State v. Fire
Decision Date | 29 November 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 69851-1.,69851-1. |
Citation | 145 Wash.2d 152,34 P.3d 1218 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Mink FIRE, a/k/a David Paul Mrowka, Respondent. |
Randall Keenan Gaylord, San Juan County Prosecutor, Friday Harber, Brett & Daugert, Philip james Buri, Bellingham, for Petitioner.
Nielsen, Broman & Assoc. James R. Dixon, Christopher Gibson, Seattle, Catherine E. Glinski, Manchester, for Respondent.
The State asks this court to review the Court of Appeals decision in State v. Fire, 100 Wash.App. 722, 724, 729, 998 P.2d 362 (2000), which reversed Mink Fire's convictions and remanded for a new trial because the trial court should have excused a potential juror for cause. The State asks this court to determine whether that juror should have been dismissed for cause and whether, where a defendant exercises a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause and the defendant subsequently exhausts all of his peremptory challenges, the remedy is automatic reversal without a further showing of prejudice. We find that even if that juror should have been dismissed for cause, Fire exercised one of his peremptory challenges to remove the juror, and there is no showing that a biased juror, against whom the peremptory challenge might have been used, sat on his panel. Following the reasoning in United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 307, 315-16, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000) and State v. Roberts, 142 Wash.2d 471, 517-18, 14 P.3d 713 (2000), we conclude that Fire did not lose a peremptory challenge, but exercised it. Therefore, he has not demonstrated prejudice and has not been deprived of any constitutional right. Without having to decide whether the juror should have been removed for cause, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for actions consistent with this opinion.
Fire was charged with three counts of child molestation in the first degree. During voir dire the prosecuting attorney asked if any of the jurors could not completely put aside what he or she had heard about the case outside of the courtroom. After no one answered, the prosecutor began to question Juror No. 8:
At that point the prosecuting attorney interrupted and indicated he would continue the conversation without the other jurors present. When Juror No. 8 was the sole juror present, the court asked him if he would like to say anything regarding reasons for sitting or not sitting on the jury.
. . . .
. . . .
JUROR NO. 8: ... I'm saying that reasonable—if reasonable has some leeway, 40, 60, I'd probably be on the 40 [side] on this particular kind of case instead of being in the middle. You know, I hate to, in something—a different subject matter, it would be completely different.
. . . .
In declining to excuse Juror No. 8 for cause, the court cited the juror's indication that he would be able to follow the instructions and the law. Fire's counsel later renewed his challenge to Juror No. 8 for cause, and the court once again declined to excuse him. Fire's counsel then exercised Fire's second peremptory challenge to excuse Juror No. 8 and subsequently exhausted his six peremptory challenges.
The jury found Fire guilty on November 5, 1998. On appeal Fire raised three issues including prosecutorial misconduct.3 The Court of Appeals held that Juror No. 8's responses indicated actual bias and that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to excuse him. Stating that it was bound by the decision in State v. Parnell, 77 Wash.2d 503, 508, 463 P.2d 134 (1969), the appeals court determined that the remedy is reversal; it remanded Fire's case for a new trial. In its petition for review the State raised only the issues of whether the court erred in not excusing Juror No. 8 and whether the remedy was correct. This court granted review on October 1, 2000.
At issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a challenge for cause to Juror No. 8 and whether, without a further showing of prejudice, reversal is the remedy for a trial court's error in not dismissing a potential juror for cause where the defendant later uses a peremptory challenge to remove that juror and exhausts his remaining challenges before the final selection of the jury. Following Caruso v. Local Union No. 690, 107 Wash.2d 524, 534-35, 730 P.2d 1299 (1987) and Roberts, we may determine the second issue without reaching the first. Thus we consider whether, even if Juror No. 8 should have been excused for cause, Fire has alleged a situation which requires reversal of his conviction to cure the error.
The United States Constitution does not provide a basis for granting relief to Fire. The central federal legal issue in Fire's case has been definitively resolved in United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792. That case is directly on point:
The Court focused on the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that Martinez-Salazar was "forced" to exercise a peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous for-cause refusal. Id. at 314, 120 S.Ct. 774. The Court reasoned that a hard choice is not the same as no choice; Martinez-Salazar chose to exercise a peremptory challenge because he did not want a particular person to sit on the jury. Id. at 315, 120 S.Ct. 774. Instead of allowing the juror to sit and pursuing a Sixth Amendment challenge on appeal following the conviction, the defendant chose instead to use his peremptory challenge curatively. Id. In removing the juror, Martinez-Salazar did not lose a peremptory challenge, but used it for what it was for: to help secure an impartial jury. Id. at 315-16, 120 S.Ct. 774. Martinez-Salazar, together with his codefendants, exercised 11 peremptory challenges, which is all he was entitled to under the rule. Id. at 315, 120 S.Ct. 774.
As the Court indicated, if a defendant believes that a juror should have been excused for cause and the trial court refused his for-cause challenge, he may elect not to use a peremptory challenge and allow the juror to be seated. After conviction, he can win reversal on appeal if he can show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the for-cause challenge.4
In Fire's case, even if Juror No. 8 should have been excused for cause, Fire exercised one of his peremptory challenges to remove him from the jury. Fire does not further show or even attempt to show that a biased juror sat on his panel. Thus, under the rule in Martinez-Salazar, Fire has not been deprived of any federal constitutional right.
Although the Court of Appeals in Fire recognized the existence and import of Martinez-Salazar, it stated it was bound by the decisions of this court. Fire, 100 Wash.App. at 727, 998 P.2d 362. After finding that Juror No. 8 should have been excused for cause, the Court of Appeals applied the rule in Parnell and reversed Fire's conviction. Id. at 729, 998 P.2d 362. The appeals court...
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