State v. Flemming

• Decision Date: 03 April 2000
• Docket Number: 97-0073
• Citation: 19 S.W.3d 195
• Parties: STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ERIC FLEMMINGIN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

STATE OF TENNESSEE v ERIC FLEMMING

No. M1997-0073-SC-R11-CD

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

Decided April 3, 2000

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County No. 95-D-2513

Seth Norman, Judge

We granted the appeal in this case to decide (1) whether fists and feet are deadly weapons under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(5)(B); and (2) whether the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on criminal responsibility for facilitation of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery was reversible error. We conclude that fists and feet are not deadly weapons under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(5)(B). In addition, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on facilitation of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.

Tenn. R. App. P. 11 Permission to Appeal; Judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals Affirmed

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and Elizabeth B. Marney, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, State of Tennessee

Jeffrey A. DeVasher, Assistant Public Defender, and Wendy S. Tucker, Assistant Public Defender, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Eric Flemming

BARKER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDERSON, C.J., and DROWOTA, BIRCH, and HOLDER, JJ. joined.

OPINION

Eric Flemming, the appellee, was indicted for the especially aggravated robbery of Derrick Lamont Smith (the victim) in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-403 (1997). At trial, the State's proof of Flemming's participation in the beating and robbery of the victim rested on the testimony of two witnesses: Juanita Smith and Antonio Batey.

Juanita Smith testified that on June 1, 1995, she observed four men chasing and beating the victim until he fell to the ground. After he fell, the men continued beating the victim with their fists and kicking him. Smith watched as two of the men, Terrance Robinson and Antonio Batey, reached into the victim's pockets, removed items, and put them in their own pockets. When the victim was later examined at the hospital, he was not wearing rings and a watch that witnesses had testified he always wore. In addition, no money was found on the victim even though he had cashed his paycheck the previous day. Smith did not observe Flemming take any items from the victim.

Antonio Batey, who participated in the robbery of the victim, agreed to testify against Flemming in exchange for remaining in the juvenile court system. At trial, Batey stated that Flemming kicked the victim and beat him with his fists. In addition, Batey testified that he saw Flemming reach into the victim's pockets, though Batey stated that he did not see Flemming take any property from the victim.¹

The State argued at trial that Flemming was guilty of especially aggravated robbery because he used a deadly weapon (his fists and feet) to complete the crime. A jury found Flemming guilty of especially aggravated robbery and assessed a fine of $12,500.00. In addition, the court sentenced Flemming as a Range 1 standard offender to eighteen years confinement.

Flemming appealed contending that fists and feet are not deadly weapons and that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Flemming's conviction concluding that fists and feet are not within the statutory definition of "deadly weapon." In addition, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on facilitation of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery.² We then granted the State's petition for permission to appeal on these issues.

DISCUSSION

A. "Deadly Weapon" under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(5)

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(5) (1997) sets forth the definition of "deadly weapon."

"Deadly weapon" means:

(A) A firearm or anything manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury; or

(B) Anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury . . . .

The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the scope of the statutory definition is not so broad that it encompasses fists and feet. The State argues that this conclusion is contrary to this Court's decision in Morgan v. State, 415 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. 1967), as well as the plain language of the statute.

In Morgan, two defendants who used hard objects wrapped in socks to beat the victims of their armed robbery contended that they had not used deadly weapons in the course of their crime. In examining the defendants' contention, we characterized deadly weapons as falling into one of two categories: weapons that are "deadly per se, such as fire arms; and deadly by reason of the manner in which they are used." Id. at 882. This characterization, however, does not suggest that a defendant's body parts could be considered deadly weapons. We reject the State's interpretation of Morgan and agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that Morgan merely recognizes that some instruments or objects, though not traditionally considered deadly weapons, may become deadly weapons by the manner in which they are used.

The State also contends that fists and feet are deadly weapons within the plain language of section -106 defining "deadly weapon," in part, as "[a]nything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." According to the State, by incorporating the word "anything" into section -106, the General Assembly evinced its intent to include fists and feet within the scope of the definition of "deadly weapon."

We examine this argument in light of relevant principles of statutory construction. Provisions of the criminal code should be "construed according to the fair import of their terms, including reference to judicial decisions and common law interpretations, to promote justice, and effect the objectives of the criminal code." Tenn. Code Ann. 39-11-104 (1997). This Court's role in construing statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope. See State v. Butler, 980 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tenn. 1998). We determine legislative intent from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute's meaning. See id. Moreover, we will not apply a particular interpretation to a statute if that interpretation would yield an absurd result. See, e.g., State v. Legg, 9 S.W.3d 111, 116 (Tenn. 1999).

Were we to interpret the statute to be written broadly enough to include one's fists and feet within the statutory definition of "deadly weapon," it would lead to an absurd result-the merger of simple and aggravated offenses-which would contradict the expressed intent of the General Assembly. Within the criminal code, the General Assembly has divided many offenses into two categories: simple offenses and enhanced offenses which include aggravated offenses and especially aggravated offenses. A simple offense is composed of the crime's most basic elements. An aggravated offense, by contrast, is the simple offense accompanied by some other element, usually use of a deadly weapon or serious bodily injury sustained by a victim. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-102(1)(A)-(B), -304(a)(4)-(5) (1997). A combination of these other elements together with the simple offense typically comprises an especially aggravated offense. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-403(A) (1997).

The General Assembly's rationale for grading offenses in this manner is evident in the corresponding sentences that may be imposed for commission of offenses. For example, a defendant convicted of simple assault is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for which a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days and a fine of $2,500.00 may be imposed. See Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-101(a)(1)-(2) (1997), 40-35-111(e)(1) (1997). If, however, that defendant used a deadly weapon in committing the assault, the misdemeanor assault becomes a Class C felony, see Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-102(a)(1) (1997), and the defendant is subject to a sentence of between three and fifteen years and a fine up to $10,000.00. See id. 40-35-111(b)(3) (1997). Thus, the General Assembly has determined that the use of a deadly weapon in the course of an assault merits a penalty more severe than that for simple assault. Clearly, the grading of offenses in the criminal code reflects the General Assembly's intent to punish more harshly enhanced offenses.

The State argues that because fists and feet, in their manner of use or intended use, are capable of causing serious bodily injury, they are deadly weapons. It logically flows from this proposition that it is irrelevant whether or not fists or feet actually cause a serious bodily injury. Because they are capable of causing serious bodily injury, they are per se deadly weapons. If this is so, then the General Assembly's distinction between simple and enhanced offenses is nullified in some circumstances. For example, to prove aggravated assault, the State would need only show that, during the commission of a simple assault, the defendant displayed a deadly weapon. Under the State's broad definition of "deadly weapon," the defendant's fists and feet would inevitably be displayed. Thus, the defendant becomes both the perpetrator and the deadly weapon, the simple assault becomes aggravated assault, and the misdemeanor becomes a felony.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a...