State v. Verna
Decision Date | 23 June 1972 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Robert A. VERNA, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Ken C. Hadley, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
John H. Clough, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lee Johnson, Atty. Gen., and John W. Osburn, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Before LANGTRY, P.J., and FOLEY and FORT, JJ.
Defendant was indicted for kidnapping and assaulting his former wife. He was convicted, in a jury trial, for kidnapping. On appeal defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss his court-appointed attorney and represent himself.
The record reflects that two attorneys appointed to represent defendant resigned prior to trial because defendant insisted on conducting his own defense and refused to cooperate with them. A third attorney was appointed and appeared at trial with defendant. On the day of trial defendant moved to dismiss this attorney and defend himself. Pertinent excerpts of the colloquy between defendant and the court relating to this request are set out in the margin. 1 The court denied defendant's motion. After taking of evidence, defendant asked to make the closing argument to the jury, which the court also denied.
A defendant in a criminal case has the constitutional right not only to be represented by counsel, but also, if he so elects, to represent himself.
'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right * * * to be heard by himself and counsel * * *.' Oregon Constitution, Art. I, § 11; State v. Butchek, 121 Or. 141, 153, 253 P. 367, 254 P. 805 (1927); State v. Dalebout, 4 Or.App. 601, 480 P.2d 451 (1971).
The same right has been held to arise out of the federal constitution, United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 275 (2d Cir. 1964), and state constitutions with provisions similar to Oregon's. See Annotation, 77 A.L.R.2d 1233, 1235 (1961). 2 Thus, although the emphasis in recent years has been on the constitutional right of indigent defendants to appointed counsel, this safeguard does not limit the right to act Pro se; the right to counsel does not force counsel on a defendant. State v. Butchek, supra 121 Or. at 153, 253 P. 367; State v. Dalebout, supra 4 Or.App. at ---, 480 P.2d 451.
Understandably, trial courts are hesitant to accept a waiver of counsel; 3 however, that caution cannot justify forced appointment of counsel when a defendant tenders an effective demand to proceed Pro se. As one commentator aptly put it:
'When a trial court is confronted with a defendant who asserts his desire to waive counsel, it must steer carefully between the Scylla of denying the defendant's substantial right to determine his own fate and the Charybdis of violating the constitutional right to counsel of a person who does not validly waive this right * * *.' Note, The Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 Minn.L.Rev. 1133, 1141 (1965).
Because the election to defend Pro se necessarily involves a waiver of the right to counsel, it is incumbent upon the court to determine, by recorded colloquy, that the election or waiver is intelligent and competent. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed.2d 1461, 1466,146 A.L.R. 357 (1938); State v. Collman, Or.App., 497 P.2d 1233 (1972). At minimum, the court should determine whether defendant understands the nature of the charge, the elements of the offense and the punishments which may be exacted. Further informing him of some of the pitfalls of defending himself, the possible advantage that an attorney would provide, and the responsibility he incurs by undertaking his own defense will also serve to insure defendant's decision is made intelligently.
Prior to trial in the case at bar defendant was examined by a psychiatrist who found him 'capable of assisting in his own defense.' The state points to segments of defendant's statements to the court as evidencing a lack of understanding concerning the nature of the charges against him. We have read these statements and find that, in context, they do not exhibit a lack of understanding but rather a disbelief that his conduct was criminal. See n. 1, supra. The court made no finding, nor does the record establish, that defendant's election to proceed Pro se was unintelligent or incompetently made, and, therefore, we reverse. United States v. Pike, 439 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1971); Reynolds v. United States, 267 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1959); People v. Ruiz, 263 Cal.App.2d 216, 69 Cal.Rptr. 473 (1968); State v. Thomlinson, 78 S.D. 235, 100 N.W.2d 121 (1960); State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 272 P.2d 195 (1954).
The right of a defendant to represent himself will not be given effect where dispensing with an attorney's services would disrupt the orderly conduct of trial. State v. Dalebout, supra; Annotation, 77 A.L.R.2d 1133, 1139 (1961), and supplemental cases. In the case at bar defendant made certain statements prior to trial which the state construes as indicating an intent by defendant to disrupt courtroom procedure if he were allowed to represent himself. 4 We do not deem these pretrial statements in the context in which they were made as sufficient to justify denial of defendant's right to defend himself. Cases cited by the state as justifying denial of defendant's right to act Pro se involve disruptive conduct During trial. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). While we do not rule out the possibility that pretrial threats of disruptive courtroom behavior under some circumstances may be sufficient to justify denying a competent defendant the right to proceed Pro se, we do not find those circumstances in the case at bar.
Reversed and remanded.
'* * *.'
After recess:
'MR. SANCHEZ: Yes. I have again advised my client like I did nor an hour or so at the jail one time. We had a pre-trial conference before Judge Olson (sic) which I talked to him then, and he persisted to tell me that he wanted to represent himself. I have talked to the other attorneys that were in this case, especially Mr. James Hannam. I have his file. I have studied the file. I have attempted to explain to Mr. Verna what the charges are.
'The one problem we have here, Your Honor, is this: Mr. Verna strongly believes that he has never been divorced, * * *. Mr. Verna claims that he was never notified of the hearing, and I have endeavored to the best of my ability to explain to him that he should have notified the Court at this time, or that he had ample opportunity to be present at the hearing.
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