State v. Fields

• Decision Date: 14 August 1984
• Docket Number: No. 9252,9252
• Citation: 686 P.2d 1379,67 Haw. 268
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shirley Lynn FIELDS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1379

686 P.2d 1379

67 Haw. 268

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shirley Lynn FIELDS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 9252.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Aug. 14, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Article III, Section 2 of the federal constitution confines the federal judiciary's authority to "cases" and "controversies." Those words limit the business of the federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.

2. Courts created pursuant to Article III of the federal constitution are barred from deciding abstract, hypothetical, or contingent questions. This restriction of power stems directly from the "case or controversy" requirement. A further but closely related limitation, ripeness, is a product of both the prudential considerations that influence courts and constitutional limitations.

3. The courts of the State of Hawaii are not bound by a "case or controversy" requirement. But they nonetheless recognize that the prudential rules of self-governance are always of relevant concern. And even in the absence of constitutional restrictions, they still must weigh the wisdom, efficacy, and timeliness of an exercise of their power before acting.

4. Ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing, and the relevant prudential rule deals with problems of prematurity and abstractness that may prevent adjudication in all but the exceptional case.

5. A ruling that an issue is not ripe ordinarily indicates the court has concluded a later decision may be more apt or that the matter is not yet appropriate for adjudication.

6. The deprivation of a fundamental right may not be lightly regarded, even when exacted as part of the price of conditional release.

7. The Hawaii Supreme Court has been charged with the general superintendence of all courts of inferior jurisdiction of the State of Hawaii. Concomitantly, it has been vested with authority to prevent and correct errors and abuse where no other remedy is expressly provided by law. However, a strong commitment to the prudential rules shaping the exercise of its jurisdiction has resulted in a sparing use of this extraordinary power.

8. The Hawaii Supreme Court's supervisory duty requires it to act in a situation where more than a few probationers are in constant jeopardy of being divested by judicial fiat of statutory and constitutional protection that should rightfully be theirs, even if the prudential rules may counsel against the consideration of an appeal.

9. Probation is a judicial act whereby a convicted criminal offender is released into the community under the supervision of a probation officer in lieu of incarceration. The essence of probation is the condition, a judicially imposed restriction upon the convicted criminal's actions after release.

10. Probationers, like parolees and prisoners, properly are subject to restrictions from which ordinary persons are free.

11. There is a difference between correctional supervision which seeks to restore a released offender to society through supervision and supervision which seeks to investigate and prosecute criminal activity.

12. A probationer has the right to enjoy a significant degree of privacy and liberty. Indiscriminate invasions of his privacy by the police would be unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom or conscience.

13. The probation officer has been described as a social therapist in an authoritative setting. The system he serves demands that he be a helper, a monitor, and an enforcer; it instructs him to aid and guide an individual who has displayed antisocial and criminal behavior, to evaluate and report on the offender's progress toward integration into the community, and to curb the offender's criminal tendencies.

14. The desired rehabilitation of the probationer is largely dependent on the probation officer's ability to gain a thorough understanding of the probationer and his environment. The probation system thus gives the officer a special and unique interest in invading the probationer's privacy. His reason for intrusion is the probationer's need for correctional supervision.

15. If anything is settled in the law of search and seizure, it is that a search without a warrant issued upon probable cause is unreasonable per se, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.

16. The liberty of a parolee or a probationer, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty; and like a parolee, he has a right to enjoy a significant degree of privacy.

17. Even if the court releasing the offender on probation deemed the release "an act of grace" and his freedom a privilege, his liberty is nonetheless valuable and entitled to constitutional protection.

18. A consent obtained in an inherently coercive situation is not a lawful consent.

19. A warrantless search must meet a test of reasonableness even when carried out in fulfillment of a condition of probation.

20. The Constitution of the State of Hawaii explicitly protects the people against unreasonable searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy.

21. As the ultimate judicial tribunal of the State, the Hawaii Supreme Court has final, unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawaii Constitution.

22. Each case of search and seizure without a warrant must turn on its own facts, and each proffered justification for a warrantless search must meet the test of necessity inherent in the concept of reasonableness.

23. The grant of probationary status presupposes at least a partial surrender of privacy.

24. When the substantial governmental interest in the success of a program designed to rehabilitate a criminal convicted of drug offenses is weighed against his diminished expectation of privacy, there is reason for permitting warrantless searches for illicit drugs by a probation officer.

25. A probationer's interest in privacy is not an insignificant one, and he may not be subjected to searches at a probation officer's caprice or fancy. The particular intrusion must still be justified by specific and articulable facts that the object of the search is being concealed by the probationer. This test of reasonableness would allow a probation officer to intrude into the privacy of an offender under his supervision on less than probable cause.

Anson O. Rego, Waianae (Joanne M. Lanham, Waianae with him on reply brief; Anson O. Rego, A Law Corp., Waianae, of counsel) for defendant-appellant.

Shirley Smith, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu (Arthur E. Ross, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu, on the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before LUM, C.J., and NAKAMURA, PADGETT, HAYASHI and WAKATSUKI, JJ.

NAKAMURA, Justice.

A condition of probation imposed upon Shirley Lynn Fields makes her "subject at all times during the period of her probation to a warrantless search of her person property and place of residence for illicit drugs and substances by any law enforcement officer including her probation officer." She contends this portion of the sentence handed down by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit contravenes her constitutionally protected right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. The State of Hawaii maintains a "probationer cannot expect to have the same rights and privileges as an ordinary citizen" and the condition is reasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding its imposition. But we think it is not entirely consonant with the objects of probation and constitutional demands. Thus, we set aside the offending condition and remand the case for the exercise of discretion consistent with the statute covering the grant of probation and constitutional provisions governing searches and seizures.

I.

The pertinent facts are simple and uncontested. The defendant was indicted on five counts of Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the Second Degree in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 712-1242(1)(c). ¹ Following plea bargaining between the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel, the defendant pleaded guilty to Counts I, II, and V of the indictment. ² The circuit court adjudged her guilty of the offenses described in those counts and placed her on probation for a period of five years on condition that she comply with the terms of probation outlined by the court. The Terms and Conditions of Probation encompassed the usual commands delivered to probationers. But they also included several "special conditions of probation," ³ including one, Condition 6(f), that appears to strip the probationer of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded under the federal and state constitutions.

Although she has not been subjected to a warrantless search pursuant to Condition 6(f), the defendant appeals from the sentence of the circuit court. Her right to seek appellate review, however, is challenged by the prosecuting attorney.

II.

The defendant seeks a declaration from this court that Condition 6(f) represents an undue infringement of her constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. But her request for review comes before any effort by the government to exploit the particular condition of probation. We are, of course, reminded by the prosecuting attorney that the self-imposed rules governing the exercise of our statutory jurisdiction militate against a present review of the circuit court's order. The contention is not without merit; yet, we think there is reason for us to act here.

A.

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States confines the federal judiciary's authority to "cases" and "controversies." See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 52 (1978). "[T]hose words limit the business of the federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process." Id. at 53. Thus, "courts created pursuant to ...