State v. Fletcher
| Decision Date | 13 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 57988,57988 |
| Citation | 341 So.2d 340 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Oliver FLETCHER, Appellant. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
C. Alan Lasseigne, Thibodaux, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Francis Dugas, Dist. Atty., Walter K. Naquin, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
The defendant Fletcher was convicted of aggravated rape, La.R.S. 14:42, and sentenced to death. His appeal raises 23 assignments of error.
In addition to attacking the unconstitutionality of the death penalty and of the statute under which it was imposed, the chief defenses to the merit urged in the trial court (and reiterated here) involve: the alleged insanity of the defendant at the time of the trial; the alleged failure of the state to prove that the victim was 'prevented from resisting the act (rape) by threats of great and immediate bodily harm', La.R.S. 14:42(2) 1; and the defendant's alleged mistake of fact, La.R.S. 14:16, whereby he concluded that the victim consented to sexual intercourse.
The victim of the rape was at home with her three year old son. She was six months pregnant with her second child. Her husband had just been transferred out of town.
According to her testimony, the defendant Fletcher appeared at her bed in the early hours of the morning, while it was still dark. She commenced screaming, and her son beside her was crying. Fletcher put his hand over her mouth and with the other arm, held both down on the bed. She threw a glass at him and tried to hit him, and her boy hit him and tried to bite him.
Fletcher threatened to punch this pregnant woman in the stomach. Because she was afraid for her unborn child and of harm to her and to her boy, she stated, she finally submitted to his demand for sexual intercourse. Immediately after he left the house, she drove to her babysitter's home five minutes away and, hysterical and crying, told her of the incident. The ladies then immediately called the police.
From the state's evidence thus summarized, the trial jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt (a) that the defendant's threats of great bodily harm prevented the victim's further resistance, and (b) that the defendant was not justified by any 'reasonable ignorance of fact or mistake of fact', La.R.S. 14:16, to conclude that the victim consented to the act. We therefore find no merit to Assignments 18 (motion for directed verdict of acquittal) and 23 (motion for a new trial), which urge that no evidence at all disputes factual contentions of the defendant to the contrary.
Likewise, with regard to the defense of insanity at the time of the offense, La.R.S. 14:14, there was substantial medical evidence that the accused, although mentally retarded (borderline; IQ 72), was legally sane in the sense that he was capable 'of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question', La.R.S. 14:14. See State v. Berry, 324 So.2d 822 (La.1975). Accordingly, we find no merit to Assignment 21, which contends that a new trial should have been ordered because of the lack of an evidentiary basis for the jury finding of present sanity.
Similarly, because of the substantial medical evidence to the contrary reasonably accepted by the trial court as preponderating, we find no merit to the defendant's contention that the trial court erred in finding no lack of mental capacity in him to assist in his defense. La.C.Cr.P. art. 641. See State v. Morris, 340 So.2d 195 (La.1976). This contention is urged in an assignment based on this ground, taken to the finding of a sanity hearing, to the denials of new trial and arrest of judgment, and to the sentencing. Assignment 1.
Assignment 21 also urges that the accused should have the right to appellate review of the jury's factual finding of sanity at the time of the offense. Assignment 11 raises the issue that Louisiana's statutory scheme for the trial of the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity deprives him of due process and equal protection in violation of constitutional right; one reason advanced is that there is no statutory scheme to ascertain, separately from the determination of guilt, the number of jurors who specifically voted against the accused's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Without summarizing the subtle arguments advanced by the accused's counsel, it is sufficient to state that we find no constitutional requirement for appellate review of the defense of insanity at the time of the crime, nor for separately polling the jury as to this factual defense. The unanimous general verdict of the jury, properly instructed as to factual defense of insanity, constitutes a factual rejection of this defense as well as of the others urged.
The appellate jurisdiction of this court to review this factual issue is limited to issues of law by our state constitution, La.Const., Art. 5, Section 5(B). We are cited to no persuasive authority that this historic limitation of review, common to that of many American jurisdictions, offends constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
The defendant moved to suppress his confession on the ground it was not voluntarily made.
The evidence on the motion, taken outside the presence of the jury, supports the trial court's finding that, beyond a reasonable doubt, it was freely and voluntarily made, without coercion or inducement. We do not find error in the trial court's finding credible the police officers' testimony to this effect and in its evaluation of the accused's testimony to the contrary as not credible. The evidence also supports a reasonable basis for the trial court's finding that, under accepted legal standards, the accused had the mental capacity fully to understand his act and voluntarily to give the confession.
We therefore find no merit in Assignment 4.
Before the confession was given, the defendant had first informed the police officers that the victim had voluntarily admitted him to her home and had consented to sexual relations. Early in the trial, the state informed the defendant of its intention to introduce this initial exculpatory version of the incident into evidence. As we read the transcript, the defendant's counsel at that time did not object and in fact acceded to the state's plan to introduce this testimony as being favorable to the accused. See Vol. I, 89--98, especially 89--93. No objection was made when evidence to this effect was subsequently introduced before the jury.
Assignment 5 is based upon the post-trial contention that the oral pre-confession version of the incident was improperly introduced, since beyond the scope of the state's pre-trial notice of its intent to introduce the written confession. La.C.Cr.P. art. 768. This closely related preliminary oral statement, taken immediately preceding and in connection with the written confession, can probably be regarded as fairly within the scope of the state's notice. In any event, however, the accused's failure to object to it before its introduction waives a subsequent claim of error in this regard. La.C.Cr.P. art. 841.
Assignment 6 relates to the denial of a motion to quash the indictment. The motion is based on the alleged arbitrary and unlawful exclusion from the general venire of all persons who had been summoned for grand or petit jury duty in the preceding two years. It is contended that only those jurors who actually served as civil or criminal jurors should have been excluded from the succeeding venires.
The evidence reveals that the grand and petit jury venires are chosen in the parish of the trial as follows:
In a large hopper are placed a great number of individual names of randomly selected individuals representing a fair cross-section of the population. From this large hopper, a general venire of 1,000 names is randomly selected. La.C.Cr.P. art. 408. It is periodically supplemented to that number, La.C.Cr.P. art. 410, to replace the previously drawn grand jury venire of fifty persons, La.C.Cr.P. art. 411, and the previously drawn petit jury venires (in this case six venires of 75 persons each), La.C.Cr.P. art. 416.
Subsequently, a grand jury is randomly selected from the grand jury venire. La.C.Cr.P. art. 413. Also, prospective petit jurors are indiscriminately drawn from petit jury venires, La.C.Cr.P. art. 784, when the venires are called to serve during criminal jury-trial weeks, and tendered for examination, challenge, or acceptance. La.C.Cr.P. arts. 786--90, 795--800.
No arguable issue is shown that the procedures thus far described did not result in a jury chosen at random from a fair cross-section of the population.
The testimony further shows, however, that once prospective jurors were called to serve on either a grand or petit jury venire, they were not placed back into the hopper for two years (after which time they were again returned to the hopper). They were excluded from further jury service for two years, whether or not they were actually chosen to serve on the grand or petit juries selected from their respective venires.
The defendant claims that such exclusion from service during that period was arbitrary and not in compliance with law. He bases this contention upon La.C.Cr.P. art. 410(1), which directs jury commissioners to exclude those persons who 'have Served as civil or criminal jurors', as well as upon Rule XXV, Section 3(f) (1974) of this court (now Rule XXV, Section 4 (1976) 2), which likewise provides for exclusion of those 'who have Served as grand or petit jurors . . . during a period of two years immediately preceding their selection for jury service.'
The defendant presents a close issue. The language of the statute and the rule are...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Rivera
...criminal sex laws and all have upheld rape statutes against constitutional challenges. 5 Moore v. Cowan, 560 F.2d. at 1303; State v. Fletcher, 341 So.2d 340 (La.1976); State v. Witt, 310 Minn. at 219, 245 N.W.2d at 618; State v. Craig, 169 Mont. at 156, 545 P.2d at 653; People v. Reilly, 85......
-
People v. Foster
...more attractive by minimizing the burden on those whose personal lives are disrupted by the obligations of jury service (State v. Fletcher, 341 So.2d 340 [La.]; Governor's Memorandum, 1954 McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y., p. 1385). Unlike challenges founded on claims of juror bias--where th......
-
State v. Drew
...14:43.1) and the crime of aggravated rape with which he was charged. This argument was previously rejected by this court in State v. Fletcher, 341 So.2d 340 (La.1976): (La.R.S. 14:43.1) merely created a lesser degree of the crime, permitting a responsive verdict, La.C.Cr.P. art. 814, subd. ......
-
State v. Ruple
...Cir.1980); Joensen v. Wainwright, 615 F.2d 1077 (5th Cir.1980); Martin v. Blackburn, 521 F.Supp. 685 (E.D.La.1981); and State v. Fletcher, 341 So.2d 340 (La.1976). As long as the appellate procedures granted by a state are indiscriminately available to all persons convicted, a state may lim......