State v. Ferry Line Auto Bus Co.

• Decision Date: 12 December 1916
• Docket Number: 13286.
• Citation: 93 Wash. 614,161 P. 467
• Parties: STATE v. FERRY LINE AUTO BUS CO. et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

161 P. 467

93 Wash. 614

STATE v. FERRY LINE AUTO BUS CO. et al.

No. 13286.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 12, 1916

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Kenneth Mackintosh, Judge.

Prosecution by the State of Washington against the Ferry Line Auto Bus Company, a corporation, and A. G. Collins and George Collins under Laws 1915, p. 227, regulating motor vehicle transportation for hire. The corporation appeals from the conviction and the state from a judgment of dismissal as to the individual defendants. Affirmed upon the corporation's appeal and reversed upon the State's appeal.

Alfred H. Lundin and W. F. Meier, both of Seattle for the state.

Jas. E Bradford, Wm. B. Allison, C.J. France, and Shorett, McLaren &amp Shorett, all of Seattle, for respondents.

FULLERTON J.

The appellant Ferry Line Auto Bus Company, a corporation, together with A. G. Collins and George Collins, were jointly accused by an information filed by the prosecuting attorney of King county of engaging in the business of carrying passengers for hire in motor propelled vehicles along the public streets of the city of Seattle, without first having a permit so to do, as required by chapter 57 of the Laws of 1915, commonly known as the Jitney Bus Act. To the information each of the defendants filed demurrers. The demurrers of A. G. Collins and George Collins were sustained by the court, and on the election of the prosecution to stand on the information, a judgment of dismissal as to them was entered. The demurrer of the Ferry Line Auto Bus Company was overruled. The corporation then entered a plea of not guilty to the information, and on a trial, which was had before the court sitting without a jury, was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine. The state appeals from the judgment of dismissal against the individual defendants, and the Ferry Line Auto Bus Company appeals from the judgment of conviction.

The record does not disclose the ground upon which the learned trial judge rested his decision as to the individual defendants, but it can be gathered from the argument of their counsel it was thought that since the principal only was required to have a permit before engaging in the business of carrying passengers for hire in motor propelled vehicles at the place named, these defendants, being merely the servants and agents of the principal, could not be guilty of a violation of the statute, even though they aided and abetted the principal in the execution of the unlawful act. This is not the law. No person committing or aiding or abetting in the commission of an unlawful act can shield himself from punishment by showing that he acted under the direction of or as the agent or servant of another. As was said by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Atkins v. State, 95 Tenn. 474, 32 S.W. 391, the relations of principal and agent, employer and employé, are not recognized in the criminal law. By that law every man must stand for himself. No man can authorize another to do what he may not lawfully do himself. If the attempt to confer such authority be made, and the unlawful act be done, both are guilty. So Mr. Bishop, in his work on Criminal Law, says that the command of a superior to an inferior, of a master to his servant, of a principal to his agent, will not justify a criminal act done in pursuance of it. Bishop's New Criminal Law,§ 355. To the same effect are our own cases. In State v. Burnam, 71 Wash. 199, 128 P. 218, it was held that the manager of the active business of a corporation engaged in the business of selling milk was guilty of a violation of the statute prohibiting the selling of milk below a certain standard, although the milk was sold from one of the wagons of the corporation which left the dairy during the manager's absence. See, also, Spokane v. Patterson, 46 Wash. 93, 89 P. 402, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1104, 123 Am. St. Rep. 921, 13 Ann. Cas. 706.

The defendants argue that if every person who is in any way engaged in the unlawful business is included within the penal provisions of the statute, then each individual agent or employé must comply with the statute, regardless of whether the principal has complied with the statute or not. Notwithstanding it is asserted that this conclusion is inevitable, we have not been able to accept it. The principal is guilty because it engaged in the business without a compliance with the statute. The agents and servants are guilty because they aided and abetted the principal in the commission of the unlawful act....