to the site in his marked patrol car and observed the appellant removing parts from a yellow Mazda. He inquired whether the appellant owned the car and requested his identification. Appellant did not respond and walked over to his own car and got in to start it. Officer Redling ordered the appellant out of the car and upon his refusal to do so, Redling reached into the car to grab the keys. Officer Redling then told appellant he was under arrest. The appellant struck Redling and the car moved forward a short distance while Redling was still hanging on. Redling removed the keys and stopped the car. Appellant was then placed under arrest and charged with reckless endangering and resisting an order to stop motor vehicle. Appellant's version of the events leading to his arrest differs slightly from Officer Redling's. He testified that Officer Redling, upon recognition of the appellant, stated that he finally "get you where I want you"; and that Officer Redling knocked him into the car so severely that his tooth was broken. He started his car in an effort to escape from Officer Redling whom he feared from previous encounters. The trial court granted appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to the charge of reckless endangering; and the jury, on July 24, 1979, returned a verdict of guilty on the second charge. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on August 3, 1979, when it was learned that the appellant was arrested again by Officer Redling two days after the trial and according to the attached affidavits, beaten by Officer Redling. Appellant also sought a new trial on the basis of undisclosed contact by a juror with his attorney. After the verdict was entered, appellant's counsel learned that the jury foreperson had attended a lecture given by counsel wherein counsel had expressed what counsel felt were radical views on police procedure and criminal law. In her motion, counsel alleged that the failure of the juror to reveal this matter was prejudicial to appellant's case. The motion was denied and this appeal taken.

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in its denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. Appellant argues that because he believed based upon a prior experience, that the Harbors Division did not have jurisdiction over the area in which he was arrested, his failure to heed the directives of Officer Redling was warranted. We disagree.

It has been established that in passing upon a motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial judge must determine whether upon the evidence, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weighing the evidence, and drawing justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rocker, 52 Haw. 336, 475 P.2d 684 (1970). On appeal of the denial of the motion, a reviewing court will not disturb the lower court's ruling if the evidence of the prosecution is such that "a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Kahalewai, 55 Haw. 127, 516 P.2d 336 (1973), State v. Rocker, supra.

At the close of the State's case, the following had been established: 1. the aforementioned facts leading to appellant's arrest, 2. Officer Redling was in uniform and was driving a Harbors Division patrol vehicle, and 3. testimony of Adam Vincent of the State of Hawaii Department of Transportation, Harbors Division, that the area in question was within the jurisdiction of the Harbors Police.

The state of the evidence at the time appellant's motion was made was such that, at minimum, a prima facie case for the offense charged had been established. Therefore, we conclude that the court did not err in denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal.

Appellant's next contention is that he was denied his right to a fair trial by the limitations that the court imposed on his cross-examination of Officer Redling and the court's exclusion of the proposed testimony of Ron Yonemoto, a deputy public defender, about a prior case involving the appellant and other Harbors Division police officers. The court refused to allow appellant to impeach Officer Redling's testimony by questioning him whether his two former wives had charged him with assault and about the reasons for his termination from a previous place of employment. The trial court also refused to permit testimony from appellant's immediate superior regarding standard police procedures following arrest.

The law is well-settled that the admissibility of evidence, generally, and the scope of cross-examination at trial are matters exercised within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Vincent, 51 Haw. 40, 450 P.2d 996 (1969); Hawley v. State, Alaska, 614 P.2d 1349 (1980). It is equally well-settled in appellate jurisprudence that a discretion vested in a trial court and exercised by it will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse. State v. Sacoco, 45 Haw. 288, 367 P.2d 11 (1961). The burden of establishing abuse of discretion is on appellant and a strong showing is required to establish it. To constitute an abuse, it must appear that the trial court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant, 24A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1861; State v. Sacoco, supra.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow appellant to impeach Officer Redling's testimony with allegations that he had beaten two of his former wives and the circumstances surrounding the termination of his former employment. These matters were properly ruled irrelevant and had no bearing on the charges alleged against the appellant.

The principal purpose of cross-examination is to probe the...