State v. Fierro, 2237

Decision Date24 April 1972
Docket NumberNo. 2237,2237
Citation108 Ariz. 268,496 P.2d 129
PartiesThe STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Robert Allen FIERRO, Appellant.
CourtArizona Supreme Court

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Phoenix by John S. O'Dowd, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tucson, and Mary Z. Chandler, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

Howard A. Kashman, Pima County Public Defender by Eleanor Daru Schorr, Deputy Public Defender, Tucson, for appellant.

HAYS, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Robert Fierro, was found guilty by a jury of kidnapping, rape, and theft of a motor vehicle. We find that the court below committed reversible error at defendant's trial in failing to sustain defense counsel's objection to a question asked by the state on cross-examination of one Victor Reyes, a parole officer for the Department of Corrections. Reyes was asked whether he once made a statement that he had always thought of the defendant as a rapist. Over objection by defense counsel, the question was answered affirmatively.

The above testimony was inadmissible for several reasons. First, the question asked Reyes, if he had ever expressed a belief that the defendant was a rapist. A witness's beliefs or opinions are not proper evidence. Britt v. State, 25 Ariz. 419, 218 P. 981 (1923). They are mere conclusions which might be founded on facts entirely irrelevant to the question of a defendant's guilt of the present charge.

The state argues that defense counsel 'opened the door' for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement. The basis for this argument concerns testimony of Reyes on direct examination that he had seen a man prior to the trial who bore a striking resemblance to the defendant. Reyes testified that he did not attempt to stop this man because he thought that if this was the alleged rapist sought by the police, he might scare him off. The state contends that Reyes's testimony can be considered an opinion on his part that the unknown person, and not the defendant, was the perpetrator of the crime. The argument continues that the prejudicial question was asked to show that a prior inconsistent opinion had been expressed concerning the identity of the crime.

We find the state's argument wholly without merit. Reyes cannot be said to have offered an opinion * as to the identity of the perpetrator at either point in his testimony. In addition, in order for a prior statement to be admitted for impeachment purposes, it must be directly, substantially and materially contradictory to the testimony in issue. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence, § 63 (1960). Reyes's testimony that he saw a person who fit the description of the suspect can in no way be said to be inconsistent with the earlier statement that he always thought of the defendant as a rapist. See Strong v. State, 81 Okl.Cr. 263, 163 P.2d 242 (1945).

Another reason for rejecting the question asked here is that it calls for testimony as to the defendant's character. It is generally only where the defendant offers evidence of his good reputation for the trait involved in the charge that the state, in cross-examination of the character witnesses, may offer testimony tending to show a bad reputation for that trait. Udall, Supra, at § 114. Here, the...

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3 cases
  • State v. Gretzler
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • April 21, 1980
    ...the risks inherent in that choice, it was not error for the trial court to preclude cross-examination on that issue. State v. Fierro, 108 Ariz. 268, 496 P.2d 129 (1972); Singh v. State, 35 Ariz. 432, 280 P. 672, 67 A.L.R. 129 The trial court also refused to allow the defense to cross-examin......
  • State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, In and For Mohave County
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • February 2, 1976
    ...tending to show the defendant's bad reputation for that trait. State v. Williams, 111 Ariz. 511, 533 P.2d 1146 (1975); State v. Fierro, 108 Ariz. 268, 496 P.2d 129 (1972). The substantive use of specific bad acts of a witness is also barred because as a general proposition they have little ......
  • State v. Navallez, 2
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • November 25, 1981
    ...to be admitted for impeachment it must directly, substantially, and materially contradict testimony in issue. State v. Fierro, 108 Ariz. 268, 496 P.2d 129 (1972); See Rule 19.3(b), Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. This offered statement did not qualify under these We now turn to the s......

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