State v. Filler, 2442-M

• Decision Date: 11 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 2442-M,2442-M
• Citation: 106 Ohio App.3d 731,667 N.E.2d 54
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. FILLER, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 731

106 Ohio App.3d 731

667 N.E.2d 54

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. FILLER, Appellee.

No. 2442-M.

Court of Appeals of Ohio Ninth District, Medina County.

Decided Oct. 11, 1995.

John J. Lohn, Medina Prosecutor, for appellant.

Marco, Marco & Bailey and Daniel J. Marco, Medina, for appellee.

REECE, Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, city of Medina, appeals the decision of the Medina Municipal Court granting defendant-appellee's motion to suppress evidence obtained by Medina Township and city of Medina police officers. We reverse and remand.

On April 23, 1994, two Medina Township officers observed defendant-appellee, Samuel S. Filler, operating a motor vehicle within the city of Medina in an erratic manner, committing numerous traffic violations. Specifically, Filler's vehicle failed to yield to the township cruiser's right of way, and the township officers observed Filler weaving, driving left of center, and making a wide right turn.

The township officers stopped Filler and immediately contacted the city of Medina Police Department for back-up. Upon arrival, Officer Thomas Carrel the Medina police officer dispatched to the scene, observed Filler behind the wheel of his vehicle. Officer Carrel also observed the two township officers outside their cruiser along with a rescue squad vehicle that was called to the scene.

Before approaching Filler, Officer Carrel was briefed by the township officers as to their reasons for the traffic stop. Upon speaking with Filler, Officer Carrel testified he noticed an odor of alcohol. Officer Carrel testified Filler then told him that he had consumed approximately three beers. After performing a number of standard field sobriety tests, and based on what the township officers told him, Officer Carrel determined Filler was under the influence of alcohol. Filler was consequently arrested by Officer Carrel for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

Prior to trial, Filler moved the trial court to suppress evidence obtained after he was stopped. He argued that probable cause did not exist for the initial stop. Filler also moved the trial court to dismiss the charges against him because the township officers were without jurisdiction to effectuate the traffic stop. The trial court treated the motion as a motion to suppress. The trial court found that the traffic stop by the township officers was unlawful because they violated R.C. 2935.03, and because none of the exceptions in R.C. 2935.03(D) were applicable. ¹ Thus, the trial court granted Filler's motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the township officers as a result of his initial detention, as well as all evidence obtained by the city of Medina police officer. The city of Medina appeals.

In its single assignment of error, the city of Medina argues that the evidence obtained by both city and township officers was improperly suppressed because the extraterritorial traffic stop did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The officers' conduct did not, therefore, invoke the exclusionary rule. We agree.

In order to invoke the exclusionary rule, the police conduct ordinarily must rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Kettering v. Hollen (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 235, 18 O.O.3d 435, 437-438, 416 N.E.2d 598, 600; Stow v. Riggenbach (1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 661, 663, 647 N.E.2d 246, 247-248; Barberton v. Smith (Feb. 10, 1988), Summit App. No. 13272, unreported, 1988 WL 17795. This court has repeatedly held that a violation of R.C. 2935.03(D) does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Stow, supra; State v. Batten (Nov. 10 1993), Summit App. No. 16279, unreported, at 5, 1993 WL 473814; State v. Szor (Dec. 26, 1990), Wayne App. No. 2581, unreported, at 4-5, 1990 WL 235962. In the present case we are not confronted with a question of constitutional magnitude.

"Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that an offense was committed." Barberton v. Smith (Feb. 10, 1988), Summit App. No. 13272, unreported, at 3, 1988 WL 17795, citing Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225-226, 13 L.Ed.2d 142, 145. At the trial court hearing, evidence was presented which would warrant a prudent officer to believe an offense had been committed. The township officers did observe Filler driving his vehicle in an erratic manner and violating traffic laws designed to promote safety. In the spirit of safety, Filler was stopped by the township officers and detained until the city of Medina police could arrive. There was no constitutional violation because reasonable suspicion existed to make the initial stop and there was probable cause for Filler's arrest. Therefore, based on this court's previous holdings in Riggenbach, Batten, and Szor, supra, the evidence should not have been suppressed by the trial court because the township officers' initiation of the stop outside of their jurisdiction did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

In his brief urging this court to affirm the trial court's suppression of evidence, Filler attempts to distinguish his case from our previous cases. However, this court is not persuaded by Filler's arguments and...