State v. Ferranto
| Decision Date | 19 May 1925 |
| Docket Number | 15916 |
| Citation | 112 Ohio St. 667,148 N.E. 350 |
| Parties | The State Of Ohio v. Ferranto. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Criminal law - First degree murder - Duty of court in accepting plea of guilty - Permission to change plea from not guilty to guilty, discretionary - Court may determine degree of crime and impose death penalty - Discretion not abused by imposing sentence to without hearing additional evidence.
1. A plea of guilty in a capital offense should be accepted cautiously, and the trial judge should fully advise the accused of his rights in the premises, and be satisfied that he acts willingly, freely, and deliberately after being so advised, and with knowledge, appreciation, and understanding of the nature and consequences of such plea of guilty.
2. The granting permission to withdraw a plea of not guilty and interpose a plea of guilty is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and, if it appear that the accused has been properly advised of his rights, the action of the court in so receiving a plea of guilty will not be disturbed unless some abuse of discretion affirmatively appears.
3. Upon a plea of guilty to an indictment for murder in the first degree, the trial court has power, without the inter-
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Criminal Law, 16 C.J. 731; Criminal Law, 17 C.J. 3575 (1926 Anno).
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vention of a jury, to determine upon evidence the degree of the crime, and, in the event the same be found to be murder in the first degree, to withhold or extend mercy. (State v. Habig, 106 Ohio St. 151, 140 Nù E., 195 approved and followed.)
4. Where, upon a trial for murder in the first degree, all the evidence has been introduced, including that of the accused testifying in his own behalf, and after both sides have rested and the state has concluded its opening argument, the defendant, upon advice of counsel, and after being cautioned and admonished as to his rights by the court, withdraws his plea of not guilty and enters a plea of guilty, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge, who heard all the evidence introduced in the case, in determining the degree of the crime the same day while the evidence was fresh in his mind, to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree with no extension of mercy, without hearing anew the evidence relating thereto; It not appearing that new evidence was tendered by the accused after he had entered a plea of guilty.
The defendant in error, Cosmo Ferranto, was indicted by the grand jury of Cuyahoga county for the offense of murder in the first degree, charged with killing one Ernest Ferranto purposely and of deliberate and premeditated malice, on January 16, 1919. Ferranto was not apprehended for some time but about four years later he was arrested in Providence, R I., said to have been living there under an assumed name brought, back to Cleveland, and, having been duly arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty, and was placed on trial before a petit jury in the common pleas court of Cuyahoga county, on November 5, 1923. The trial lasted until Monday, November 12, when, at the conclusion of all the evidence in the case, both sides had rested, and, the state having completed its opening argument, the defendant, in open court, by and with the advice of his counsel, and upon full inquiry and explanation by the trial judge, withdrew his former plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty of general homicide, which plea was accepted by the court; and the court, proceeding to determine the degree of the crime and pronounce sentence accordingly, determined that Ferranto was guilty of murder in the first degree, finding nothing to warrant a recommendation of mercy.
The journal entry of the Court of Appeals discloses that
In view of the fact that this reversal involves, among other things, the alleged abuse of discretion by the court of common pleas, it is necessary to advert to the evidence in the case and the facts as shown by the record upon which the trial court based its judgment.
On the day in question, January 16, 1919, the defendant, who had been a boarder in the Ferritto family, came home from his work as a laborer with a plumber, having been assisting upon a job on Quincy avenue, near 105th street, not far from Colonial Court, where the Ferritto family lived. At about noon, or shortly thereafter, he appeared at the Ferritto residence dressed in working clothes, and, finding the children at home on their noon recess from school, Ferranto gave the daughter, a school child, 5 cents, to go to school, and told two of the boys to go outside and get a stone and a nail and he would help them fix a flag. Mrs. Ferritto and Ernest Ferritto, the decedent, a child of tender years, were the only ones left in the basement room, generally used as a kitchen by the Ferrittos. Mrs. Ferritto claims to have been engaged in mending clothes when the defendant, Ferranto, approached her and made known his desire to have improper relations with her. Mrs. Ferritto testifies that the defendant swore at her and persisted in his demands, that a struggle ensued, and that he knocked her down, and that in the struggle, Mrs. Ferritto having been thrown to the floor several times, the defendant, Ferranto, drew a knife and began to stab her, and the small child, Ernest Ferritto, who seems to have come to his mother's side during the altercation; the wounds inflicted upon Ernest Ferritto proving fatal. Mrs. Ferritto, covered with blood as a result of the many wounds upon her, continued the unequal struggle, calling for help, and the defendant, Ferranto, being unable to accomplish his purpose, and doubtless fearing apprehension, fled from the room, locking the door on the outside. The two boys who were outside were stabbed by him in his flight, and a neighbor, Paul Polatino, seeing Mrs. Ferritto covered myth blood, came to the scene of the homicide, and, being told the direction in which Ferranto had fled, pursued him for a short distance; Ferranto, waving his bloody knife, warned him, when the neighbor Paul Polatino came within 60 or 65 feet, and said:
The defendant escaped, and, after having gone to Toledo, found his way to Providence, R. I., where he is said to have lived under an assumed name until apprehended. The mother, Mrs. Camelia Ferritto, the two boys, Dominic and Tony, were taken to the hospital and remained for some time, recovering from the wounds. The child, Ernest Ferritto, was also taken to the hospital and died shortly thereafter, as a result of the wounds inflicted on the day in question by Ferranto, in the county of Cuyahoga and the state of Ohio.
Upon the trial, the defendant took the stand in his own behalf and testified, in substance, that he had some wine stored in the Ferritto house, and that upon his return from work he found Mrs. Ferritto taking wine from the barrel and putting it into a bottle, The defendant claims to have protested with Mrs. Ferritto for taking his wine, and that an altercation ensued in which Mrs. Ferritto struck the defendant over the eye with a bottle, that this blow stunned him, and that his memory of what transpired after that is very vague, and that he does not remember anything except, in a general way, his fleeing and sleeting that night in a park and making his way to Toledo, where he had treated the wound which he claims to have sustained on his forehead, and from thence he went East.
The trial had progressed several days. The testimony on behalf of the state was concluded, and the defendant wads on the stand testifying in his own behalf when, on Friday, November 5, court adjourned until Monday morning at 9:15 o'clock; the adjournment taking place about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, we are informed by counsel. Upon the incoming of court on Monday morning, the examination of the defendant was continued, and two witnesses were called by the defendant, who testified to the good character of the accused, and a third who testified to the fact of having seen Mrs. Ferritto drink wine on some occasion.
The defendant having no other witnesses in attendance, the court declined to longer delay the trial, admonishing counsel that they had had since Friday afternoon at 3:30 to secure the attendance of such witnesses as they might desire, and that, no subpoenas having been served, the court had no power to issue a capias, and ordered the trial to proceed.
Thereupon Mr. Williams delivered the state's opening argument to the jury.
Court and counsel confer.
Thereupon, at 11 a. m., the jury retired from the courtroom. "Defendant's Plea.
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State v. Sands
...discretion" is one of art, connoting judgment exercised by a court which neither comports with reason, nor the record. State v. Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-678 (1925). An abuse of discretion may be found when the trial court "applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct lega......
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IN THE MATTER OF: K.E.C.
...Id. Therefore, "abuse of discretion" describes a judgment neither comporting with the record, nor reason. See, e.g., State v. Ferranto (1925), 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-678. {¶25} Appellant cites Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d), which provides: "[i]f one or more objections to a magistrate's decision are tim......
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State v. Coulter, 2008 Ohio 1021 (Ohio App. 3/7/2008), 2007-P-0028.
...essentially connoting judgment exercised by a court which neither comports with reason, nor the record. See, e.g., State v. Ferranto (1925), 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-678. See, also, State v. Firouzmandi, 5th Dist. No. 2006-CA-41, 2006-Ohio-5823, at ¶54-56; accord, State v. Elswick, 11th Dist. ......
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State v. Hess, CASE NO. 2018-P-0106
...not comport with reason or the record." State v. Underwood, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-113, 2009-Ohio-2089, ¶30, citing State v. Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-78 (1925). Stated differently, an abuse of discretion is the trial court's "'failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal deci......