State v. Fiala
Decision Date | 15 May 1991 |
Citation | 810 P.2d 1344,107 Or.App. 193 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Richard Wayne FIALA, Appellant. 10-89-08865; CA A65251 (Control), CA A65252. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Dorothy J. Morey, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Yuanxing Chen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Before WARREN, P.J., and RIGGS and EDMONDS, JJ.
Defendant appeals from convictions for sexual abuse in the first degree. ORS 163.425. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for court-appointed counsel and in not advising him of the consequences of proceeding to trial without counsel. We reverse.
After the arraignment, defendant's retained attorney was allowed to withdraw, and the court granted defendant's request for a court-appointed attorney. Thereafter, the court withdrew the appointment. Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion, because its decision was based on the credit limit available to defendant on his credit cards. The determination as to whether defendant qualifies for court-appointed counsel is a question for the trial court, and we review only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Freeman, 96 Or.App. 70, 73, 771 P.2d 304 (1989). The affidavit of indigency 1 shows that, when the court withdrew the appointment of the attorney, defendant was a student and was unemployed. Previously, he had been employed in the Lane County Sheriff's Office with a net pay of $1,700 per month. Defendant had $300 in bank accounts and owned an unencumbered vehicle valued at $4,000. His monthly expenses were $376. Of that amount, $145 was applied to credit card balances. In the light of the value of defendant's vehicle, his employment history and his living expenses, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request for a court-appointed attorney.
Defendant argues that the court erred in not advising him of the consequences of proceeding without counsel. Before trial started, this exchange occurred:
In State v. Verna, 9 Or.App. 620, 626, 498 P.2d 793 (1972), we said:
(Citations omitted.)
Defendant argues that, because he was not advised of the consequences of proceeding to trial without counsel, his election to represent himself was invalid. Relying on State v. Lingren, 79 Or.App. 324, 719 P.2d 61 (1986), and State v. Schmick, 62 Or.App. 227, 660 P.2d 693, rev. den. 295 Or. 122, 666 P.2d 1344 (1983), the state argues that Verna is inapplicable, because defendant was able to hire his own attorney but failed to do so and, even if he did not have enough time to hire an attorney, he failed to request a continuance. In Schmick and Lingren, the question was whether the court had abused its discretion by forcing the defendants to proceed to trial without ...
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