State v. Fix
| Decision Date | 10 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12–1068.,12–1068. |
| Citation | 830 N.W.2d 744 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Bryan Michael FIX, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Matt Jarvey, Legal Intern, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Amy Devine, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by VAITHESWARAN, P.J., and TABOR and MULLINS, JJ.
Iowa case law observes a one-death, one-homicide rule—prohibiting a trial court from entering judgments and imposing sentences for multiple homicide offenses if the defendant was convicted for killing only one person. Our supreme court's two applications of the rule have followed jury verdicts. See State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 567 (Iowa 1995); State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa 1972). The question in this case is whether by accepting a plea agreement that called for consecutive sentences to be imposed on two homicide offenses for one death, Bryan Fix waived the protection of the one-homicide rule.
Finding Fix did not relinquish his right to invoke the one-homicide rule by entering his guilty pleas, we annul and set aside the judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction for involuntary manslaughter.
On November 18, 2009, Stephanie Kloppenborg left her three children in the overnight care of her boyfriend Bryan Fix. Fix was the biological father of her two older children, but not the father of C.K., who was born in September 2009. Kloppenborg fed C.K., changed his diaper, and then left for work at 8:30 p.m. When she returned home the next morning, Fix met her on the stairs, telling her there was something wrong with the baby. C.K. was limp and gasping for air.
Doctors at University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics diagnosed C.K. with a large, hyperacute subdural hematoma, diffuse multilayered retinal bleeds, and eight rib fractures. The doctors opined the head injury occurred immediately before the infant became symptomatic, the morning of November 19, 2009. The doctors believed three of the eight rib fractures were inflicted two to three weeks earlier. C.K. died after being removed from life support on November 25, 2009. An autopsy showed the cause of death to be complications from head injuries sustained on November 19.
On December 9, 2009, the State prepared a three-count trial information charging Fix with murder in the first degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1, 707.2(2), and 707.2(5) (2009); child endangerment resulting in death, in violation of section 726.6(4); and child endangerment, multiple acts, in violation of section 726.6A.
Eight months later, the State and Fix entered a written memorandum of plea agreement, outlining the following charging concessions: count one was amended from first-degree murder, a class “A” felony, to involuntary manslaughter, a class “D” felony, which carried a five-year sentence; count two remained child endangerment resulting in death, a class “B” felony, which carried a fifty-year penalty; and count three was amended from multiple acts of child endangerment, a class “B” felony, to child endangerment resulting in serious injury, a class “C” felony, which carried a ten-year sentence. The parties agreed “the sentences are to run consecutively, for a total of 65 years.” The court's concurrence with the agreement was a condition of the acceptance of the plea. The county attorney, the defendant, and defense counsel all signed the agreement.
The court held a plea hearing on August 4, 2010. Fix personally acknowledged his understanding of the plea agreement, including the recommendation for consecutive sentences. Fix entered pleas of guilty to all three offenses, admitting that he “forcibly handled the child in a manner that resulted in the child receiving a subdural hematoma that resulted in the child's death.” Fix also acknowledged engaging in “physical action toward the child that resulted in the child sustaining fractures to the child's ribs.”
The district court signed a calendar entry on the same day, accepting the guilty pleas and indicating it would “embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the Plea Agreement or another disposition more favorable to the Defendant than that provided for in the Plea Agreement.”
At the September 2, 2010 sentencing hearing, the defense counsel told the court that “the plea agreement is pretty clear as to what the parties' position was with regard to sentencing.” Fix told the sentencing court he had nothing to say. The court noted the plea agreement called for consecutive sentences and both the State and the defendant agreed to that result. Based on the plea agreement, the court imposed consecutive terms for a total indeterminate sentence of sixty-five years.
On April 30, 2012, Fix filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, alleging count one (involuntary manslaughter) and count three (child endangerment resulting in serious injury) should have merged into count two (child endangerment resulting in death). The motion discussed the “impossibility test” for lesser included offenses, but did not mention the one-homicide rule. The State filed a resistance on May 3, 2012, alleging the three counts were for “three specific and different acts” and resulted from a favorable plea agreement. The court denied the motion on May 10, 2010, finding the offenses were “separate and distinct” and did not merge. Fix filed a pro se notice of appeal on May 31, 2012.
We review Fix's sentencing claim for legal error. See State v. Ruesga, 619 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa 2000) (). Fix contends to the extent his claim involves a deprivation of constitutional rights, our review would be de novo. Because we find the one-homicide rule to be independent of double jeopardy protections, we do not entertain that alternative standard of review.
III. AnalysisA. Arguments on Appeal
Under Iowa law, when a defendant is convicted of separate homicide counts involving a single victim, judgment can be entered and sentence can be imposed for only one homicide offense. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d at 567 (); Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d at 68 (). In holding that a defendant who kills one person cannot be convicted and sentenced for two separate homicides, Iowa follows the prevailing view among state courts.1See Ex parte Rice, 766 So.2d 143, 151–52 (Ala.1999) (collecting cases); Ervin v. State, 991 S.W.2d 804, 807–09 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (same).
In this appeal, Fix alleges the entry of judgment and imposition of sentence on both involuntary manslaughter and child endangerment resulting in death violated the one-homicide rule recognized in Wissing and Gilroy. He asks us to annul and set aside the judgment and sentence on his involuntary manslaughter conviction for unintentionally killing C.K. Because his actions resulted in only one death, he contends imposition of consecutive terms under the plea agreement was an illegal sentence. Fix also contends an illegal sentence is not subject to the usual requirements of error preservation.
The State does not contest error preservation, agreeing alleged sentencing errors need not be raised in the trial court. The State lobbies for an exception to the one-homicide rule in this plea-bargain case where Fix agreed to consecutive sentences and “received a benefit—a substantial charging concession—as a result.” The State asserts Fix waived the Gilroy rule by entering a voluntary plea agreement. The State relies on State v. Birkestrand, 239 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Iowa 1976), for the proposition that the protection against double punishment is a “waivable privilege.” The State urges recognizing such a waiver would prevent the defendant from “trifling with the courts by attempting to better [his plea] bargain through the appellate process.”
In his reply brief, Fix contends even if Birkestrand stands for the proposition that the Gilroy rule can be waived, waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right, and the prosecution bears the burden of affirmatively showing he intended to relinquish his protection from double punishment for a single homicide. Fix notes he did not have specific information about the potential waiver of the one-homicide rule before entering his guilty plea. Fix argues under State v. Woody, 613 N.W.2d 215, 218 (Iowa 2000), the parties may not rely on a plea agreement to uphold an illegal sentence, and the State is the party which “bears the consequences” of a faulty assumption that the bargained-for sentence was legal.
At oral argument, the State disagreed with Fix on the proper remedy if we determine the plea agreement did not waive the protections of the one-homicide rule. The State believes it should be allowed to reinstate the original charge of first-degree murder or negotiate a new plea with Fix.
B. History of Iowa's Single–Homicide Rule
In analyzing the parties' positions, it makes sense to start with the origin of our state's one-homicide rule. Gilroy appears to be the first Iowa case to adopt the principle that a court may not impose multiple judgments and sentences for homicide offenses arising from one death. That case, which predated Iowa's 1978 criminal code revision, involved one conviction for murder in the preparation of robbery and one conviction for premeditated murder for the same death. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d at 64. Although Gilroy did not challenge his sentences for both convictions either at trial or on appeal, our supreme court cited to two secondary sources—21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 546 and 24...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- State v. Ceretti
-
Noble v. Iowa Dist. Court for Muscatine Cnty., 17-0422
... ... MCDONALD, Judge. Defendant Brett Noble filed this direct appeal from the denial of his second motion to correct an illegal sentence. There is no appeal as a matter of right from the denial of a motion to correct illegal sentence. See State v. Propps , 897 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 2017). The supreme court ordered Nobles notice of appeal be treated as a petition for writ of certiorari and, at its discretion, granted the petition. The supreme court transferred the case to this court for disposition on the merits. The question presented is ... ...
- Shank v. State
- State v. Trombone, 15–1696.