State v. Field

• Decision Date: 30 September 2009
• Docket Number: A134181.,CM0520645
• Citation: 231 Or. App. 115,218 P.3d 551
• Parties: STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SHAWN WESLEY FIELD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

218 P.3d 551

231 Or. App. 115

STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SHAWN WESLEY FIELD, Defendant-Appellant.

CM0520645

A134181.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted on May 11, 2009.

Decided September 30, 2009.

Daniel H. Koenig argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Rolf Moan, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.

Before EDMONDS, Presiding Judge, and WOLLHEIM, Judge, and SERCOMBE, Judge.

EDMONDS, P.J.

Defendant appeals convictions for murder, ORS 163.115, assault, ORS 163.175, criminal mistreatment, ORS 163.205, and manufacture of a controlled substance, former ORS 475.999 (2003), renumbered as ORS 475.904 (2005), all relating to the murder of his girlfriend's three-year-old child. He raises three assignments of error on appeal. In his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting statements he made to police while he was in custody and after he allegedly had asserted his right to counsel. He also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial and that the court improperly imposed consecutive sentences without underlying jury findings to support those sentences. We affirm and write only to discuss defendant's assertion that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress; we reject his other assignments of error without discussion.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we are bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact when there is constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record to support them. State v. Caprar, 214 Or. App. 434, 439, 166 P.3d 567 (2007), rev. den., 345 Or. 317, 195 P.3d 65 (2008). "If findings are not made on all [historical] facts, and there is evidence from which such facts could be decided more than one way, we will presume that the facts were decided in a manner consistent with the [trial court's] ultimate conclusion[.]" Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 487, 443 P.2d 621 (1968). We then assess whether those facts are sufficient to meet constitutional standards. State v. Holcomb, 213 Or.App. 168, 173, 159 P.3d 1271, rev. den., 343 Or. 224, 168 P.3d 1155 (2007). Here, the trial court made the following detailed findings regarding defendant's conversations with police officers and his assertion of his right to counsel:

"On the afternoon of June 3, 2005[,] officers began a homicide investigation involving the death of [the minor child]. The defendant, Shawn Field, was interviewed by law enforcement personnel at the scene and asked to remain at the scene. Later in the afternoon Corvallis police Detective Jason Harvey asked the defendant to go with police officers to the law enforcement center for additional interviews.

Although he was not under arrest at the time, at approximately 3:30 in the afternoon Detective Harvey advised the defendant of his Miranda[¹] warnings, and the defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights and indicated that he had no questions about his rights. He voluntarily spoke with Detective Harvey. At one point during the interview the defendant told the detective that, quote, `This is something where I need to get a lawyer. I don't know what to do now,' unquote. Now, when the detective followed up with the fact that defendant had mentioned a lawyer[,] the defendant told Detective Harvey that he didn't want to get a lawyer and wanted to talk with Detective Harvey adding, quote, `I'll talk to you right now,' end quote. At approximately 4:00 p.m. the defendant told Detective Harvey `I'm just wondering if I need—I mean, am I supposed to get an attorney to consult anything? What am I supposed to do?' Detective Harvey told the defendant he couldn't give him legal advice, and that if he wanted an attorney he had the right to contact one. The defendant responded, quote * * * `I don't want to not—I didn't do it so I don't want to fight it.' Lieutenant Hendrickson then asked the defendant if he could ask a couple of questions. The defendant answered `Sure' and voluntarily continued to answer questions until approximately 7:00 p.m. The defendant then went to another interview room and lied down on the couch. At approximately 9:00 p.m. the defendant said he wanted to leave, and Detective Harvey asked Officer Hurley to take the defendant wherever he wanted to go. While en route the district attorney told detectives to bring the defendant back and to arrest him for manufacturing a controlled substance. When the defendant arrived back at the Law Enforcement Center he was arrested and taken into custody, was not re-advised of his Miranda rights, and voluntarily answered additional questions.

"On Sunday morning, June 5, 2005[,] the defendant called friends and asked them to have his parents contact attorney Steve Ensor. At approximately 3:00 p.m. Detective Karin Stauder visited the defendant in the jail. Her initial purpose was to see if the defendant could tell her someone to call to take care of his cat. She engaged the defendant in conversation about a request form that he had submitted to corrections staff regarding speaking with a mental health representative. She did not advise the defendant of his Miranda warnings. Detective Stauder asked the defendant if he wanted to talk to a counselor or a police officer. The defendant stated that he just wanted to talk to someone, have a conversation. Detective Stauder reminded the defendant that he had previously told detectives that he didn't want to talk to anybody and wanted an attorney. That was her recollection, although there was not evidence that in fact the defendant had done that. It was presented at the pretrial hearing. The defendant told Detective Stauder that after he was arrested he said he guessed he should have an attorney and a phone call, and specifically he said, `Well, we walked over from here and he was arresting me and I said—I said, `I guess I should have an attorney now and a phone call,['] and then I just—I thought since I was being arrested that I should be—I mean, I thought that would be the smart thing, because before I was arrested I was—I mean, I told them everything they asked me. I answered every question.' and it goes on. And then Detective Stauder asked the defendant, `Well, do you want to talk to me? If you do— because I kind of want to go through the part that you—you know, you have a right not to talk to me, you have a right to have an attorney. You're already in what we call is you're invoked, which means that you don't want to talk to us, and once you do that I can't talk to you, but if you want to waive that right and you want to talk to me I'll be glad to listen, Shawn, but I just want to make sure that you're protecting yourself here,' and the defendant's response was `Oh, I'll talk to you. I mean—I mean, I have the right to s[ay] no or end the conversation,' and the defendant continued to voluntarily make statements and answers to Detective Stauder's questions.

"At approximately 4:30 attorney Steve Ensor contacted the jail and said that he was coming over to see the defendant. He was instructed by jail staff that the defendant was not available at that time because it was supper time and instructed to call back later. When he called back later, approximately an hour later, he was—again requested to speak with—to see about coming over to speak with [defendant] and was told that he was not available because he was in a special visit. Corrections deputies and law enforcement did not advise the defendant that Mr. Ensor was attempting to get ahold of him * * *."

Based on those findings, the court granted defendant's motion to suppress all statements he made to police after "Mr. Ensor's 4:30 telephone call informing the jail staff that he'd been asked to represent the defendant and was coming to the jail to see him * * *." However, the court denied the motion as to any statements made by defendant to law enforcement officers before 4:30 p.m. on June 5, 2005.

On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court "erred in denying that part of defendant's motion to suppress statements made by the defendant prior to 4:30 p.m. on Sunday, June 5, 2005 obtained in violation of Miranda and after he had invoked his right to counsel." His assertions divide into two distinct arguments: (1) the court should have suppressed statements made by defendant after his arrest because he was not given Miranda warnings at that time; and (2) in any event, all defendant's statements to police on June 5, 2005, should have been suppressed because they were the result of an unlawful interrogation after defendant had unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. The state responds that, "[t]he officers in this case fully advised defendant of his Miranda rights, and no subsequent events required further warnings. Moreover, defendant never invoked his right to counsel and, even if he did, he initiated further discussion of the crimes being investigated * * *." Finally, according to the state, even if defendant's statements were incorrectly admitted, any error was harmless.

We turn first to defendant's contention regarding the giving of Miranda warnings. "Under the Oregon Constitution, Miranda-like warnings are required when the defendant is in full custody and may be required in circumstances that, although they do not rise to the level of full custody, create a setting which judges would and officers should recognize to be compelling." State v. Zelinka, 130 Or.App. 464, 473, 882 P.2d 624 (1994), rev. den., 320 Or. 508, 888 P.2d 569 (1995), (quoting State v. Smith, 310 Or. 1, 7, 791 P.2d 836 (1990), and State v. Magee, 304 Or. 261, 265, 744 P.2d 250 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, under the United States Constitution, Miranda warnings must be given when a person's freedom has been significantly restrained. Smith, 310 Or. at 8, 791 P.2d...