State v. Tungate
| Decision Date | 31 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 39A01-0807-CR-341.,39A01-0807-CR-341. |
| Citation | 899 N.E.2d 60 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Charles TUNGATE and William Reynolds, Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Jennifer A. Joas, Joas & Stotts, Madison, IN, Attorney for Appellees.
In this consolidated appeal1 involving several drug-related and theft charges, the trial court suppressed evidence seized from Charles Tungate and William Reynolds (the "Defendants") because the warrants authorizing the seizure of such evidence were not supported by probable cause. On appeal, the State raises the sole issue of whether the trial court properly concluded the warrants were not supported by probable cause. Concluding that there was probable cause to search some, but not all, of the areas described in the warrants, we affirm in part and reverse in part. We also address the proper standard of review to apply in cases such as this where the trial court suppresses evidence after a magistrate determined there was probable cause to issue a warrant.
On September 9, 2006, Indiana State Police Trooper Michael Caplinger received information from a colleague that Barry Lauber, an employee with the Rural Electric Membership Corporation, reported that one of his subordinates recently "discovered an unauthorized electric meter ... while in the course of his duties inspecting the kilowatt usage on the authorized electric meter" servicing property in Jefferson County owned by Sheila Shirley. Appellant's Appendix at 30. The colleague also told Trooper Caplinger that Lauber reported the unauthorized meter displayed the identification number "7030" and had been "retired from service in 1986 after having been disappeared [sic] from its installed location in Franklin County...." Id. On September 11, 2006, Trooper Caplinger drove by the Shirley property and observed a white farmhouse, "a red dilapidated barn to the west of the [farmhouse,] and a white camper trailer sitting directly against the west side of the barn with no space in between and [] a light on in the camper." Id. at 31. The next day, Trooper Caplinger spoke with John Huffman, also an employee with Rural Electric, who had visited the Shirley property on September 7, 2006, in response to the earlier discovery by Lauber's subordinate. During his visit, Huffman observed two active electric meters on the property. Huffman determined that one of them ran electricity to the farmhouse, while the other, which Huffman reported as displaying the identification number "7030," had an extension cord connected to it that ran into the barn. Id. at 32.
Believing that his observations along with those of Huffman and Lauber's subordinate constituted probable cause to search for evidence of electricity theft, on September 13, 2006, Trooper Caplinger prepared an affidavit containing the foregoing information and requesting entry into the barn and the camper trailer to search for the 7030 electric meter, as well as other "items used to facilitate the theft of services including junction boxes, extension cords, electric wire, breaker boxes, service breakers, and items being used to facilitate the delivery of electric current to operate appliances/equipment." Id. A magistrate granted Trooper Caplinger's request the same day, and, later that afternoon, Trooper Caplinger and ten other troopers2 drove in a multi-vehicle caravan to the Shirley property to execute the warrant.
Trooper Caplinger arrived at the Shirley property one to three minutes after several troopers had entered the farmhouse. According to the trial court, these troopers entered by "us[ing] a battering ram to knock down the front door." Id. at 64. Once inside, the troopers found Shirley and Reynolds and observed numerous firearms, drug paraphernalia, counterfeit currency, and materials and equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine. Around the time the troopers entered the farmhouse, other troopers assigned to secure the rest of the property found Tungate inside the white camper trailer. After the three had been detained, Caplinger and several others entered the barn and observed numerous firearms, a truck and a motorcycle with altered VIN numbers, and materials and equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine. The troopers also discovered a marijuana plant and methamphetamine-related materials in the yard; materials and equipment used to manufacture methamphetamine in a "cave" that had been dug out along the bank of a nearby creek, Defendant's Ex. B at 58-59; and a tan camper next to the barn that Trooper Caplinger had not noticed during his September 11, 2006, drive-by of the property because it was not visible from the road.
Approximately three hours after executing the warrant, Trooper Caplinger sought and received another warrant authorizing him to enter the farmhouse, barn, and tan camper and seize the evidence the troopers had already observed. Trooper Caplinger's execution of the warrants yielded over 185 separately marked items of evidence.
As for seizing evidence of electricity theft, after the Shirley property had been secured, a Rural Electric employee removed the electric meter that had been previously identified as displaying the number "7030." The employee determined, however, that this meter had not been stolen—both Huffman and Lauber's subordinate had misread the identification number3—but nevertheless had been deactivated at some point by Rural Electric and later reactivated without authorization.
On September 15, 2006, the State charged the Defendants with several methamphetamine-related and theft offenses, among others.4 On November 1, 2006 Tungate filed a motion to suppress, and Reynolds followed suit nearly a year later. On April 22, 2008, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Defendants' motions, during which it heard testimony from Trooper Caplinger and admitted into evidence the warrants, Trooper Caplinger's affidavits supporting the warrants, and several deposition transcripts, including those of Lauber and Trooper Caplinger. On May 21, 2008, the trial court ordered that "the items seized by the State ... in arresting the Defendants ... and executing the two search warrants in this case shall be suppressed ...." Id. at 65. The State now appeals.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in relevant part that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." In determining whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant, "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Courts reviewing such a decision should determine whether the magistrate had a "substantial basis" to conclude that probable cause existed. Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)). "A substantial basis requires the reviewing court, with significant deference to the magistrate's determination, to focus on whether reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence support the determination of probable cause." State v. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d 949, 953 (Ind.2006). "Reviewing court" means not only the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, but also an appellate court's review of the trial court's ruling. Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence presented to the magistrate and not post hoc justifications for the search. Edwards v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1072, 1077 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).
We pause here to note that the foregoing standard of review is not the one the parties urge us to apply, claiming instead that the proper standard is whether the trial court's decision was contrary to law. This court has stated repeatedly that when the trial court grants a motion to suppress, the State is appealing from a negative judgment and bears the burden of establishing that the trial court's decision was contrary to law. See, e.g., State v. Rucker, 861 N.E.2d 1240, 1241 (Ind.Ct. App.2007), trans. denied; State v. Figgures, 839 N.E.2d 772, 776 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005), trans. denied; State v. Farber, 677 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied. The problem with this rule of application is that the State is not always appealing from a negative judgment when the trial court grants a motion to suppress. An appeal from a negative judgment occurs when the trial court denies relief to the party that had the burden of proof. See Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind.2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1164, 122 S.Ct. 1178, 152 L.Ed.2d 120 (2002). The State, however, does not always have the burden of proof when a defendant seeks to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Generally speaking, placement of the burden turns on whether the State obtained a warrant. See Malone v. State, 882 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). If so, the burden is on the defendant; otherwise, the State bears the burden of establishing that an exception to the warrant requirement applies. See id. With these principles in mind, we apply the "substantial basis" standard of review because the State obtained a warrant before conducting its search of the Shirley property and therefore is not appealing from a negative judgment. See Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 952-53 (...
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