State v. Figgures, 02A04-0506-CR-345.

• Decision Date: 28 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 02A04-0506-CR-345.,02A04-0506-CR-345.
• Citation: 839 N.E.2d 772
• Parties: STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Darnetta FIGGURES, Appellee-Defendant.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

839 N.E.2d 772

STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Darnetta FIGGURES, Appellee-Defendant.

No. 02A04-0506-CR-345.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

December 28, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellant.

Anthony S. Churchward, Deputy Public Defender, Fort Wayne, for Appellee.

OPINION

DARDEN, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State appeals the trial court's grant of Darnetta Figgures' motion to suppress evidence.

We affirm.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred when it granted Figgures' motion to suppress evidence.

FACTS

On December 12, 2003, Officer James Branum of the City of Richmond Police Department sought two search warrants for two residences in Wayne County, Indiana, based on an investigation by the Wayne County Drug Task Force conducted from September to December of 2003. According to the investigation, two brothers, James Curry and Henry Lee Watkins, were trafficking crack cocaine together from their residences — Curry at 220½ N. 12th Street; Watkins at 214 N. 12th Street, Apt. # A. The affidavit for the search warrants contained information about a controlled buy from Curry at 220½ No. 12th Street and complaints of drug dealing there, as well as information from confidential informants that on numerous occasions they had seen Watkins cook powder cocaine into crack cocaine at his residence at 214 N. 12th Street, Apt. # A. Conspicuously absent from the affidavit is any implication that Figgures was present or involved in any manner in dealing drugs; in fact, the affidavit contained no mention whatsoever of Figgures. The details of the affidavit will be further discussed later in the opinion.

Branum's affidavit requested permission to "seize all property used in the trafficking of crack cocaine, including . . . any records, receipts, moneys, and other documents that relate to the trafficking of cocaine." (Ex. A). Based on Branum's affidavit, the trial court granted a warrant authorizing the police to enter Watkins' residence at 214 N. 12th Street, Apt. # A, to search for and seize "crack cocaine and records pertaining to the sale of crack cocaine." (Ex. B). This warrant was issued in the cause of State of Indiana v. Henry Lee Watkins and no other person[s] were named in the warrant.

Officer William Shake of the Wayne County Drug Task Force was involved in the execution of the search warrant. In searching for records pertaining to the sale of crack cocaine, Shake looked for "anything from a little piece of paper that has. . . name[s] and dollar amounts to more intricate record keeping," and items, such as mail, that indicate proof of residency. (Tr. 12). As he searched the front bedroom of the residence, which the record indicates was occupied by Figgures and her husband Credell Henry,¹ Shake looked inside some opaque Rubbermaid stackable drawers. He found and seized two bank statements from two different banks. The bank statements were in the names of Credell Henry and Figgures, and both were dated September 30, 2003. One statement showed a balance of $48.09, and the other showed a balance of $4,014.24. Shake also found pieces of mail addressed to Figgures from Wayne County Office of Family and Children ("OFC") in the bedroom. Until viewing this mail, Shake was unaware that Figgures was a recipient of public assistance.

After the search and opening of Figgures' mail, Shake called Elizabeth Maddox, who was Figgures' caseworker at OFC, about the information discovered in the search. Shake then forwarded copies of the police reports to her, as well as the bank statements and the piece of OFC mail (a benefits statement). Maddox turned the packet of information over to OFC fraud investigator Dianna Shoemaker. When Shoemaker received the information, she discovered that Figgures had not reported the bank accounts and that the balances exceeded the limit permitted for public assistance. She therefore sought subpoenas to obtain Figgures' records from the banks. As a result, OFC received copies of Figgures' savings and money market account reports revealing "she had money in the accounts under her name during the time she received public assistance." (App.10). Figgures had a savings account in her name with a balance of $4,023.07 and was listed as a co-owner of a money market account with a balance of $8,019.37. The suppression of this evidence is the subject of this appeal.

The State charged Figgures with one count of welfare fraud, a class C felony, regarding her receipt of food stamps; one count of welfare fraud, a class D felony, regarding her receipt of temporary assistance; and one count of Medicaid fraud, a class D felony. Figgures filed a motion to suppress evidence on February 23, 2005. The court conducted a hearing on March 16, 2005, and granted the motion on April 4, 2005. The court found that neither the warrant nor the probable cause affidavit in support of the warrant contained a reference to Figgures, that neither the warrant nor the probable cause affidavit in support of the warrant referred to any bookkeeping procedure or banks used by Curry or Watkins or any other individuals, and that the warrant lacked "adequate specificity to justify the seizure and `admission into evidence' of the bank records. . ." of Figgures. (App.25).

DECISION

The State, appealing from negative judgment, has the burden of demonstrating that the trial court's grant of Figgures' motion to suppress was contrary to law. See State v. Phillips, 828 N.E.2d 441, 442 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). "We will reverse a negative judgment only when the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences lead to a conclusion opposite that of the trial court." Id. "This court neither reweighs evidence nor judges the credibility of witnesses." Id. "Rather, we consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment." Id.

The State argues that the search warrant is valid because it sufficiently described the items to be seized. The State also contends that even if the warrant was determined to be invalid, the "officers relied upon the warrant in good faith when executing the search." (State's Br. 6). Figgures maintains that the warrant was a general one, failing to describe with particularity the items to be seized, leaving discretion to the executing officer. Furthermore, Figgures asserts that the good faith exception does not apply herein.

Both the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Art. 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution require that warrants particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 11. This requirement prohibits general warrants, which prevents "`a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings'" and "`the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.'" Warren v. State, 760 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind.2002) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1965)). "A warrant that leaves the executing officer with discretion is invalid." Warren, 760 N.E.2d 608, 610 (citing Hester v. State, 551 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ind.Ct.App.1990)).

"While the items to be searched for and seized must be described with some specificity, there is no requirement that there be an exact description." Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1140, 1158-59 (Ind.2003) (citing Phillips v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1073, 1075 (Ind.1987)). In this case, the warrant authorized the executing officer to search for and seize "crack cocaine and records pertaining to the sale of crack cocaine." (Ex. B). Since enumerating a precise list of documents may be impossible to do, the specification of records pertaining to the sale of crack cocaine is sufficient to encompass bank records such as a bank statement. See United States v. Vanichromanee, 742 F.2d 340, 347 (7th Cir.1984) (holding that a warrant authorizing a search of an attaché case for "documents, papers, receipts, and other writings which are evidence of a conspiracy to violate Title 21, U.S.C., Section 963 [conspiracy to import heroin]" was not overly broad). Thus, searching for records pertaining to crack sales by Curry and Watkins may include looking at, and perhaps even seizing, relevant bank statements. Because the warrant was sufficiently specific in its description of the kind of records to be searched for, and the affidavit described whose crack sales were to be investigated, the warrant was valid to search and seize "crack cocaine and records pertaining to the sale of crack cocaine" by Curry and Watkins. However, our analysis does not end there.

The search warrant in question was issued in order to investigate the residence of Henry Watkins at 214 N. 12th Street, Apt. # A, based on evidence that he and his brother, James Curry, were trafficking crack cocaine. According to the affidavit, the officers had been receiving "complaints of drug dealing" from Curry's residence since September 3, 2003, and they had observed known crack abusers leave Curry's residence. (Ex. A). The affidavit further stated that the officers had learned about Curry's criminal history, including prior arrests for narcotics possession and dealing cocaine.

According to the affidavit, confidential informants disclosed information that Curry and Watkins were selling crack out of their apartments. One C.I. divulged details regarding where the brothers were from, where they procured the cocaine, and where they sold the crack. She also agreed to make a controlled buy from Curry, but when the C.I. arrived at his residence, no one was home. Another C.I. reported that she had been to Curry's residence at least eighty times to purchase crack, that she had been to Watkins' residence at least fifteen times, and that she had seen Watkins cook the powder cocaine into crack approximately seven times. She also described...