State v. Fillpot

• Decision Date: 18 December 1908
• Citation: 51 Wash. 223,98 P. 659
• Parties: STATE v. FILLPOT.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

98 P. 659

51 Wash. 223

STATE v. FILLPOT.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 18, 1908

Appeal from Supreme Court, Spokane County; D. C. Carey, Judge.

Charles Fillpot was convicted of murder, and appeals. Affirmed.

John L Wiley and H. Maxwell Brooks, for appellant.

R. M Barnhart, Fred C. Pugh, and A. J. Langhon, for the State.

CROW J.

The defendant, Charles Fillpot, having been charged with murder in the first degree and convicted, judgment and sentence of death were entered, and he has appealed.

The appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the information, in permitting the introduction of evidence, and in overruling his motion in arrest of judgment. The information charges as follows 'Comes now the prosecuting attorney, and charges said defendant as follows: That said defendant, Charles Fillpot alias Charles Williams, alias Will Myers, alias Will Dodson, on or about the 28th day of March, A. D. 1906, in the county of Spokane and state of Washington, purposely and of his deliberate and premeditated malice, and while engaged in the perpetration and attempt to perpetrate the crimes of robbery and burglary, killed N.M. Cole by then and there purposely and of his deliberate and premeditated malice beating and mortally wounding said Cole in some way and manner to the prosecuting attorney unknown.' In support of the above assignments of error, upon which he seems to base his main reliance for a reversal, the appellant contends that the facts stated do not constitute the crime of murder in the first degree or any other crime, that the allegations are obscure and indefinite, and that the information attempts to plead four distinct causes of action improperly joined, to wit, (1) the commission of murder in the first degree by premeditated killing and malice; (2) the commission of murder in the first degree by a killing in connection with the crimes of robbery and burglary without pleading the facts constituting the latter crimes; (3) the commission of robbery without pleading the facts constituting that crime; and (4) the commission of burglary without pleading the facts constituting that crime. Section 7035, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. (section 1554, Pierce's Code), defines murder in the first degree as follows: 'Every person who shall purposely, and of deliberate and premeditated malice, or in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any rape, arson, robbery, or burglary, or by administering poison, or causing the same to be done, kill another, shall be deemed guilty of murder in the first degree. * * *' The information not only charges the appellant with having killed N.M. Cole purposely and of deliberate and premeditated malice, which would be murder in the first degree, but also charges that he purposely killed Cole while he, the appellant, was engaged in the perpetration and attempt to perpetrate the crimes of robbery and burglary, which would also be murder in the first degree. Appellant concedes that proof of purposely killing while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate the crimes of robbery and burglary without any evidence of premeditation or malice would sustain the charge of murder in the first degree; but insists that the commission of, or attempt to commit, the included crimes of robbery and burglary, is made the basis of the charge of murder in the first degree in this case; that the clause of the information charging such included offenses is an important one as it relieves the state from the necessity of proving premeditation and malice; that the state should therefore be required to fully plead all the facts constituting such included offenses; that the use of the language of the statute in pleading them is insufficient, and that the information is not only bad for duplicity under section 6844, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. (section 2097, Pierce's Code), but that it is also otherwise insufficient in law. In support of these contentions appellant cites numerous authorities from other jurisdictions based upon common-law rules. We do not deem it necessary to discuss these citations, as the strict rules of common-law pleading do not obtain in this state. In passing upon the sufficiency of this information, we must measure it by the requirements of our own statutes. By section 6800, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. (section 2091, Pierce's Code), all forms of pleading in criminal actions heretofore existing are abolished in this state, while section 6850, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. (section 2103, Pierce's Code), provides that an information shall be sufficient if it can be understood therefrom. '* * * (6) that the act or omission charged as the crime is clearly and distinctly set forth in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended. * * *' In State v. Day, 4 Wash. 104, 106, 29 P. 984, this court in passing on the sufficiency of an information and in discussing these sections said: 'The ancient forms and technicalities of the common law, which subserved no purpose except to embarrass and impede the administration of justice, have been wisely discarded, and we now have a system of criminal pleading which neither disregards any of the substantial rights of the accused nor permits him to shield himself from just punishment by requiring the insertion in the indictment or information of allegations in nowise necessary to inform him of the 'nature and cause of the accusation against him,' but which under the old system were necessary to be alleged and proved, or an acquittal would result, though the fact of guilt were otherwise manifest. Under our statute an indictment or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the act or omission charged as the crime is clearly and distinctly set forth in ordinary and concise language without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended. * * *' State v. Womack, 4 Wash. 19, 29 P. 939; State v. Turner, 10 Wash. 94, 38 P. 864. Although the information in State v. Day, supra, which charged the crime of murder in the first degree, did not charge the defendant with purposely killing while engaged in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, one or more of the included crimes mentioned in the statute, yet we think the liberal rules of pleading announced in the opinion of this court in that case should be applied when we come to a consideration of the sufficiency of the information now before us. It is apparent that it charges but one crime, that of murder in the first degree. While it is true that the statute specifies more than one way in which that crime may be committed, and although the information following its language alleges that the appellant killed N.M. Cole purposely and...