State v. Fields
Decision Date | 19 July 2016 |
Docket Number | ED 103288 |
Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Ardell FIELDS, Appellant. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Daniel N. McPherson, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
Scott Thompson, St. Louis, MO, for Appellant.
Ardell Fields ("Movant") is incarcerated for a rape he claims he did not commit. In his quest to be exonerated, Movant pursues post-conviction DNA testing, pursuant to Section 547.035.1 Movant appeals from the motion court's judgment, after an evidentiary hearing, denying his post-conviction motion for DNA testing. We affirm.
In April 1996, Movant was convicted, after a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, of forcible rape, resisting arrest, and third degree assault. Movant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment for the forcible rape conviction, a term of 10 years of imprisonment for the resisting arrest conviction, and a term of one year of imprisonment for the third degree assault conviction, all terms to run consecutively. Previously, this court affirmed Movant's convictions on direct appeal, State v. Fields , 948 S.W.2d 201 (Mo.App.E.D.1997), as well as Movant's motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15, Fields v. State , 991 S.W.2d 213 (Mo.App.E.D.1999).
In July 2012, Movant filed a pro se post-conviction motion for DNA testing, pursuant to Section 547.035, asserting his innocence. After appointed counsel filed an amended motion, the motion court denied Movant's prayer for relief without an evidentiary hearing. Thereafter, on appeal, this court reversed the motion court's holding and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing. See Fields v. State , 425 S.W.3d 215 (Mo.App.E.D.2014).
On remand, the motion court conducted an evidentiary hearing upon Movant's post-conviction motion for forensic DNA testing. During the evidentiary hearing, the motion court was presented with evidence and the testimony of three witnesses; (1) Donna Becherer ("Becherer"), a forty year veteran of the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department's crime laboratory; (2) Terri Johnson, Movant's trial counsel ("Trial Counsel") and former employee of the Missouri State Public Defender; and (3) Movant. The litigants stipulated that there existed evidence secured in relation to the underlying crime which DNA testing could be conducted upon; specifically, Victim's jeans, Victim's underwear, Victim's shirt, Movant's shirt, Movant's pants, Movant's underwear, and swabs from Victim's rape kit procured during her examination at the hospital.
Subsequently, the motion court issued its judgment, overruling Movant's post-conviction motion for forensic DNA testing, concluding, inter alia , that, at the time of Movant's trial, DNA testing technology was reasonably available to Movant and Trial Counsel, and the election to forgo DNA testing was a matter of trial strategy.
This appeal now follows.
Movant submits two points on appeal. First, Movant asserts the trial court clearly erred in denying his motion for post-conviction DNA testing, in that the trial court administered an "objective" test regarding the availability of DNA testing technology rather than a "subjective" test, in violation of Section 547.035.2(3)(a).
Second, Movant maintains the trial court clearly erred in denying his motion for post-conviction DNA testing premised upon Movant's failure to satisfy 547.035.2(5). Movant claims the trial court's finding was against the weight of the evidence, in that there existed a reasonable probability that exculpatory evidence secured by DNA testing would have exonerated Movant.
As discussed, infra , we find Point I dispositive and need not reach Point II.
A motion for DNA testing, pursuant to Section 547.035, is a post-conviction motion, governed by that standard set forth under Rules 24.035 and 29.15. Weeks v. State , 140 S.W.3d 39, 43–44 (Mo. banc 2004). As such, appellate review of a post-conviction motion is limited to determining whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. State v. Ruff , 256 S.W.3d 55, 56 (Mo. banc 2008) ("Denial of a post-conviction motion for DNA testing is reviewed to determine whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law were clearly erroneous."). Inasmuch as we presume the motion court's findings are correct, this court deems a motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law clearly erroneous only if a full review of the record leaves us with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Mallow v. State , 439 S.W.3d 764, 768 (Mo. banc 2014).
For individuals in the custody of Missouri's Department of Corrections seeking exoneration, Section 547.035 prescribes a statutory construct to file a post-conviction motion for forensic DNA testing. See Section 547.035.1; see also Hudson v. State , 190 S.W.3d 434, 438 (Mo.App.W.D.2006). Pursuant to Section 547.035.2, upon the filing of a post-conviction motion for forensic DNA testing, an evidentiary hearing shall be afforded to a movant if the motion incorporates specific enumerated information. State v. Kinder , 122 S.W.3d 624, 629 (Mo.App.E.D.2003). Particularly, the motion must allege facts demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following:
Thereafter, the prosecutor will be ordered to show cause as to why the motion shall be denied unless it appears from the motion that a movant is not entitled to relief or the court determines the file and records of the case conclusively show that a movant is not entitled to relief. See Section 547.035.4; Kinder , 122 S.W.3d at 630 ; see also Hudson , 190 S.W.3d at 438–39 () (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). However, if an evidentiary hearing is granted and conducted, the motion court shall order the appropriate testing if the motion court concludes:
Section 547.035.7; see also Hudson , 190 S.W.3d at 439. Nevertheless, the movant still bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations of the motion, including each and every element of Section 547.035.2. See Matney v. State , 110 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Mo.App.S.D.2003) ; State v. Waters , 221 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Mo.App.W.D.2006) ().
In the instant matter, prior to the evidentiary hearing conducted upon Movant's motion, the parties stipulated and did not dispute Movant's motion satisfied elements (1), (2), and (4) of Section 547.035.2. As such, during Movant's evidentiary hearing, elements (3) and (5) of Section 547.035.2 were specifically at issue. Those same elements form the nucleus of Movant's dual points on appeal.
Insomuch as this court concludes the trial court did not err in adjudging Movant failed to satisfy element (3) of Section 547.035.2, Movant's Point I is dispositive, and we elect not to address Movant's Point II. See Waters , 221 S.W.3d at 418 ().
In his first point on appeal, Movant asserts the trial court clearly erred, inter alia , in adjudging Movant failed to satisfy prong (a) of element (3) of Section 547.035.2, in that the trial court administered an "objective" test regarding the availability of DNA testing technology rather than a "subjective" test. Specifically, Movant avers the trial court inappropriately determined Movant failed to meet Section 547.035.2(3)(a) because DNA testing technology was not reasonably available to Movant or Trial Counsel , even though DNA testing was available and had been utilized in the jurisdiction of the City of St. Louis since 1991. Moreover, Movant claims the election not to request and conduct DNA testing at the time of Movant's trial could not have been a matter of trial strategy because neither Movant nor Trial Counsel was aware of DNA testing technology at the time of Movant's trial and there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding that this was, indeed, trial strategy.
"Section 547.035.2(3) requires Movant to allege facts that demonstrate that the evidence was not previously tested by him because: (a) the technology for the testing was not reasonably available to the movant at the time of the trial; (b) neither the movant nor his or her trial counsel was aware of the existence of the evidence at the time of trial; or (c) the evidence was otherwise unavailable to both the movant and movant's trial counsel at the time of...
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